



Daily Report

East Europe

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Tuesday
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NOTICE TO READERS: The processing indicators appearing in brackets at the start of each item in this publication have been changed. All indicators now begin with "FBIS" to make the material more easily identifiable in databases. Some also indicate whether the item has been translated from the vernacular or transcribed from English.

All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

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Newspaper Publishes Text of Draft Constitution

AU1410182194 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in
Albanian 6 Oct 94 pp 1-3

["Draft Constitution of the Republic of Albania"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Part I—Fundamental Principles

Article 1—The Form of the State

The Republic of Albania is a sovereign, democratic, and unitary state. Its territory is indivisible and inalienable.

Article 2—Sovereignty

1. Sovereignty belongs to the people, who exercise it through their representative bodies and by referendum.
2. Nobody apart from bodies explicitly defined in this constitution can exercise sovereignty in the name of the Republic of Albania.
3. The representative bodies are elected by free, general, and direct ballot.

Article 3—The Principle of Legality

1. All the activity of the state is conducted on the basis of the constitution and the laws in force.
2. The exact observation of legal regulations is equally binding on all state bodies, political parties, associations, and organizations, and all other physical and legal persons.

Article 4—The Division of State Power

The organization of the state is based on the principle of the separation of powers into the legislative, executive, and juridical.

Article 5—Political Pluralism

The life of society in the Republic of Albania is based on the principle of political pluralism.

Article 6—The Political Parties

1. The parties take part in and assist the formation and expression of the will of the people. They may be created freely in accordance with the law. Their organization and activity must accord with democratic principles.
2. The activity of parties that endanger the existence of the Republic of Albania or the institutions of democracy is forbidden.
3. Political parties on a religious or ethnic basis are not allowed in Albania.

Article 7—The Secular Character of the Albanian State

1. Religion is separated from the state in the Republic of Albania.
2. The state guarantees the freedom of religious beliefs.

3. Religious activity that endangers the existence of the Republic of Albania or of democratic institutions and the use of religion for political purposes are forbidden.

4. The heads of large religious communities must be Albanian citizens born in Albania and permanently resident there for the past 20 years.

Article 8—Care for Albanians Living Abroad

1. The Republic of Albania defends the rights of its citizens temporarily or permanently resident beyond its borders.
2. It supports the recognition and defense of the human and national rights of the Albanian population living beyond the state borders of the republic, in accordance with international documents and agreements.

Article 9—International Relations

In its foreign relations, the Republic of Albania defends its national independence and interests, and applies a policy of cooperation, peace, and international security.

Article 10—International Law and Domestic Legislation

1. The Republic of Albania recognizes and respects the generally accepted principles and standards of international justice, as well as the international treaties and agreements to which it is party.

Article 11—The Duties of the Armed Forces

The Armed Forces ensure the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Albania and defend its territorial integrity and constitutional order.

Article 12—The National Economy and Forms of Ownership

1. The economy of the Republic of Albania is based on the principles of the market economy.
2. Ownership is private and public.
3. The exercise of free, private initiative is guaranteed by law. h3

Article 13—The Official Language

Albanian is the official language in the Republic of Albania.

Article 14—The Coat of Arms

The coat of arms of the Republic of Albania is a black two-headed eagle placed on a shield with a red field. Skenderbeg's helmet is placed above the coat of arms.

Article 15—The Flag

The State flag of the Republic of Albania is a red field with a black two-headed eagle in its center.

Article 16—The National Anthem

The national anthem of the Republic of Albania is "United Around Our Flag."

Article 17—The National Holiday

The national holiday of the Republic of Albania is Flag Day, 28 November.

Article 18—The Capital City

Tirana is the capital city of the Republic of Albania.

Part II—Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms**Article 19—The Right to Life**

1. Every person's right to live is protected by law.
2. Nobody can be deprived of his life, except under the execution of a court sentence for an extremely serious and intentionally committed crime, for which the law provides the death penalty.
3. Youths under the age of 18 at the time when their crime was committed and women cannot be subjected to the death penalty.

Article 20—Freedom of Expression of Opinion

1. Freedom of expression of opinion is inviolable.
2. No law can be issued that restricts in advance freedom of speech, of the press, and of other communication media, except in order to protect the interests of children or human lives.
3. Everyone has the right to express opinions in speech, in writing, or through any other medium of communication, but is answerable under the law for the abuse of this right.
4. Nobody can be denied the right to be informed.
5. The exercise of these rights and freedoms cannot be restricted, except in cases provided for by the law, and which are considered as necessary for the interests of national security, the protection of public safety and order, the prevention of crime, the defense of health, morals, or the honor and rights of others, the prevention of the dissemination of information given in confidence, or in order to guarantee the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

Article 21—The Prohibition of Torture

Nobody can be submitted to torture or to inhuman or humiliating punishment or treatment.

Article 22—The Prohibition of Forced Labor

Nobody can be called upon to do forced labor, except under the execution of a court sentence, during military service, or in the course of service necessitated by a state of emergency or natural disaster threatening people's lives and health.

Article 23—Freedom and Personal Security

1. Human freedom and security are inviolable.
2. Nobody can be detained or arrested without adequate evidence.
3. Nobody can be detained for more than 48 hours.
4. The detainee or person under arrest must be informed immediately of the reason for his detention or arrest and within 48 hours must appear before a judge, who will issue a decision within 48 hours.
5. Every detainee or person under arrest must be told at the moment of his detention or arrest that he is not obliged to make any statement and has the right to communicate immediately with a lawyer.
6. The person under arrest has the right to a court appeal against his arrest.
7. The maximum period of detention on remand is defined by law.

Article 24—The Prohibition of Unlawful Convictions

1. Nobody can be accused or declared guilty of a crime that was not considered a crime under the law at the time when the act was committed.
2. No punishment can be meted out that is in excess of that provided for by the law at the time when a crime was committed.
3. Concessions made in the penal code have a retroactive effect.

Article 25—Presumption of Innocence

Nobody can be considered guilty until his guilt has been proved by a court verdict in a final form.

Article 26—Guarantees of Penal Procedure

During criminal procedures, nobody can be deprived of the right:

- a) to be informed immediately and in detail about the accusation against him;
- b) to have adequate time and facilities to prepare his own defense;
- c) to have the free services of a translator, if he does not speak or understand Albanian;
- d) to defend himself or to be defended with the assistance of legal defense counsel chosen by himself, to communicate freely and privately with this counsel, and to be guaranteed defense by a lawyer free of charge, if he does not possess sufficient funds;
- e) to ask questions of witnesses that are present and to demand the appearance of witnesses, experts, and other persons and the submission of material evidence that may elucidate the facts.

Article 27—Freedom From Any Obligation To Admit Guilt

Nobody can be obliged to testify against himself or to admit his own guilt.

Article 28—The Inadmissibility of Illegal Evidence

Nobody can be declared guilty on the basis of evidence collected in an illegal way.

Article 29—The Right To Be Heard in Court

Nobody can be denied the right to be heard in court before being convicted.

Article 30—The Prohibition of Being Tried Twice for the Same Offense

Nobody can be tried or convicted more than once for the same offense, except when the retrial of a case is decided upon by a higher court.

Article 31—The Right to Appeal

Everybody has the right to appeal to a higher court against a court decision.

Article 32—The Right to Rehabilitation and Compensation

1. Nobody can be denied the right to rehabilitation and compensation in accordance with the law, if he has suffered because of irregularities in the course of justice or because of an illegal administrative act.

2. Everybody has the right to compensation in accordance with the law for damage he suffers from the acts of others.

3. No person under arrest or imprisonment can be denied the right to humane treatment and moral rehabilitation.

Article 33—The Inviolability of Private Life and Personal Dignity

1. Private life and personal dignity cannot be violated.

2. Data about a person's private life may only be collected with his permission, when it is necessary to investigate a crime, or with the approval of the responsible state body as defined by law, when necessary for national security. The collection, handling, and ultimate use of personal data, as well as the control and preservation of the secrecy of these data, are regulated by law.

3. Nobody can be denied the right of access to the data collected concerning him, except in cases in which a court decision exists to protect the interests of criminal procedures or national security.

4. The use of personal data for purposes other than those for which they were collected is prohibited.

Article 34—Privacy of the Home and the Individual

1. The home is inviolable. A home can be entered without the permission of the person dwelling in it only following a court decision in cases provided for by law, or, without such a decision, in order to avert an immediate danger to people's lives and health or to property, when a crime is being committed, or immediately after it has been committed.

2. Nobody can be submitted to a personal search except on entering or leaving the territory of the state or in order to avert an immediate threat to public security. Personal searches may be carried out only by the state authorities defined by law.

Article 35—Privacy of Correspondence

There can be no encroachment on the privacy of correspondence or other means of private communication except following a court decision in order to protect the interests of criminal procedure, or with the approval of the responsible state body defined by law, when this is necessary for national security.

Article 36—Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion

1. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is inviolable.

2. Everybody is free to change his religion or convictions and to exercise them individually or collectively in public and private life through religious denominations, in education, or in the performance of practices and ceremonies.

3. The freedom to exercise religious beliefs and convictions cannot be restricted, except in cases provided for by law, involving measures vital for the interests of public security, the protection of public order, health, morality, and human rights and freedoms.

Article 37—Election Rights

1. Every citizen over the age of 18 possesses election rights, with the exception of citizens no longer of sound mind.

2. Persons under arrest and persons serving a prison sentence possess only the right to vote.

3. Voting is individual, equal, and secret.

Article 38—The Right to Organize

1. Nobody can be denied the right to collective organization for any legal purpose.

2. Restrictions to the exercise of this right may be defined by law for public service employees.

Article 39—The Right to Assembly

1. Peaceful and unarmed assemblies cannot be restricted.

2. Gatherings in public squares and thoroughfares may be held with the prior permission of the responsible authority, which may fail to allow them only for good reasons involving a danger to public order and security.

Article 40—The Right to Mobility

1. Everybody has the right to choose his place of residence and to move freely in any part of the territory of the state, except in cases where restrictions are imposed by law for reasons of health or public security.

2. Everybody may freely travel abroad and return.

Article 41—The Prohibition of Deportation and Extradition

1. No Albanian citizen can be deported.

2. Extradition is permitted only when explicitly provided for in international agreements to which the Republic of Albania is a party.

3. The collective deportation of foreigners is forbidden. Individual foreigners may be deported under conditions defined by law.

Article 42—Citizenship

1. Nobody can be deprived of Albanian citizenship or the right to surrender citizenship without his agreement.

2. Conditions for the acquisition and surrender of citizenship are regulated by law.

Article 43—Equality Before the Law

Everybody is equal before the law, regardless of sex, race, ethnicity, language, religion, economic and social position, political convictions, or parentage.

Article 44—The Rights of National Minorities

1. Persons belonging to national minorities have the right to exercise fundamental human rights and freedoms in complete equality under the law. They have the right to freely express, preserve, and develop their ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic identity, to learn or be taught in their mother tongue, and to join in organizations and associations for the protection of their interests and identity.

2. Nationality is defined on the basis of internationally accepted norms.

Article 45—The Right to Private Property and Inheritance

1. Nobody can be denied the right to possess private property in his own right or together with others, as well as the right to inherit. The acquisition, enjoyment, and sequestration of property and the right to inheritance are regulated by law.

2. Nobody's property can be expropriated except in the public interest and against full compensation.

Article 46—The Right to Labor

Each person has the right to earn his livelihood by lawful work which he himself has chosen or accepted. He is free to choose his profession, workplace, and manner of professional qualification.

Article 47—Trade Union Freedom

Employees have the right to freely associate in trade union organizations in defense of their work and social security interests.

Article 48—The Right to Strike

1. The right of employees to strike in pursuit of improved working conditions, pay, or any other benefit from their work cannot be restricted.

2. The conditions and regulations for the exercise of this right as well as guarantees in order to ensure indispensable social services are defined by law.

Article 49—The Right to Social Security and Assistance

1. Everybody has the right to social security in old age or when unable to work, according to a system approved by law.

2. Employees left without work for reasons unconnected with their own will have the right to recompense under conditions provided for by law.

Article 50—Marriage and the Family

1. Everybody who has reached marriageable age has the right to freely select a spouse and to create a family. Marriage and the family enjoy the special protection of the state.

2. Marriage and divorce are regulated by law.

Article 51—The Protection of Women and Children

1. Children, young people, pregnant women, and young mothers have the right to the special protection of the law.

2. Children born out of wedlock enjoy exactly the same rights as children born in wedlock.

Article 52—Health Care

1. All persons enjoy an equal right to health care from the state.

2. Compulsory medical treatment can be carried out solely for the patient's benefit and in cases defined by the law.

3. Nobody can be subjected to a medical or scientific experiment without his consent.

Article 53—The Right to Education

1. Everybody has the right to free education lasting not less than eight years.

2. General secondary education is open to everybody.
3. Entry into secondary-level vocational training and higher education is governed solely by professional criteria.
4. Schoolchildren and students also have the right to be educated at private schools.
5. The autonomy of universities is guaranteed.

Article 54—Freedom of Creativity and the Right to Intellectual Property

1. Each person enjoys freedom of creativity in the fields of science, technology, literature, and the arts.
2. An author's rights are protected by law.

Article 55—The Right of Petition

1. Everybody, either individually or together with others, has the right to submit requests, complaints, and criticisms to the responsible state bodies.

Article 56—Due Legal Process

Freedom, property, or rights admitted by law cannot be encroached upon without due legal process.

Article 57—The Rectification of Justice Through the Courts

Nobody whose rights recognized under this constitution have been violated can be denied the rectification of justice through the courts.

Article 58—The Guarantee of a Fair Trial

1. Nobody can be deprived of the right to a fair, public, and fast trial by a competent, independent, and impartial court.
2. The presence of the public and the information media may be restricted during a trial, when the interests of public order or morality, national security, the private lives of the parties concerned, or of justice demand it.

Article 59—The Temporary Limitation of Rights

The exercise of specific rights may be temporarily limited by law when war or a state of emergency is declared, with the exception of the rights provided for by this constitution under Articles 19 (The Right to Life), 20 (Freedom of the Expression of Opinion), 21 (The Prohibition of Torture), 24 (The Prohibition of Unlawful Convictions), 26 (Guarantees of Penal Procedure), 27 (Freedom From Any Obligation To Admit Guilt), 36 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion), 43 (Equality Before the Law), 57 (The Rectification of Justice Through the Courts), and 58 (The Guarantee of a Fair Trial).

Part III—High-Level State Bodies

A. Legislature

Article 60—Its Role and Structure

1. Legislative power is exercised by a legislature which consists of one chamber of 140 deputies.
2. The electoral system is defined by the law.

Article 61—Length of Mandate

1. The legislature is elected for four years.
2. This mandate may be extended with the approval of the president of the republic only in case of war or a state of emergency and as long as these circumstances continue.
3. A new legislature is elected no later than 60 days after the expiry of the mandate or dissolution of the previous legislature.
4. A legislature's mandate continues until the first meeting of a new legislature.

Article 62—The Sessions

1. The legislature is summoned to its first meeting by the president of the republic no later than 20 days after the day on which the elections are concluded.
2. The legislature conducts its annual proceedings in two sessions. The first session is opened on the third Monday in January, and the second session is opened on the first Monday in September.
3. The legislature meets in an extraordinary session when summoned by the president of the republic, one-third of its deputies, or the prime minister.

Article 63—Conditions for the Election of Deputies

Every Albanian citizen, permanently resident in Albania for at least the previous two years, and who enjoy electoral rights, may be elected a deputy.

Article 64—The Incompatibility of a Deputy's Seat With Other Posts

1. The occupation of a deputy's seat is incompatible with any other state office apart from that of a member of the government.
2. A deputy's rights and duties are defined by law.

Article 65—The Nature of a Deputy's Representation

A deputy represents the entire people and is not bound by any other obligatory mandate.

Article 66—A Deputy's Immunity

1. A deputy enjoys immunity. He cannot be subjected to criminal prosecution except with the approval of the

legislature on the basis of a request from the procurator-general. A deputy may be subjected to criminal prosecution without this approval only when he is caught in the flagrant commission of a serious crime.

2. A deputy cannot be called to account for his views expressed during the exercise of his function, or for a vote he has cast.

Article 67—The Legislature's Internal Organization

1. The legislature elects from among its members its chairman and his deputies, permanent and temporary commissions, and the bureau of the interlegislative group.

2. The legislature functions according to procedures it establishes.

Article 68—The Public Character of Its Sessions and the Presence of a Majority

1. The legislature's sessions are open. The legislature may hold closed sessions at the request of the president of the republic, the prime minister, or one-fifth of the deputies, when a majority of all the deputies have voted for it.

2. The legislature may conduct its proceedings when more than one-half of the deputies are present.

Article 69—The Approval of Laws

1. Laws and other legislative acts are considered approved when more than one-half of the deputies present, but no fewer than one-third of the deputies, have voted for them.

2. Voting is individual.

Article 70—Interpellations and Questions

Deputies have the right to hold interpellations and to put questions to the prime minister and the ministers according to schedules and regulations defined by the procedures.

Article 71—The Presence of Members of the Government

1. Members of the government have the right to take part in every meeting of the legislature and its commissions. Following a submitted request, they must be given a priority hearing.

Article 72—Legislative Prerogatives

The legislature:

1. approves, changes, and revokes laws;

2. examines and approves the draft state budget and the report on the implementation of the preceding budget. Any further law involving new expenditure must define the source for this expenditure,

3. decides on the holding of referendums. No referendum is permitted for the revocation of laws prescribing taxation, laws on the state budget, laws proclaiming amnesties, or normative acts authorizing the ratification of international treaties,

The manner of holding a referendum is defined by law.

4. elects and discharges the president of the republic.

5. approves the prime minister and the program of the government, and controls the government's activity.

6. elects the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the procurator-general and his deputies.

7. issues amnesties.

8. declares partial and general mobilization, a state of emergency, and a state of war in case of armed aggression against the Republic of Albania, or when this is necessary in order to fulfill obligations arising out of international treaties.

9. ratifies and renounces by law:

a) treaties of a political or military character;

b) treaties or agreements relating to the borders of the Republic of Albania;

c) treaties or agreements concerning fundamental human rights and freedoms;

d) treaties entailing financial obligations for the state or legislative changes;

e) other treaties or agreements explicitly stating that they must be ratified or renounced by the legislature.

Article 73—Legislative Initiatives

1. Legislative initiatives are the property of the president of the republic, the government, every deputy, and 20,000 electors.

2. Only the government may submit to the legislature bills with financial implications.

Article 74—The Procedure for Discussing and Voting on Laws

1. Every bill put before the legislature is first examined by the relevant commissions, which submit their amendments and views. After being discussed by the legislature, the bill is subjected to no less than two votes.

2. The legislature may define in its procedure a different method for the examination of individual bills.

Article 75—The Promulgation of a Law

1. A law is considered promulgated when the president of the republic has not exercised his veto within 15 days after the day on which it is submitted to him.

2. The president of the republic may return a law for reexamination only once. In this case, a majority of the total number of deputies must vote for the approval of the law.

Article 76

A law comes into effect 15 days after its publication in the FLETORJA ZYRTARE [Official Gazette], except in cases in which a different date is laid down by law.

Article 77

In cases of the declaration of a state of war or a state of emergency, the legislature may decide that a law comes into effect immediately after it is reported by the mass media of communication.

B. The President of the Republic

Article 78—The President's State Position and Personal Conditions

1. The president of the republic is head of the state and represents the unity of the people.
2. Only an Albanian citizen resident in Albania for no less than 10 years previously and over the age of 40 can be elected president of the republic.

Article 79—The Election of the President

1. The president of the republic is elected by the legislature by secret ballot and by a majority of two-thirds of the votes of all the deputies. When this majority is not achieved in a first ballot, a second ballot is held, in which the president is elected by an absolute majority of the votes of all the deputies.
2. Every presidential candidate is proposed to the legislature by a group of no fewer than 30 deputies. A deputy may not take part in more than one of the groups proposing presidential candidates.
3. When there is more than one candidate for president of the republic, the second ballot is held with only the two candidates who have gained the largest number of votes in the first ballot. The candidate who wins the absolute majority of votes is considered to be elected.
4. If the president is not elected even at the second ballot, a third ballot is held. If no candidate achieves an absolute majority even at the third ballot, the president dissolves the legislature. New elections will be held within (? 30) days. The new legislature elects as president of the republic the candidate who wins the most votes.

Article 80—The President's Mandate

1. The president of the republic is elected for five years with the right to be reelected only once. The election of a new president of the republic takes place no later than 30 days after the expiry of the mandate.

2. The mandate of the president of the republic can be extended only when the legislature cannot meet because of war or a state of emergency.

3. The president of the republic, having been elected by the legislature, takes the relevant oath before the legislature and embarks on his duties, but not before the outgoing president's mandate expires.

Article 81—Incompatibility With Other Posts

The function of president of the republic is incompatible with any other state or public post and with the post of party chairman.

Article 85—Attributes in the Field of Defense

The president of the Republic of Albania is the commander-in- chief of the Armed Forces and chairman of the National Security Council.

Article 86—The National Security Council

1. The National Security Council is created in order to direct, organize, and mobilize all the country's forces and resources in the defense of the homeland.
2. The composition of the National Security Council is approved by the People's Assembly on the proposal of the chairman of the National Security Council.

C. The Government

Article 87—Its Role and Manner of Formation

1. The government determines and directs the policy of the state and exercises general leadership of the state administration.
2. The prime minister is appointed by the president of the republic and is approved by the legislature. Ministers are proposed by the prime minister and approved by the president of the republic.
3. If the prime minister appointed by the party that has gained the most votes is not approved, the president of the republic appoints a prime minister from the second-largest party according to the number of seats in the legislature. If the prime minister is still not approved, he is appointed from the third-largest party in the largest. If it still remains impossible to approve a prime minister, the president of the republic dissolves the legislature. New elections are held within 30 days. In order to prepare the new elections, the president of the republic creates a working government with representatives of all the parties represented in the legislature.

Article 88—Respective Oaths and Start of Mandate

1. The prime minister and the ministers take their respective oaths individually in front of the president of the republic.
2. The government's mandate begins on the day this oath is taken and continues until a new government takes its oath.

Article 89—Vote of Confidence

The government must win a vote of confidence from the legislature within 10 days of taking its oath.

Article 90—Composition

1. The government is composed of the prime minister, his deputies, the ministers, and persons equal to them.
2. The prime minister and the members of the government may not exercise any other state duty or private activity, apart from the duties of deputy.

Article 91—Principal Prerogatives

The governments:

1. issues decisions, orders, and instructions on the basis of the laws and in pursuit of their enforcement. They are signed by the prime minister and, when they are of a normative character, are published in the FLETORJA ZYRTARE;
2. directs and controls the activities of the ministries and other central institutions of the state administration;
3. directs activities for the performance of national defense duties, on the basis of an in pursuit of the enforcement of decisions of the National Security Council;
4. coordinates and supervises the activities of local authorities of the state administration;
5. drafts economic and social programs for the country's development and the state budget, besides coordinating, disciplining, and controlling the state finances and the monetary and credit system;
6. ensures the preservation and protection of the environment, appropriate working conditions, and protection for the health of the population;
7. signs international agreements and approves and renounces those that are not subject to ratification.
8. orders the revocation of unlawful acts by ministers and directors of central institutions of the state administration.

Article 82—Discharge Before Expiry of Mandate

1. The president of the republic cannot be held to account for acts committed in the exercise of his duty, except for treachery to the homeland or serious and intentional violation of the constitution.
2. In such cases, the president's discharge may be demanded by no fewer than one-fourth of the total number of deputies, and decided by now fewer than two-thirds of the total number of deputies.

Article 83—Replacement of the President

1. In the case of the discharge or death of the president, a serious illness rendering him unfit to perform his

duties, or his resignation, the chairman of the parliament takes his place and exercises his prerogatives, apart from the dissolution of the legislature.

2. In such cases, a new president is elected within 20 days.

Article 84—The President's Prerogatives

The president of the republic:

1. guarantees respect for the constitution and the laws;
 2. determines the dates of legislative and local government elections and of referendums;
 3. promulgates laws and decisions to hold referendums made by the legislature;
 4. proposes popular referendums to the legislature;
 5. with good reason, within 15 days of a law being submitted to him, may return this law to the legislature once for reconsideration;
 6. appoints the prime minister and receives his resignation;
 7. on the proposal of the prime minister, appoints or discharges ministers, other individual members of the government, and directors of central institutions;
 8. in special instances, chairs meetings of the government, placing on the agenda matters he considers require consideration and settlement. In such cases, he signs the relevant decisions;
 9. on the proposal of or with the countersignature of the prime minister, and after taking the counsel of the chairman of the legislature, may dissolve the legislature before the conclusion of the period of the legislature, when its composition does not allow the legislature to exercise its own functions and makes the government of the country impossible. In this case, legislative elections are held no later than 45 days after the dissolution.
- The president may not exercise this prerogative in the final six months of his mandate;
10. on the proposal of or with the countersignature of the prime minister, signs international treaties and agreements, and ratifies and renounces those that parliament itself does not examine;
 11. appoints and discharges diplomatic representatives, on the proposal of or with the countersignature of the prime minister;
 12. receives the letters of credential and letters of summons of the diplomatic representatives of foreign states;
 13. approves requests for the grant or surrender of Albanian citizenship;
 14. exercises the right of pardon;
 15. awards decorations and honorific titles;

16. on the proposal or with the countersignature of the prime minister, awards the highest military ranks;

17. when it is impossible for the legislature to meet, declares partial and general mobilization, and a state of emergency. In such cases, the relevant decree is submitted to the legislature for approval within five days;

18. when it is impossible for the legislature to meet, declares a state of war in the case of armed aggression against the Republic of Albania;

19. communicates with the legislature through messages that are read out at plenary sessions;

20. issues decrees of an individual nature and decisions; in cases of urgency, on the proposal of the prime minister or the relevant minister, or with their countersignatures, issues decrees of a normative character that are submitted to the legislature for approval within 15 days;

21. creates advisory bodies of an auxiliary nature, dependent on him;

22. seeks opinions and information in writing from the directors of state institutions over matters relating to their duties;

23. exercises other prerogatives provided for in this constitution.

Article 92—Submission of the Budget Bill

The prime minister, on behalf of the government, must submit the budget bill during the autumn session, which cannot conclude without approving it. If the bill is not approved by the start of the next financial year, the government implements the budget of the previous year, until the new budget is approved.

Article 93—Approval of Expenditures

The government must submit to the legislature the expenditures of the past year for examination and approval during the first session of the following year.

No expenditure can be authorized except by law.

Taxes and duties are defined by law and are solely for public purposes.

Article 94—The Functions of the Prime Minister and the Members of the Government

1. The prime minister represents the government, chairs its meetings, and directs its general activity, as well as answering for it.

2. The ministers and directors of the central institutions direct the relevant ministry or central institution of the state administration. Each one of them is responsible for the activity of the ministry or other central institutions entrusted to his direction.

3. The ministries and directors of central institutions issue orders, regulations, and instructions concerning

matters within their competences, on the basis of and in enforcement of the law and the decrees and orders of the government. Their acts possessing a normative character are published in FLETORJA ZYRTARE.

4. The ministers and directors of central institutions revoke the unlawful orders and instructions of their subordinate institutions and authorities.

Article 95—Motions

1. A reasoned motion of no confidence in the prime minister over specific issues must be signed by no fewer than one-sixth of the deputies.

2. A further motion of no confidence may be submitted only after six months. This interval need not be observed when the motion is put forward by more than one-half of the deputies.

3. A motion of no confidence is examined by the legislature not earlier than three days after the date on which it is submitted.

Article 96—Request for a Vote of Confidence

The prime minister may ask the legislature to give him a vote of confidence over a specific aspect of the government's activity.

Article 97—Resignation

When the legislature approves a motion of no confidence or refuses to give a vote of confidence, the prime minister and the ministers immediately tender their resignations.

Article 98—Immunity and Criminal Responsibility

The members of the government enjoy immunity. They cannot be subjected to criminal prosecution without the authorization of the president of the republic.

The Supreme Court is responsible for the trial of these cases.

Article 99—Expiry of Mandate

The government's mandate expires:

a) when the legislature has passed a vote of no confidence in the prime minister;

b) when the president has accepted the prime minister's resignation;

c) when the prime minister has died or can no longer perform his functions because of his serious state of health.

Part IV—Organization of Justice and the Constitutional Court

A. Judicial System**Article 100**

1. The power of the judiciary is independent. It is exercised by the Supreme Court and by other courts defined by the law.
2. In the exercise of their duties, judges confine themselves solely to the constitution and the law.
3. the organization and prerogatives of the courts are regulated by law.
4. The pay and perquisites of judges cannot be reduced.

Article 101—The Prohibition of Special Courts

The legislature may create courts for special fields, but on no account for individual cases.

Article 102—The Supreme Court

1. The Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority. It consists of nine judges. The chairman and members of the Supreme Court are elected by the legislature on the proposal of the president of the republic.
2. The conditions for a person's election as a member of the Supreme court are defined by law.
3. The chairman of the Supreme Court remains in office for four years with the right to reelection only once. He is replaced by the aforementioned procedure by one of the court's members.
4. The judges of the Supreme Court can be removed from office and subjected to criminal prosecution under circumstances provided for by the law on the basis of an argued decision by the legislature on the proposal of the president of the republic, and when the majority of all the members of the legislature have voted for it.

Article 103

The courts may directly apply the constitution in cases connected with fundamental human rights and freedoms. These cases are necessarily examined by the Supreme Court, which decides them by a majority of all its members.

Article 104—The Argumentation of Judicial Verdicts

1. Judicial verdicts must be argued.
2. The Supreme Court publishes its decisions.

Article 105—The Immunity of Judges

1. Judges may be criminally prosecuted or removed from office only by a decision of the Supreme Council of Justice, under conditions provided for by law.
2. They have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court.

B. The Procurator's Office**Article 106—The Role and Judicial Position of the Procurator's Office**

1. The procurator's office is the authority conducting criminal prosecutions during investigations and in the court.
2. The procurator's office is organized and operates as a single centralized authority.
3. The procurators are subject to the law in the exercise of their competences.

Article 107—The Procurator-General and His Deputies

1. The procurator-general and his deputies are elected and released from their duties by the legislature on the proposal of the president of the republic.
2. The organization and other competences of the procurator's office are regulated by law.
3. The directors of the procurator's offices at every judicial level enjoy the immunity provided by Article 105.

Article 108—Incompatibility With Other Posts

The posts of judge and procurator are incompatible with any other state or private function.

Article 109—The Supreme Council of Justice

1. The Supreme Council of Justice is headed by the president of the republic and consists of the minister of justice, the chairman of the Supreme Court, the procurator-general, and nine lawyers well known for their high level of professional ability and who are elected by a joint meeting of the members of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor-General's Office, for a five-year period, and without the right of immediate reelection.
2. The Supreme Council of Justice is the sole authority deciding on the appointment, promotion, demotion, disciplinary responsibility, and transfer of judges and directors of procurator's offices at every judicial level.
3. The manner in which the Supreme Council of Justice conducts its work is defined by law.

C. The Constitutional Court**Article 110—Its Role and Independence**

The Constitutional Court is an independent body with the task of guaranteeing respect for the constitution.

Article 111—Its Composition and Manner of Formation

The Constitutional Court consists of nine members. The chairman and members of the court are elected by the legislature, on the proposal of the president of the republic.

Article 112—Incompatibility With Other Posts and Activities

The post of member of the Constitutional Court is incompatible with any other state, party, or private position.

Article 113—Mandate

1. The mandate of a member of the Constitutional Court lasts for eight years.
2. The composition of the Constitutional Court is renewed at the end of every four years, on the first occasion for four of its members, and on the second occasion for the remaining five.

Article 114—Immunity

1. A member of the Constitutional Court bears no legal responsibility for his views and decisions issued in the course of his duties.
2. A member of the Constitutional Court enjoys immunity. He cannot be subjected to criminal prosecution without the consent of the Constitutional Court given by a majority of votes and under a decision explained by a general meeting of the court.

Article 115—Prerogatives

The Constitutional Court has the following prerogatives:

1. It interprets the constitution and decides on the compatibility of laws, decrees, and bye-laws with the constitution. It decides on the suspension of these acts when it observes that serious consequences may result from their enforcement.
2. It decides whether an international agreement signed on behalf of the Republic of Albania, but still not ratified, is compatible with the constitution. It also decides upon the compatibility of the legal dispositions in force with universally accepted norms of international law, and with the content of agreements to which the Republic of Albania is a party.
3. It resolves disagreements among the powers of the state regarding prerogatives.
4. It decides issues relating to the constitutionality of the activities of parties and other political or social organizations.
5. It resolves requests [line missing] the legitimacy of the election of the president of the republic and of deputies. It also examines the legitimacy of a popular referendum, announcing the final results.
6. It examines the constitutionality of a criminal charge that the legislature has laid against the president of the republic.

Article 116—Subjects Entitled To Submit Requests

The following have the right to submit requests for the judgment of cases by the Constitutional Court: the president of the republic, every legislative group, one-fifth of the deputies, the Council of Ministers, and local government authorities.

Article 117—Decisions

1. The Constitutional Court makes decisions by a majority of votes of all its members.
2. The decisions of the Constitutional Court are conclusive and final. They must be argued. In case of doubt or misunderstanding over the meaning of a decision, the court has the right to interpret it on its own initiative or at the request of the interested party, within 30 days of the notification of such a request.
3. Laws, decrees, bye-laws, and their individual dispositions that are declared incompatible with the dispositions of this constitution, with the law, with universally accepted norms of international law, or agreements to which the Republic of Albania is a party, lose their power on the day after the publication of this decision in FLETORJA ZYRTARE.
4. In other cases, the decision of the Constitutional Court comes into effect at the time provided for by the decision.
5. When it is decided to revoke laws or other acts, and circumstances arise requiring judicial regulation, the Constitutional Court's decision is reported to the People's Assembly or to other responsible authorities, in order that they may undertake the measures provided for by the constitution.

Article 118—Organization and Operation

The organization and operation of the Constitutional Court, its procedure for resolving cases, and other basic matters for the performance of its duties are regulated by law.

Part V—Local Government

Article 119—The Organization of Local Government

1. The territory of the Republic of Albania is divided into communes, municipalities, and districts.
2. Local government is organized and operates in every commune, municipality, and district.
3. Local government is organized and operates according to the law, on the basis of the principles of decentralization, self-government, and autonomy.

Article 120—The Election of Local Government Bodies

1. Local government bodies are directly elected by the people.

2. The manner of their election and their prerogatives are defined by law.

Article 121—Representative Bodies

1. The representative bodies of local government are the communal council, the municipal council, and the district council.

2. The chairman of the commune and the chairman of the municipality are elected by a ballot of the local population.

3. A district council elects its own presidium and chairman.

Article 122—Economic Activities

Local government bodies are legal persons. They possess property as recognized by law and conduct economic activities within and beyond their territory.

Article 123—Financial Sources

1. Local government bodies have their own budgets.

2. Their financial sources, the manner of their use, and their obligations to the state are defined by law.

3. The state provides financial contributions for individual communes, municipalities, and districts.

Article 124—Dissolution

Elected local government bodies may be dissolved by a decree of the president of the republic according to a proposal made by the prime minister, only in cases provided for by the law.

Part VI—Transitional and Final Dispositions

Article 125

The constitutional institutions existing on the date this constitution comes into effect operate in accordance with the dispositions of this constitution.

Article 126

The republican form of the state cannot be the object of constitutional changes.

Article 127

This constitution comes into effect on the day following its approval.

Article 128

Law No. 7,491 of 29 April 1991, "On the Main Constitutional Dispositions," and other constitutional laws involving changes, additions, and supplements to this law are superseded when this constitution comes into effect.

Article 129

Other legal dispositions remain in force to the extent that they do not conflict with this constitution.

Article 130

Amendments to change this constitution are approved by a referendum, after two-thirds of the number of deputies have voted for them.

Berov Hands Over Prime Minister's Office

AU1810094594 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 18 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] On 17 October former Prime Minister Professor Lyuben Berov introduced Reneta Indzhova, prime minister of the caretaker cabinet, to the heads of the Council of Ministers' departments, and briefly explained the specific characteristics of their activity.

Professor Berov handed Reneta Indzhova the keys to the cabinet and to the official safes, and withdrew with wishes for success.

Indzhova Outlines Priorities

AU1710163694 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 17 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, Mrs. Reneta Indzhova, prime minister of the caretaker cabinet, met journalists and outlined the priorities of the caretaker cabinet.

In first place she put the necessity of preserving social peace in the country. She pointed out that this is a prerequisite of normal and successful elections.

This cabinet intends to function normally in the economic sphere, Mrs. Indzhova said, stressing that this is the second priority of her cabinet.

Mrs. Indzhova further said that combating the problems of the impoverished and deprived population strata is the third priority of the caretaker cabinet during the brief period of its tenure.

The caretaker cabinet will hold a meeting every Thursday. At its first meeting, it will formulate the aforementioned priorities and the means of implementing them.

Trenchev, Russia's Avdeyev Discuss Trade

AU1710175394 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 17 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] On 17 October Konstantin Trenchev, president of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, and Evgeniya Koseva, Podkrepa secretary, met Aleksandr Avdeyev, Russian ambassador to Bulgaria, and Aleksandr Kyrenko, adviser at the Russian Embassy.

Issues related to restoring the traditional trade contacts between Bulgaria and Russia and implementing the projects of expanding the gas pipeline and building an oil pipeline between the two countries were discussed.

According to the participants in the meeting, those projects would have a great social value in creating new jobs.

Ambassador Avdeyev gladly accepted Mr. Trenchev's invitation to visit Podkrepa's headquarters in the near future.

Aleksandrov Warns of Budget Deficit Overrun

AU1710155294 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 12 Oct 94 p 4

[Report by Ana Dimova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—According to figures issued by the Ministry of Finance, at the end of September the internal debt exceeded 250.7 billion leva. According to experts, the chief reasons for its rise are the bonds issued by the state under the Law for Settlement of Unserved Credits, which have reached over 140 billion leva in value, and the growing budget deficit. By 30 September, the budget deficit had reached 26.5 billion leva, which is 73.5 percent of the planned deficit for the year of 33.7 billion leva. However, within the last month alone the deficit increased by 6 billion leva, because it was difficult to cover the forthcoming payments from the planned 1994 budget. The envisioned direct loans of 10 billion leva from the Bulgarian National Bank [BNB] have already been drawn and added to the state budget; during September alone the Finance Ministry received credits valued at 5 billion leva. The Finance Ministry officials state that on the expenditure side the budget is 85.2 percent fulfilled, while the state has collected over 140 billion leva in revenue.

Outgoing Finance Minister Stoyan Aleksandrov declared that an overrun in the budget deficit will be disastrous for the country. He said that the negative consequences would be felt not only in our relations with international financial institutions but also in our life as a whole. He said that the increased budget deficit would cause a further rise in inflation, followed by even more drastic impoverishment and social disintegration. He and his team wanted to fight to keep the budget within its approved limits, especially because the fulfillment of its revenue side was very encouraging. Up to the end of September the revenue side was 90 percent fulfilled, with the receipts from value-added tax alone being almost 25 billion leva, and represented 92.7 percent of the amount envisioned in the budget. However, it was said the collection of general income tax was proceeding more slowly, and the amount collected was less than 60 percent of planned annual receipts. The high inflation is eating away at budget revenues. In their calculations, financial experts are juggling with abstract figures whose dimensions fail to correspond in any way to the realities. The billions of leva that have flowed into the budget have been devalued, while the fast-rising interest rates are increasing the budget debt. All the figures issued in recent months indicate that in reality the figures envisioned in the 1994 Budget Act no longer have anything

in common with the country's financial and economic state, or with the social divisions in our society.

Kozloduy Reactor Functioning at 75 Percent

AU1710175494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 17 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] After eliminating the malfunction in the draining system of the turbine at the

Kozloduy Nuclear Plant Fifth Reactor, the 1,000-megawatt reactor is functioning at 75 percent of its capacity, BTA reports.

The First, Second, and Fourth Reactors are also connected to the country's power supply system. Their total capacity at present is 1,300 megawatts.

At present, the 1,000-megawatt Sixth Reactor is undergoing a scheduled repair and has been switched off for about 40 days.

Klaus Sees German Election Result as 'Positive'

AU1810113894 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 17 Oct 94 p 3

[CTK report: "Results of German Election Pleasing and Surprising"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ostrava/Prague—According to Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, the preliminary results of the German parliamentary election indicate that the present government coalition will most likely stay in office in Germany. Speaking to journalists in Ostrava yesterday, Klaus said: "I think this is an expression of stability, which is what Germany needs. Looking at things from the Czech Republic's point of view and that of countries to the east of Germany, I think this is a positive result because we need to follow a clear path toward an unmistakable market economy." [passage omitted]

Minister Cited on Oil Contingency Reserves

AU1710175194 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 14 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by "map": "The Czech Republic Has Crude Oil for Three Weeks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Czech Republic has strategic crude oil reserves for 14-20 days and fuels for 60 days. After the completion of storage facilities, the stocks could go up so as to last up to 90 days, Minister of Trade and Industry Vladimir Dlouhy (Civic Democratic Alliance) told yesterday's meeting of the parliamentary Defense and Security Affairs Committee.

In the event of a crisis in which oil would stop flowing, our stocks would last about three months, provided that drastic measures are adopted.

Speaking about the construction of the Ingolstadt oil pipeline, the minister noted that it would not have to be realized if the Druzhba oil pipeline were in perfect condition and if it ran through stable territory. At present, the Czech Republic uses the Druzhba oil pipeline, whose capacity is 10 million metric tons a year. Besides Druzhba, there is the Adria pipeline, with half the capacity, which is currently not in use because of the military conflict in the countries of former Yugoslavia. Dlouhy said he supposes that next year, at the latest, Chemapol will stop being the exclusive supplier of Russian crude oil. The foreign consortium's involvement in the privatization of the petrochemical industry should not, according to the minister of industry, jeopardize the state's majority influence in this branch of industry. No reduction in the state's stake is being considering because, as the minister noted, "the government will not allow a recurrence of the Volkswagen situation," where the state still holds the majority of shares but has only a minority representation in the company's board.

Shareholders Change Aero Vodochody Management

AU1810105794 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 14 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Jaroslav Kmenta: "Shareholders Replaced Management in the Aero Vodochody Enterprise"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—At their General Meeting yesterday, Aero Vodochody shareholders replaced the management of the enterprise. The hitherto chairman of the board, Zdenek Chalupnik, was replaced by Jaroslav Borak, director general of the Restructuring Department of the Trade and Industry Ministry. For the time being, Chalupnik was left with the post of Aero enterprise director general.

Although no reasons for the change were given, it is generally assumed that it is a reaction to the conflict between Chalupnik and high-ranking Aero and state administration officials over the selection process of the foreign supplier of components for the L-159 aircraft.

Chalupnik supported the Israeli firm Elbit, while the Defense Ministry and Aero technical team favored the U.S. Rockwell company. The government eventually recommended the U.S. firm.

According to some shareholders, the published information on the background of the Thai contract, from whose proceeds an election campaign in that country was allegedly financed, certainly did not help Chalupnik because the decision was made regarding the changes in the management.

Chalupnik yesterday rejected a vote of no-confidence in himself. "It was just honoring the principle of the owners," he said. At present, the Konsolidacni Banka, the Investicni a Postovni Banka, and the Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Bank hold the majority, and the remainder, approximately 44 percent, is owned by the Aero Holding.

[Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech on 14 October on page 1 adds: "The seven-member board of Aero Vodochody will be composed of two Aero Vodochody employees, one representative of the holding, and representatives of the banks. After the sale of Mesit Uherske Hradiste and Moravan Otrokovice, there are eight subsidiaries left in the Aero holding" and "In recent weeks, the management of Let Kunovice and Motorlet Prague has also changed. The post of director general of Let Kunovice was entrusted to Zdenek Pernica, who is THIS general of Aero Holding Prague Co."]

Prime Minister on VW's Plans With Skoda

AU1810081194 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 14 Oct 94 p 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Viktor Krejci; place and date not given: "Piech's Speech Again Reopened the Skoda Issue"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In today's regular interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, we discuss the fall of the ruble, the situation at the Skoda works in Mlada Boleslav, and other topical events of the week.

[Krejci] How do you view the fall of the ruble? Do you have an explanation for its fall, and might it have some political repercussions for Russia?

[Klaus] In countries such as present-day Russia, in which the political and economic situation is completely unclear, on-off affairs such as the sudden movement in the exchange rate of the ruble do not have a profound economic foundation, in my opinion. The markets on which the ruble is being traded are extremely shallow, to use economic terminology. This means that anything can happen with them. The movement of prices or the exchange rate is quite extensive, and, in such a situation, it is impossible to assess economic strength and the success or failure of this or that measure. I would also not dare draw any fundamental political conclusions from it.

What I find rather puzzling is that two politicians have been made responsible for the ruble's fall. This is a very unusual occurrence, which is the most gentle expression I can use.

[Krejci] The Nobel Peace Prize is to go to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin and Yasir 'Arafat. How do you view this, especially with regard to the second name?

[Klaus] The Nobel Peace Prize is something completely different from the other Nobel prizes, which are awarded for lifelong work in difficult fields of study, for dozens of books and publications, hundreds of research projects and scientific works. The Nobel Peace Prize is politics sui generis, and I am not sure whether the word "peace" accurately reflects the significance of what is involved. Basically, the prize goes to politicians who contributed in some major way to a change in the existing world order. The prize had been awarded to similar duos a few times before, duos that, after decades of mutual hatred, sat down at the negotiating table and brought the problem to some solution that is good for everyone. One of the two has always been closer to us humanistically oriented people, while the other usually stood on the other side of the barricade. Whatever I may think about decades of Mr. 'Arafat's activities, the fact remains that this action took place.

Views on the awarding of the prize vary. It leaves me cold, however, because this is one of dozens of prizes being awarded in the world. I would not attribute extraordinary importance to this peace prize, in particular. [passage omitted]

[Krejci] Do you think the Czech side will or should react to the words of Mr. Ferdinand Piech [Volkswagen Group Chairman] that the Skoda works in Mlada Boleslav will be producing 300,000 cars annually in the year 2000?

[Klaus] As Ministers Dlouhy and Dyba, who were in the auditorium during Mr. Piech's speech in Prague, assured

me, there was more to the speech than the two short sentences pulled out of context that have appeared in our media. It reopened this entire issue for us all over again and, in general, prompts us to assess the whole situation. I have therefore decided to call a consultative meeting with a few interested ministers on this issue, to become clear myself about our further course of action in this matter.

[Krejci] The Constitutional Court complied with the proposal of opposition deputies to remove from the amendment to the Criminal Code a provision allowing testimony by anonymous witnesses. This provision supposedly limits the defendant's right to a fair trial. What do you think about this?

[Klaus] I do not have a strong opinion on this issue because such problems are somewhat beyond my capacity to differentiate. However, when this law was being drafted, I accepted the argument of my government colleague, Minister Novak, that its wording is correct. I also lent credence to the argument that such provisions exist also in a number of other European countries. Now I observe the indignation of the ministers of justice and interior and other people over the Constitutional Court's decision, but I cannot say that this is a matter for which I would be ready to go to battle.

[Krejci] The Regional Court turned down the application for the registration of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] for local elections in Mlada Boleslav, confirming thereby the District Court's decision. The main reason supposedly is that one of the ODS candidates does not have permanent residence in that city.

[Klaus] I consider it, naturally, a great pity that the ODS is not able to run in the local elections in an important city such as Mlada Boleslav. I am no legal expert and no interpreter of the law. These matters really are up to the courts. Nevertheless, I cannot imagine that this was a deliberate attempt to deceive someone. [passage omitted] The idea that someone would deliberately give a false address seems to me quite incredible, and I do not think anyone could accuse the ODS of anything of that sort. This is why I consider the court's aforementioned ruling peculiar and think that it would have been much fairer to resolve this matter by removing this candidate from the slate than by barring the ODS from running in Mlada Boleslav altogether.

Police Arrest Drug Gang Boss in Prague

*AU1810111894 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
15 Oct p 2*

[Unattributed report: "Drug Boss Arrested"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Central Criminal Police Narcotics Department police, in cooperation with the Central Bohemian Vice Squad, on 13 October in Prague arrested the head of a gang manufacturing the Czech drug pervitin. The 39-year-old "boss" is the last

link in a 13-member group the police arrested in February within the framework of Operation "Wind." During the operation, 10 kilograms of ephedrine and 250 grams of pervitin were seized. According to Police Presidium Spokesman Ales Svoboda, the gang boss made no secret about not allowing himself to be arrested, even if he had to shoot his way out of trouble. "Thanks to the professionally executed police operation, however, the

arrest took place without injury," the spokesman added. Police sources report that no shooting took place in the operation, and everything ran smoothly. The Prague Investigation Office investigator has charged the drug boss with the illegal manufacture and possession of narcotics and poisons and the illegal possession of firearms. The suspect was taken into custody. He could be imprisoned for up to 10 years.

First Postelection Poll: Luptak Most Trustworthy*AU1710131394 Bratislava SME in Slovak 14 Oct 94 p 1*

[Article by "(dos)": "Jan Luptak Is the Most Trustworthy Slovak Politician"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Methodological-Research Department (MVK) of Slovak Radio conducted a representative public opinion poll involving 997 respondents from 2 to 9 October. In the public opinion polls published previously, trust in politicians was ascertained on the basis of an open question. The respondent was supposed to say which politician he trusted most, while he could mention at least three names. In this survey, the respondent was given a list of politicians, and he had to state, in reference to each one, whether he trusted him or not (or, alternatively, if he did not recognize the name). This means that the trustworthiness of politicians ascertained in this way is allotted higher values than if the respondents themselves had to cite the names of at least three politicians they trust. According to this survey, the most trustworthy politician is Jan Luptak, chairman of the Association of Workers of Slovakia. He is also the politician in whom confidence has increased most significantly since the last MVK survey, which was carried out on 16-19 September.

	Percent
Jan Luptak	48.8
Ivan Gasparovic	48.0
Michal Kovac	47.8
Jozef Moravcik	46.8
Lubomir Roman	40.4
Brigita Schmognerova	40.1
Vladimir Meciar	39.7
Peter Weiss	32.3
Pavol Kanis	30.9
Jan Slota	26.0
Ladislav Pittner	24.2
Jan Carnogursky	23.1
Lubomir Cernak	20.5
Jaroslav Volf	17.3
Vojtech Bugar	15.3
Jan Klepac	14.8
Ivan Miklos	13.4
Miklos Duray	10.1
Laszlo Nagy (Hungarian Civic Party)	9.2
Vladimir Randa (Party of Entrepreneurs and Tradesmen)	6.6
Jozef Pokorny (Green Party of Slovakia)	4.3

Commentary Analyzes Results*AU1710173694 Bratislava SME in Slovak 14 Oct 94 p 4*

[Commentary by Ondrej Dostal: "How the Voters Express Their Trust in Political Leaders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The results of the first postelection public opinion poll, carried out by the Methodological-Research Department of Slovak Radio, have imparted the surprising information that Jan Luptak, chairman of the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], is the most trustworthy Slovak politician. The most senior constitutional officials—the chairman of the parliament, the president, and the prime minister—come just behind him. Another surprising finding is undoubtedly the fact that Culture Minister L. Roman and Deputy Prime Minister B. Schmognerova were placed before V. Meciar in the trustworthiness rankings. However, we have to remember that, this time, trust in politicians was not ascertained by the answer to the question "Whom do you trust most?" but by a statement made in reference to a list of politicians.

Luptak, while enjoying almost the complete confidence of ZRS voters, is also trusted by a simple majority of Common Choice (SV) and Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] voters and by almost half of Slovak National Party [SNS] voters. Compared with the rest, voters of the other parliamentary entities also perceive him relatively favorably. The fact that he is viewed quite positively by the voters of the current coalition and the current opposition may perhaps explain his primacy. The others mostly receive support within the framework of one of these two groups, while the other group of voters views them more negatively.

So, Meciar enjoys a high level of trust among HZDS and SNS voters but only minimal trust among voters of the Hungarian Coalition (MK), the Democratic Union [DU], the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], and the SV. On the other hand, M. Kovac and J. Moravcik enjoy the trust of more than half the voters of DU, the MK, the KDH, and the SV, while HZDS and SNS voters trust them to a much lesser degree. The stance of the voters of Luptak's ZRS is interesting. Fifty percent of them trust J. Moravcik, 40 percent trust M. Kovac, and only 34.3 percent trust V. Meciar.

It is worth noting that, in the cases of the HZDS, the SV, and the KDH, the chairmen of these entities are preceded in trustworthiness by one of their party colleagues—not, however, among the voters of the appropriate entity. I. Gasparovic enjoys, overall, greater trust than V. Meciar, especially due to the fact that, with the exception of HZDS voters, he enjoys greater trust among the voters of all of the other parliamentary entities. J. Carnogursky is even preceded by two KDH ministers—L. Roman and L. Pittner. A simple majority of DU, KDH, and SV voters trust L. Roman, while almost half of ZRS voters trust him, too. L. Pittner precedes J. Carnogursky among DU and SV voters. J.

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Carnogursky is, along with his primacy within the KDH framework, received better than his colleagues among MK voters. SDL Chairman P. Weiss is preceded in trustworthiness by B. Schmognerova, and P. Kanis is snapping at his heels. All three of them enjoy most trust among SV voters, followed by DU voters (more than 60 percent in the case of B. Schmognerova). In the cases of P. Weiss and P. Kanis, ZRS voters are in third place, while it is the KDH (50 percent) in that of B. Schmognerova. Trust in P. Kanis among HZDS voters is slightly greater than in his colleagues. The chairmen of the SV coalition parties enjoy considerably less trust than Party of the Democratic Left representatives. Trust in the leaders of the MK parties is quite understandably substantial and is almost exclusively only among MK voters. V. Bugar enjoys more than 10 percent of trust only among SV, KDH, and DU voters, while L. Nagy enjoys the same amount of trust only among DU voters.

RSS Wants Speedy Formation of Government

LD1710143494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 17 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the early parliamentary election, journalists have not had much chance to get firsthand information directly from the representatives of the victorious Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. That is why they welcomed a chance today to meet the representatives of the HZDS's coalition partner, the Farmers' Party of Slovakia [RSS]. Bernard Hornak presents a report from the news briefing:

[Begin Hornak recording] RSS Chairman Pavol Delinga pointed out that his party has become a part of a parliamentary group, and, as such, it would try to contribute to forming a new government as soon as possible. In this connection, he emphasized that the RSS asked the president of the Republic to entrust the task of forming a new government to HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar.

Speaking about the talks regarding a possible composition of the Cabinet, Pavol Delinga noted that the political parties that were successful in the election were making the situation difficult in this respect. He feels there should be no more delays, and specific agreements should be concluded. The RSS would welcome a new government formed by the HZDS-RSS coalition and the Slovak National Party [SNS], the Association of Workers of Slovakia, and the Joint Choice coalition.

As for casting doubts on the mandates of the deputies from the Democratic Union of Slovakia, on which the Constitutional Court is due to deliver a decision soon, Pavol Delinga said that the RSS regarded this complaint lodged by the HZDS and the SNS as justified.

The RSS supports the referendum on the origin of the money used in auctions and privatization. According to

the RSS chairman, privatization has so far been an unclear issue, and the referendum will help clarify this situation.

Asked whether the RSS counts on filling the post of agriculture minister in the future government, Pavol Delinga said that, provided the HZDS-RSS coalition participates in the government, the RSS would be prepared, following an agreement with its coalition partners, to fill this post. [end recording]

ZRS's Kolnik Outlines Association's Views

AU1810105494 Bratislava SME in Slovak 14 Oct 94 p 4

[Extract from an interview with Klement Kolnik, deputy chairman of the Association of Workers of Slovakia, by an unidentified DOMINO EFEKT reporter; place and date not given: "We Cannot Dissociate Ourselves From Russia"—reprinted from issue No. 41/94 of the East Slovak weekly DOMINO EFEKT]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Government Coalition

We want to have the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], the Slovak National Party [SNS], and the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] in the government because they rocked the Republic. We will not participate in the government; it would be suicide. Yes, we will support the HZDS and the SNS in a tacit coalition. Kozlik and Keltosova were at the talks, and they said that it would be no problem to meet our demands. This will be a tacit agreement, a so-called tacit coalition. We will support them, and that is it. For example, the condition that we placed among the twelve—that those who offended the workers should leave parliament—does not go down well with me because, as Jano told us what happened in this parliament, this would mean that everyone would have to leave. If Meciar meets our demands, we will support him in reasonable bills that will also be acceptable for us. We are going to support this government, and we will see what government program it presents and what it will resolve.

We do not need experts in the government. What experts? All of them have a title, and what have they done? You only need common sense there. If Kanis can be defense minister, then I understand the health care system as much as he understands defense. This is why our defense looks the way it looks.

The Economy

As regards privatization, this is not privatization, this is stealing property. We are against privatization in its present form. We are in favor of employees' shares. The bosses first made state property of it, so they might privatize it later. Dubcek would never have signed it. This was national property, not state property. When

those people came, they immediately made state property of it. What is an s.r.o. [limited company], in fact? Three or four people who put up 100,000 or 200,000 korunas and other people work for them and repay their capital. They become millionaires in 10 years, and the workers have nothing. They are thieves. I have not yet heard of workers' establishing a limited company.

The President

I do not know what the HZDS will want, whether it will want us to support the dismissal of the president or not, but I will tell you my personal opinion: I would like to see him dismissed, and my colleagues, too. Luptak did not even vote for the president.

Who would become president? If Meciar took over this position, Mr. Kozlik would certainly become prime minister. We will continue to hold it against President Kovac that, when he came here to Presov, he said that the Communist Party had wronged him. However, he worked in a London bank, and his sons graduated from university. I would like to have been so persecuted, thank you very much. I have never seen him in a factory here in Presov, but he has visited parsonages.

The International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and NATO

Let us have a look at the International Monetary Fund [IMF]. How much debt has it caused us? The countries that accede to its conditions will be turned into colonies. The IMF needs to destroy all of our markets to be able to import its goods here. They may grant us credit, but only on paper. They flood us with goods we do not need. The IMF recommends, for instance, that we raise transportation fares, rents, and energy and gas prices. Try not to respect this, and they will not grant you credit.

We are also against the European Union [EU] and NATO. Do they not know how to calculate what NATO costs? We have left one pact and are stepping right into another. This is nonsense. When I spoke with Kanis, he told me about our joining NATO: My dear, I have to speak like that. I must dance according to their tune. I asked him about our joining NATO, whether we are really going to join it, and he said: No. We join NATO? No way....

Russia is a power, and we must not dissociate ourselves from it. If we do, the West will let us die. The West only needs us as a colony. We are principally against the EU, NATO, and the IMF.

Religion

I was invited by former Federal Deputy Prime Minister Rychetsky. I talked with him for two and a half hours. We discussed all of the sectors, including the church. I told him they had destroyed the Republic, but this will not be all because the Germans will eat them up, and we will be eaten by the Hungarians. He asked me about my party membership. I told him I was without party

affiliation: You abolished the communist party, so I am not a member of any party. When he asked me whether I still had my party card, I replied that I did but that I needed a sponsor who would help me put it into a golden frame.

Magvasi Comments on Trade Talks in Iran, Ukraine

*AU1710122194 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
13 Oct 94 p 2*

[Interview with Slovak Economics Minister Peter Magvasi by Lubo Rabay; place and date not given: "Prospects Among Traditional Partners"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak Minister of Economy Peter Magvasi recently paid brief official visits to Tehran and Kiev. Because it is precisely this minister who is being criticized, even in circles within his own party, for traveling too much, we asked him what results he expected these short visits to yield.

[Magvasi] In Iran, we were acquainted with investment projects of the second five-year plan, and it was stressed that they are reckoning with Slovak companies in their implementation. Very encouraging from the point of view of reviving traditional economic relations, are, in particular, projects concerning the joint assembly of tractors, construction and road-building machinery, and small motorcycles. Moreover, when the situation in former Yugoslavia becomes consolidated and the operation of the Adria pipeline is resumed, Iranian crude oil reserves represent a very important way to diversify Slovakia's sources of raw materials. The suggested possibilities of clearing mutual accounts were also very stimulating. The signing of an agreement on mutual trade can be considered the most important outcome of the visit. Thanks to this agreement, Slovakia can establish itself far more significantly on the solvent Iranian market. On the other hand, Iran is reckoning with the Slovak Republic as an important partner in Central Europe, through which it can enter the markets of the European Union.

[Rabay] Even if they concern only trade, relations with Iran always have a special political flavor....

[Magvasi] Indeed, we do not approach Iran from the point of view of routine commercial criteria. However, cooperation with Tehran is necessary. In spite of all of the political problems this country has overcome, it is a rich state that will always play an important role in the Middle East. Cooperation with Iran opens markets throughout the region.

[Rabay] Ukraine does not pose a problem from the political point of view. It can even be said that it has the greatest economic potential of all of Slovakia's neighbors. The problem here is, rather, one of the country's temporary solvency.

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[Magvasi] I was in Kiev to open the "Slovakia Introduces Itself '94" exhibition. It covers twice the space of last year's exhibition, even though I must say that the approach by the organizer, the Incheba a.s., disappointed me somewhat. On the other hand, talks with our Ukrainian partners confirmed that they regard economic relations with Slovakia as a priority. This is also borne out by the fact that Prime Minister Masol received me. As regards the financing of trade relations, we discussed the so-called countertrade [ustretovy obchod] mechanism. This is more than mere barter. More than 50 percent of world trade is being carried out in this way. If we managed to establish such a relationship between the two countries, Slovakia's trade with Ukraine could increase fivefold as early as 1995.

[Rabay] In what areas, for example?

[Magvasi] That will be discussed by a mixed commission for economic relations in Bratislava in early November. For the time being, I would like to mention the project of a duty-free zone in the border area, which should become the site of joint production activities. We have also agreed that an exemption from the relatively tough Ukrainian laws will be granted for the benefit of mutual capital support between the Trnava Automobile Works and the Zaporizhzhya Automobile Works in the production of a modern utility vehicle.

Meciar, Tajik Prime Minister Outline Trade Talks

AU1710173594 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA
in Slovak 14 Oct 94 p 2

[Interview with HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar and Tajik Prime Minister Abdudzhali Sadamov by Jozef Janto in Bratislava on 12 October: "My Visit and My Talks Say It All"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As we reported yesterday, Tajik Prime Minister Abdulmadjid Samadov is currently on an unofficial visit to the Slovak Republic with his entourage. He held talks with Vladimir Meciar, chairman of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], and other movement leaders on 12 October. Our editor took the opportunity to ask the Tajik guest and his host a few questions.

[Janto] First of all, what led you, Mr. Prime Minister, to Slovakia, and what did you discuss with HZDS representatives?

[Sadamov] Tajikistan is a young state, just like Slovakia. This was one of the main reasons we came to you. I believe we have a great deal in common, and Slovakia's experiences, especially as far as developing market-economic relations are concerned, are very important for Tajikistan. Today, we have been talking about cooperation in those spheres that interest us and also you. First

and foremost, this involves agriculture, the mining industry, and financial issues.

[Janto] Mr. Chairman Meciar, how do you assess the outcome of today's talks with your Tajik guests?

[Meciar] This is an unofficial visit by the prime minister. During our talks, we have been looking for new systems of cooperation. We are interested in establishing relations with Tajikistan on a new basis. The Tajiks want assistance from us, for example, in constituting their state, and we can give it to them. As far as economic and trading spheres are concerned, it is necessary to state that, for example, we used to import most of our cotton from Tajikistan, and now we want to resume these supplies. There are also major opportunities for cooperation, advantageous to the two states, in other spheres.

[Janto] What kind of Slovak goods is Tajikistan interested in, Mr. Prime Minister?

[Sadamov] In three groups of commodities: foodstuffs, plant and equipment for the development of our agriculture, and medicines.

[Janto] Tell us, please, about the current political situation in your country.

[Sadamov] We are at a stage before the election of a president and a referendum on a new constitution. I think these will be very important factors for stabilizing our state following the end of the civil war. We want to continue to make reforms in all the spheres in which we also have support abroad.

[Janto] You have major problems with the opposition, however.

[Sadamov] The opposition to the current government is divided into three groups. A small part wants to resolve problems with weapons, which cannot be done; therefore, it has no chance. Another part is under the influence of Islamic fundamentalism, but we could agree with the third part, because its main aim is the independence of Tajikistan. My government is prepared to cooperate. The time is ripe to resolve things by peaceful means and to let the people finally know who will lead our independent state.

[Janto] Some of Tajikistan's problems also stem from the fact that it neighbors Afghanistan...

[Sadamov] Tajikistan has 5.5 million inhabitants; Afghanistan has many more, but there are 6.0 million Tajiks among them...

[Janto] What is your assessment of the political situation in Slovakia?

[Sadamov] My visit says it all. And also that I have held talks with Mr. Meciar. There has been an election in your country; it is necessary to respect the will of the people, the voters. I am a little envious of you, and I would be happy if we were to find ourselves in the same situation as you.

Security Preparations for CSCE Summit Outlined

AU1810094494 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 15 Oct 94 pp 1,13

[Correspondent's report: "Traffic Jams During the Summit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian security services are preparing for the biggest personal security measures in the history of this country. Presidents and prime ministers of some 70 countries are expected in Budapest for the CSCE summit, including Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who has already announced his intention to participate to the Hungarian organizers. The security service is planning serious traffic restrictions in the capital, but no closure of city districts.

Police Brigadier General Ferenc Berkesi told us that the police had worked out its own anti-terrorist concept two years ago. They guarded the relevant buildings as if masses of people wanted to invade it while, as the bombing attack at Gate 19 of the parliament building showed, these objects were not defended against individual terrorists.

Speaking about the defense of the parliament building, the commander of the National Guards Unit said that the overall defense of the building would cost hundreds of millions of forints. The new guarding and checking order, which was implemented recently, provides an efficient defense of Kossuth Square. However, the system is not flawless—Berkési added. In his opinion, the system is capable of preventing terrorist actions, which lead to great public outcry.

Asked whether the attack on the parliament building harmed the international prestige of the Hungarian security services, Berkési said that several heads of state and prime ministers had visited Hungary since that event, and all of them arrived only with their closest bodyguards. "The actual guarding of these people was carried out by our guards, and this means that they trust us."

It will be the common task of the Hungarian security services to provide security for the almost 70 presidents and prime ministers expected to come to the CSCE summit. On the basis of the government decision, the interior minister and the commander of the national police charged Berkési with the task of coordinating the relevant tasks of the police, Guards Unit, Border Police, and the civilian secret services. Berkési told us that neither the security services nor the domestic and foreign secret services have any information of terrorist organizations preparing to disturb the event in Budapest. However, the three summit days could make Budapest a first-class terrorist target.

The Hungarian police will have to guarantee the security of presidents and prime ministers arriving in Budapest. However, this does not exclude the presence of individual bodyguards brought by each statesman. The leaders of the big powers will probably arrive with a large

security service. Coordination talks are currently under way. It is already certain that the Guards Unit will have to guard Boris Yeltsin, because Boris Yeltsin's office has already announced that they accept the invitation.

Considerable traffic restrictions will be implemented in Budapest at the time of the summit. Berkési does not plan any closure of city districts and, contrary to the rumors, the Chain Bridge will not be closed to traffic. Seventy delegations will travel between the hotels, residences, and guest houses and the Conference Center several times a day. Even if a statesman is only given one minute to get out of his car and enter the building, both the arrival and the departure will take more than one hour, and the roads around the Conference Center will be closed at this time. The same applies to the airport highway.

The Guards Unit will rent 300 Mercedes and Mitsubishi cars for the summit for the statesmen who do not bring their own official vehicles. The rental fees and the police expenses will be paid by the Foreign Ministry.

Police in the provinces will be placed in higher alert. Experience shows that the increased police readiness in itself prevents crime—said Berkési in conclusion.

Horn: NATO Must Play Stabilizing Role

BR1710154694 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 16 Oct 94 p 10

[Interview with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn by Angel Santa Cruz in Budapest; date not given: "Without a Capitalist Elite There Can Be no Market Economy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Budapest— *Next week this former communist politician with an austere demeanor and impeccable pedigree (working-class, communist father, seven brothers, worked as a mechanic for Siemens, was a student in the USSR, worked his way up in the party until he joined the Central Committee in 1985, and became foreign minister in 1989) will have completed 100 days at the head of a Social Democratic government. Horn's neck no longer sports the orthopaedic collar he had to wear for two months following a car accident during the election campaign, but he still feels some discomfort and cannot practice jogging as he used to. He still smokes, but no longer incessantly.*

[Santa Cruz] How is the coalition between former communists and former dissidents working?

[Horn] I am not sure whether one should speak of former communists now that the government has been formed. In some western countries, communists have become social democrats. Those who brought about change in Hungary were reformist socialists, back in 1989 and 1990, and it is not by chance that we are still at the forefront of the effort to create the necessary conditions for a free economy. What concerns us now is how to speed up this process, particularly privatization and

cutting back state ownership. We would like market rules to prevail in all fields. One problem lies in the fact that the previous government promised to set up a social market economy and a system for social dialogue. In that respect, almost nothing has been done yet, but without such a system we cannot handle social tensions. The stabilization program we are implementing affects certain social groups unfavorably.

[Santa Cruz] What is the situation as regards the tripartite agreement—along the lines of the Spanish model—between the government, the employers, and the unions?

[Horn] We would like to reach such an agreement quickly with the various social players, but negotiations are long and complicated. In the meantime, we have permanent consultations on important issues. However, the government must implement certain measures, even though it may not get everyone to agree on every issue, because it is what our voters expect us to do.

[Santa Cruz] Hungary's external deficit in 1993 rose above 11 percent of its GDP; its foreign debt amounts to \$26 billion; the forint has already been devalued by 15 percent this year. It sounds like a serious situation.

[Horn] The major international financial institutions are asking us to prevent our budgetary deficit from increasing further, achieve internal balance, and reduce the deficit of our balance of payments. This is a great challenge, because we cannot take measures that would hinder growth. On the contrary, we must bring about stability while at the same time trying to stimulate enterprise. Out of 10.5 million Hungarians, 800,000 people and their families are linked to some sort of business activity, that is, between 2 and 3 million people. I am optimistic because, given that there are so many of them, the country's development will depend on the conditions that we are able to secure for them.

[Santa Cruz] NATO said that there will be no quick access for Hungary and the Visegrad group. What is Hungary looking for by joining NATO? Guarantees against Russia, against the explosion of neighboring nationalism?

[Horn] NATO did not say that it will not allow Hungary to join... It has said that now is not the right moment, but we hope the issue will again be placed on NATO's agenda. We believe that the Visegrad four ought to be admitted into NATO. Not against Russia, of course. The West should take the Russian factor into account, we have never denied this, but the sovereign decision made by these countries wishing to join is important. We do need security guarantees, because the appropriate conclusions must be drawn from Bosnia. It is relatively easy to begin a war, but it is difficult to bring it to an end. In this region there are many differences among national minorities, and if NATO wants to play an effective role, it must be a stabilizing one.

[Santa Cruz] Do you believe that the election of a nationalist like Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia would

worsen the situation of the Hungarian minority in that country? What sort of problems do Hungarians face in other countries?

[Horn] I do not believe that Meciar will worsen the Hungarian minority's situation. It is up to Slovaks to decide whom they want to choose to govern their country, and we respect their choice. The important thing is to cooperate with whoever happens to be leading the country. If he forms a government, we will try to reach an understanding with him. As far as the general situation is concerned, practically none of our neighbors is fully guaranteeing the rights of Hungarian minorities. There are problems everywhere, whether in Romania or Ukraine, but the extent of the problem is not the same everywhere. That is why we need separate negotiations. We believe that the normalization of bilateral relations can improve the situation of Hungarians.

[Santa Cruz] Does Hungary want to sign agreements with its neighbors in order to secure its borders?

[Horn] With any neighbors requiring such agreements, we will sign them. But the agreements must not refer only to the inviolability of borders, but also to guaranteeing Hungarian minorities' rights. These two aspects are inseparable. All European countries ought to comply with standards on minority rights.

[Santa Cruz] One gets the feeling in your country that, following the change in government, an ostentatious capitalist elite has emerged...

[Horn] This is a positive development. Without a capitalist elite there can be no market economy... This is so wherever you go, I believe it is the same in Spain, too. The problem is not that shops are full of luxury items. This is necessary and is part of the economy's proper functioning. The problem lies in the fact that the gap is too wide, and sometimes very blatant. Our duty as a liberal-socialist government is to protect those who are in a difficult situation, the losers within the market economy.

[Santa Cruz] When did you realize that it was impossible to reform socialism?

[Horn] In the 1970's, when we established contacts with western social democrats and we were able to see how the economy and a multi-party system worked. This was decisive to realize that reforms were not enough, and that a change was necessary.

Defense Minister Views Reorganization, NATO

AU1810114294 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 15 Oct 94 p 7

[Interview with Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti by Zoltan Vereckei; place and date not given: "We Will Bring Painful Measures—Gyorgy Keleti on the Army's Reorganization, on the Secret Service, and the Marxist Truncheon"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We will begin altering the Army's structure in 1995 and will complete this task by the second half of the year. In the course of this, we will terminate or merge certain command units: We will terminate the commands of the various military services, we will eliminate some units, and we will only have two military districts instead of the current four. We will also get rid of our unnecessary properties which will make our budget more economical. We wish to reduce the number of conscripts by more than 10 percent by the end of 1996. I must admit that the decisions will be painful in many cases. However, to change the Army, these measures will have to be taken, Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti told our correspondent, adding that the modernization of military technology will also be started at the same time. According to calculations, a complete rearming of the whole Army would cost 1,500 to 1,600 billion forints, which is equal to the country's annual budget. Therefore, this will not happen. The Army has no other choice but to attempt to maintain and modernize its existing equipment. [passage omitted]

[Vereckei] The investigation into the lawfulness of the Military Security Office's [KBH] operation, carried out by Parliament's relevant committee, was closed on 14 October. In the report, the deputies establish that both the former and the current leaders of the KBH have organized the office's operation on the basis of principles that, in their view, contradict the relevant law. What will you do to stop this practice?

[Keleti] On one hand, my intention is to have the National Security Law passed as soon as possible. To achieve this, we are speeding up the preparatory work. Until then, I will soon sign a measure which will allow the KBH to accept only written instructions from now on. We will also define the range of offices and ranks in connection with which the office can carry out security investigations. I have already ended the practice of the service preparing security opinions at promotions to a higher rank. [passage omitted]

[Vereckei] You have conducted an active military policy since you were appointed. As part of this, you also met the Romanian defense minister. Officials of the two ministries have been stating for years that relations between the two armies are very good. To what extent can these relations be influenced by the news that Romania has a complete military plan for the event of possible action by the national minorities?

[Keleti] The way a given country treats its minorities is a very important factor in our relations. Therefore, when I next meet the Romanian defense minister, I will inquire about the way this statement was made and we will form our future relations accordingly.

[Vereckei] The media keep raising the issue of Hungary's future relations with NATO. According to even the most optimistic forecasts, Hungary can only join NATO in the first quarter of the next century at best.

[Keleti] Actually, it is not that far off anymore. I myself also believe that this will not happen overnight. This is one of the reasons I find the institution of the Partnership for Peace—which was offered to many countries by NATO—very good. In addition to promoting future NATO membership, it also influences relations between the countries that participate in the program. This is very important: It is not in NATO's interest to accept countries as members which have any kind of tensions between themselves. The program is trying to solve these tensions in this region. I cannot say when Hungary will be a NATO member because NATO has not formulated concrete requirements for membership which we could meet at a given time. Our cooperation so far shows that the so often mentioned compatibility is not such a serious requirement. This was also proved by the joint British-Hungarian exercise where linguistic problems, rather than the incompatibility of the weapons, were the major difficulty. It is also a problem that we have differences in staff-level work, namely in planning on maps. We have to pay more attention to these areas.

[Vereckei] To gain membership, we will also have to meet several economic and social requirements. It is also a criterion for a NATO member to spend a much higher proportion of its budget on the army than is done in Hungary where the Army's bad financial situation is public knowledge. What can you do on this issue?

[Keleti] We have to start from the premise that the country's economic situation is as it is. If it is our goal to meet the internal organizational and military technology requirements of NATO membership then money has to be provided for this, which in turn is waiting for politics. On the other hand, if we want to undertake tasks in the Partnership for Peace program in the hope of future membership then this also costs money: For this very reason, this amount must not be taken away from the Army's budget, from the amount earmarked for daily tasks. Participation is the whole country's, rather than only the Army's, interest. For this reason, in next year's budget, I would like to have a fund for this purpose, separate from the Army's budget.

Kovacs Predicts Good Relations With Germany

LD1710200594 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 17 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Germany continues to support Hungary in joining the European Union. Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs said this when he assessed the German election results. According to the minister, the results ensure that the good cooperation between Bonn and Budapest over the past several years will continue.

[Begin Kovacs recording] We have no reason to assume that the victory of the Christian Democratic-Christian Socialist Union and the forming of a joint government with the liberals—that is to say, the continued functioning of the previous government coalition—would be

disadvantageous for Hungary in any way. On the contrary, we are certain that good cooperation will continue.

Hungarian-German relations have significance beyond party political considerations. According to experience, there is no correspondence between the kindness, closeness, and variety of German-Hungarian relations and the fact that the government coalitions in the two countries are of the same or different colors. [end recording]

Party Heads Comment on Media Bill Disagreement

LD1810112794 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 0600 GMT 18 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] After indicating its disagreement with the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] over the Media Bill yesterday morning, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] held an extraordinary news conference yesterday afternoon on the matter. Following this, HSP Chairman Gyula Horn gave his opinion to this program on what was said.

[Unidentified correspondent] The SZDSZ criticized the HSP's negotiating position on three points. SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Petoe said the main problem was not SZDSZ's incapability of reaching a compromise. They believe the main problem was that the HSP's opinion was not practical enough and that the HSP was delaying decisions one after one another, both in the media matter and other matters.

According to the SZDSZ, the HSP wants to keep its say in the appointment of the heads of the Hungarian

Television and Radio and it insists on the participation of the government in the independent radio and television committee.

Is it an ultimatum or a breaking point that the junior coalition partner turned to the public for help?

[Begin recording] [Petoe] The problem now outlined is that these decisions cannot be extracted and we want to extract them. We have not broken up.

[Correspondent] What if you cannot extract them?

[Petoe] Then the same happens as with other matters. We tried to influence our coalition partner in front of the public and indicated we were unsatisfied with the operation of the coalition. [end recording]

[Correspondent] In his party's statement, Gyula Horn, party chairman-cum-prime minister, described what happened as regrettable. He denied that the allegations—which the SZDSZ cited as fact—that the HSP's ideas on the Media Bill were stated at the coalition council's session in the same way as the SZDSZ spelled them out to the press.

[Begin Horn recording] I do not consider this to be an expedient method. Nevertheless, I do not think that there was substantial coalition coordination under the Antall government, but this in only a presumption. However, it is better if we do not hide serious disagreements from the public. It is better to sort them out, even in front of the public, than to have someone who harbors suspicions. In my view, common stance can be found in this too. However, it takes longer than expected particularly because of the present coordination mechanism. [end recording]

Political Spat Over Army Getting 'Dangerous'*MM1710143394 Opole NOWA TRYBUNA OPOLSKA
in Polish 6 Oct 94 pp 1, 15*

[PAP-attributed report: "War Over Army: Onyszkiewicz Says Dyarchy Prevails in Defense Ministry"; followed by untitled commentary by Piotr Jankowski]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the source of the current conflict within the National Defense Ministry [MON] is the system of dyarchy in operation there. Onyszkiewicz, former defense minister and current deputy chairman of the Sejm National Defense Commission, appearing as a guest on Wednesday's "Radio Zet" program, added that the chief of the General Staff appears to be outside the sector minister's control, while the Army is heavily politicized.

"The president is attempting to subordinate the Army totally and ensure its complete loyalty, which could on occasion result in activities contravening the laws in force such as, for example, a failure to execute instructions issued by the national defense minister," Onyszkiewicz said.

In Onyszkiewicz's opinion, the Army must be nonpolitical—that is, have no right to issue opinions on matters of state policy. "As things are, however, the Army, through the voice of certain leading commanders grouped at the General Staff, has been pronouncing on matters of absolutely fundamental significance—namely, the state's political system," he said.

Onyszkiewicz expressed his hope that, were the present national defense minister—that is, Piotr Kolodziejczyk—to tender his resignation, the prime minister would not accept it. He described as "intolerable" the recent incident at the Drawsko training ground, where, during a formal dinner attended by the president and the body of generals, a "kind of 'primary election' was informally conducted for the defense minister's post, and a vote of no confidence was expressed in respect to Minister Kolodziejczyk."

Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk has been pressured to tender his resignation. This took place during Friday's briefing for the MON command officers at Drawsko. According to claims made by ZYCIE WARSZAWY, it was there and then that the majority of generals refused, in the president's presence, to comply further with the minister's instructions. Piotr Kolodziejczyk promised to tender his resignation within a week, although, according to the Warsaw daily's editors, he is already thinking of changing his mind. Even as it recalled the conflicts persisting between the Belweder Palace and the national defense minister relating to the Belweder's attempts to force the chief of the General Staff to accept his subordination to the president, ZYCIE WARSZAWY was alerting its readers to the possibility that the defense portfolio could be entrusted

to Romuald Szeremietiew, leader of the right-wing Movement for the Republic group.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY commentator Piotr Zaremba warns that, in a country where democracy is still young and inexperienced, political games involving generals can only result in disaster, and the end result could well be of a Latin American rather than a European character.

[Jankowski commentary starts] Struggle for power is a normal phenomenon in every democratic system. We have observed this phenomenon in Poland, too, over the past five years. The trouble is that it is beginning to assume increasingly exaggerated proportions. The impression is that the people "at the top" are beginning to run amok, that a veritable epidemic is raging around us—an epidemic whose culmination we have just reached, although it is truly hard to anticipate the direction of the next moves by our "elites." The wars that rage over such issues and subjects as privatization, the National Bank, freedom of speech, the proposed model of the reforms (or, rather, the introduction of reforms as such) are but one front in the struggle for power, which could still be justified, after a fashion, by the differences in views and concepts concerning the building of a new Poland. However, another front overlaps dangerously with the first—that of a vulgar fight for "a place at the trough." Its beginning was marked by the Polish Peasant Party's move to distribute influential positions at the level of voivodship authorities and allocate important government posts. For the past few weeks, we have witnessed a disgraceful and improper scramble for influence over television (whoever has such influence commands political power), and now a similar battle is being fought over command of the Armed Forces. Things are beginning to look dangerous. At the same time, Prime Minister Pawlak is scheduled to speak in Strasbourg today, with the aim of convincing the Council of Europe that Poland is a stable country. Of course, you may try to peddle any nonsensical notion in the West, but you cannot hope to get away with it for long. The political and economic consequences of what is happening in Poland now could well close the door to Europe against us sooner than we expect. And the worst thing is that we can no longer count on anyone to step in and get the situation under control. This is because the opposition is too weak, the voices that advocate reason from within the government coalition are drowned out by the screams of the combatants, and the president, the prime minister, and their select cohorts are taking an active part in the process of tearing Poland apart.

Committee Questions MON Leadership in Drawsko*WS1710130494 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in
Polish 15 Oct 94 p 2*

[Article by Luiza Kowalska: "Troubles With Generals"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] *Behind closed doors, the minister of national defense submitted to the Sejm subcommittee for the crisis in the Ministry of National Defense [MON] examples of insubordination of the General Staff head. After the session, the deputies were as silent as the grave; they did not want to say anything about the allegations so as not to make the defense of the "cooks of the Drawsko dinner" any easier.*

The special subcommittee for the crisis in MON questioned for almost five hours the civilian leadership of the ministry: Piotr Kolodziejczyk, Danuta Waniek, and Jerzy Milewski. After the session, the deputies would not reveal any details of the session. One of the reasons was that they did not want to facilitate the defense of the generals who voted in favor of recalling the minister in Drawsko.

We found out, however, that Kolodziejczyk accused General Staff head Tadeusz Wilecki and several other generals of, among other things, undermining the minister's authority and blocking changes in the structures of command in the Army. The minister is to prove all of the charges on Monday. The documents that he will submit will probably encompass the letter from General Janusz Ornatowski, Silesian Military District [SOW] commander, to President Lech Walesa. This letter by the SOW head (a close friend of the General Staff head) was highly critical of the civilian leadership of MON.

Yesterday it turned out that Gen. Ornatowski forwarded this letter to the Sejm and Senate speakers as well. However, they did not turn it over to the Sejm or Senate defense committees. "This puts some of the blame on the speakers. Had we received this signal earlier, perhaps the entire 'Drawsko case' could have been prevented," deputies said angrily yesterday.

As an example of General Wilecki's insubordination, Kolodziejczyk listed the fact that no sanctions were applied to Ornatowski for forwarding this letter (Ornatowski is subordinated directly to Wilecki). The General Staff head reportedly justified this by the fact that the author of the letter, even though he sent it last July, meant only the former defense ministers.

One of the charges that Danuta Waniek leveled at the General Staff was that Kolodziejczyk was not invited to military events. "The minister would have virtually found out about military events from the press," she said.

On Wednesday, Gen. Wilecki will be questioned by the subcommittee. Tomasz Nalecz of the Union of Labor does not rule out the possibility of inviting other participants of the dinner at Drawsko, as well, especially Mieczyslaw Wachowski. Some people fear, however, that the list of people to be questioned by the subcommittee may become longer. If all participants of the dinner were invited, the list would also have to include Field Bishop Leszek Slawoj Glodz.

Kolodziejczyk Submits Proof of Insubordination

WS1810133494 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 18 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Luiza Kowalska: "Insubordination of Generals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Minister of National Defense Piotr Kolodziejczyk did not want to say what he had brought in a black case to the Sejm yesterday.

"This is my lunch," he said jokingly as he entered the room where the secret session of the Sejm subcommittee was going to be held. The subcommittee was set up for the purpose of, among other things, elucidating the details of the Drawsko dinner when a group of generals voted in favor of the dismissal of the civilian leadership of the Ministry of National Defense [MON]. The subcommittee is also to examine the reasons behind the conflict between Kolodziejczyk and General Staff head Tadeusz Wilecki.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY has managed to find out that Kolodziejczyk submitted at least six pieces of written evidence proving the insubordination of the General Staff head and the generals subordinated to him. Among them is a letter by General Janusz Ornatowski, Silesian Military District [SOW] head, to the president, which we mentioned on 15 October. In this letter, the SOW head criticized the civilian leadership of MON. "He had a right to do that as an ordinary citizen but not as the commander of a military district," deputies fumed.

Even though the minister, whom the letter reached, demanded that sanctions be applied to Ornatowski, the general was not punished. He explained that, even though he had sent the letter last July, he referred only to the former defense ministers.

Under Its Own Control

Kolodziejczyk also presented documents regarding the establishment of a special Inspection Team within the General Staff a few months ago. According to the minister, the Inspection Team was set up without his consent. The military wanted this organ to replace the MON Control Department, which today is directly under the minister.

The Sejm deputies also received the minister's letter to the head of the General Staff, in which he requested the issuance of regulations that would subordinate directly to MON the Conference Center in Warsaw and two vacation centers. Even though the letter was written in July, to date it has not been answered.

Kolodziejczyk also submitted the military ceremonial draft, prepared by the General Staff, which entirely ignores civilian MON establishments in the organization of important events in military units. One of the provisions of this document says that, during visits to military units, the president is accompanied by the General Staff head. If units are visited by other representatives of the

state's supreme authorities, the head of the General Staff is represented by his deputies. The regulation does not say anything about the presence of the defense minister or deputy ministers.

Against Changes

As an example of boycotting his orders, Kolodziejczyk listed the rejection of his proposal regarding reform of the command structures of the Polish Army. As a result of the reform, powers of the General Staff were to be limited and three commanding centers were to be established: land troops, navy, and air force.

Kolodziejczyk presented the deputies with one more allegation. Our interlocutors, however, would not tell us what it concerned. However, they termed it as serious.

"We realize that these are only fragments of the relations between the General Staff and MON. The minister certainly did not collect evidence of the generals' insubordination throughout the year; no one was able to predict that it would be needed," we were told by one of the members of the subcommittee. "However, all of this confirms that the head of the General Staff did not consider the minister his superior."

On Wednesday morning, the staff head will answer questions of the subcommittee. It cannot be ruled out that his three deputies will also be summoned: General Edmund Bolociuch, General Leon Komornicki, and General Zbigniew Zalewski.

Deputy MON Head on Ukrainian Visit, Relations

WS1710125994 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish
17 Oct 94 p 1

[Interview with Deputy Defense Minister Jerzy Milewski, secretary of state in the Ministry of National Defense, MON, by Andrzej Medykowski; place and date not given: "We Are Building Infrastructures for Neighborly Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Medykowski] Ukrainian politicians say that cooperation with Poland is one of the strategic directions of their foreign policy. Did you get that impression while you visited Ukraine?

[Milewski] Close cooperation with Poland is one of the priorities of Ukrainian foreign policy. This was confirmed by Leonid Kuchma, when I handed him a letter from President Lech Walesa on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of liberating Ukraine from German occupation. The same is true of Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov, who is also defense minister, and of Foreign Affairs Minister Hennadiy Udovenko.

The politicians with whom I spoke want to continue the policy of drawing nearer to Poland. They also want to develop good-neighborly relations with Russia. We support them in this respect because both Poland and Ukraine must have good relations with this country. This is indispensable if we want the situation in the

eastern part of Europe to be stable. This offers us a chance to enter the 21st century along with the entire political configuration that has developed since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the establishment of independent states.

[Medykowski] By definition, a border is something that separates. However, a lot seems to suggest that the border between Poland and Ukraine will not separate us. Rather, it will be favorable to mutual contacts and increasingly broader cooperation. Does this also go for the issues of security and military cooperation?

[Milewski] Direct contacts between our countries are becoming increasingly easier. The communication minister has just informed me that a light pipeline will soon be established between Kiev and Warsaw. It will greatly facilitate contacts in the technical sense. But, well, this was just a digression.

Now, reverting to the heart of the matter, it should be recalled that, back in 1993, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, minister of national defense at that time, and Ukraine's Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov signed an agreement on military cooperation. As a result of the agreement, we determined rules of cooperation between our ministries and general staffs.

The present head of the Defense Ministry wants to continue this policy, and a lot seems to indicate that it will be implemented in increasingly lower levels.

[Medykowski] Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov has recently taken over the duties of defense minister. Is he going to visit Poland?

[Milewski] He is going to visit Poland within the next few weeks, perhaps even in October or November. I congratulated the deputy prime minister and wished him success, not only because he became the head of the Defense Ministry, but also because the Ukrainian authorities accepted the European standard of entrusting such a post to a civilian.

At the meeting in Kiev, we spoke about Poland's and Ukraine's participation in the Partnership for Peace [PFP] program. Technology and logistics experts will take part in various undertakings carried out within the framework of this program. There will also be training sessions and exercises at training fields.

We also decided that, before Minister Shmarov visits Poland, our two-partite working commission will have a session. The commission will prepare proposals for undertakings that should be carried out in the program of bilateral cooperation and in the PFP program in 1995.

[Medykowski] What are concrete examples of military cooperation between our countries?

[Milewski] We recently hosted a platoon of Ukrainian soldiers at multinational exercises called "Cooperative Bridge 1994" in Biedrusko, organized by NATO Headquarters, with Poland as the host.

During our talks, we also recalled that we had hosted a German company of paratroopers and a mechanized Dutch company as part of the Tatra 1994 exercises. Next year, subunits from both NATO states and Ukraine might take part in our regular military exercises. This proposal was received with interest, and I believe that, as a result of this invitation, we will see Ukrainian subunits more frequently in Poland. [passage omitted]

ZChN Leader on Presidential Election, Walesa

WS1710141294 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 15 Oct 94 p 2

[Interview with acting ZChN President Ryszard Czarnecki by Igor Zalewski and Piotr Zaremba; place and date not given: "Walesa Will Not Be the Right Wing's Candidate"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The shadow of Lech Walesa has fallen on the Christian-National Union [ZChN]. Is the Belweder going to take your party away from you?

[Czarnecki] The ZChN has never been a group that would build its position on the basis of the Belweder or on a fight against it. We will certainly back Walesa if, in the second round, he runs against a postcommunist candidate.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] How about the first round?

[Czarnecki] The right wing—not only the Alliance for Poland [PdP], but also the 11 November Bloc and perhaps Solidarity ["S"]—should field its own candidate. It would be a good opportunity to strengthen our electorate. However, as a flower on the sheepskin coat of the Belweder, Freedom Union [UW], or "S," the right wing has no chance.

Lech Walesa both wants and does not want to be the candidate of the right wing.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] He vetoed the abortion law, defended the Vatican concordat.

[Czarnecki] He has misunderstood the term "president of all Poles" all along. He wanted to be nice to everybody. He wanted to be nice to the right wing, but, at the same time, he supported the "left pillar." He is genuine when he is defending the Catholic identity of the nation. However, he submitted the liberal-leftist Charter of Rights and Liberties, and he made it easier for the communists to take over power by dissolving the previous parliament. Such steps cannot be taken by a rightist candidate. A certain U.S. mayor won his election thanks to the votes of white people, and then he started to coax the blacks. He did not win the blacks over to his views, and he lost the confidence of the white people. In the end, he lost.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Within the ZChN, there is a strong pro-Walesa representation—Henryk Goryszewski, Jan Lopuszanski. The congress in Czeszochowa has already supported Walesa.

[Czarnecki] The pro-Belweder opinions are based on the conviction that only Walesa can defeat a postcommunist. However, this thesis has not been proved. Moreover, the world does not end in presidential elections. If the ZChN and the right wing want to develop, they should take advantage of the experiences of the left wing. [passage omitted] If my colleagues express support for Walesa at the January congress, they will not help him much. The ZChN will then be sitting in neutral for a year.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Would the PdP break up in such a situation?

[Czarnecki] The PdP is already experiencing a crisis today. The ZChN, along with the Peasant Accord and the Movement for the Republic [RdR], wants to hold talks with the 11 November Bloc to select one rightist candidate for president. The Center Accord [PC] and the Conservative Coalition believe that the PdP alone will be the center of a big camp, and it is this formation that should be consolidated. This attitude does not correspond to the challenges the rightist and center-rightist camp is about to face.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] RdR Leader Romuald Szeremietew is ready to accept the post of minister that may be offered by Walesa, and he probably does not exclude the possibility of backing him in the election. Why did you not support the PC's idea to remove him from the PdP?

[Czarnecki] I criticized Mr. Szeremietew quite severely. It cannot be so that a minister leaves a session of government to take part in a meeting of an opposition bloc. In addition, he would make such people as Miller and Cimoszewicz more credible. If Szeremietew became a member of the government, he would have to leave the PdP. For the time being, however, the only things of which we have been able to accuse him have been unfortunate statements. The right wing has only just begun to integrate, and now it should disintegrate? Some of its leaders want to use salami tactics—cutting off, like slices—on parties that do not fit their image of the right wing.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The common candidate of the right wing should be given publicity already today.

[Czarnecki] The Democratic Left Alliance, the Polish Peasant Party, and UW are not in a hurry to do that. Our formation is rich in spirit but financially poor, so a lengthy campaign would be suicidal for us.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Politicians from other parties, however, are already drawing attention to themselves. For example, Jacek Kuron has begun wearing a formal jacket.

[Czarnecki] We do not have to be in such a hurry because there is social demand for a new man from outside the present configuration.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] GAZETA POLSKA has listed eight candidates: Olszewski, Macierewicz, Krasowski, Parys, Romaszewski, Grzeskowiak, Strzembosz, and Lech Kaczynski. For whom would you vote?

[Czarnecki] From this list it would be Alicja Grzeskowiak because I am courteous to the weaker sex. However, there are also other, no less respectable, candidates who are not included in this list.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] By undermining all along the idea of fielding a common candidate with UW, did you not contribute to the victory of leftist Jacek Kuron within this party?

[Czarnecki] It is certainly no thanks to me that Kuron is defeating Suchocka. The idea of fielding one candidate was all along supported by only part of UW. Jan Litynski said long ago on behalf of UW decisionmaking circles that they needed a tough candidate who would unite the party's electorate. Litynski was first, Czarnecki second. [passage omitted]

UW Deputies View Democratic Forum Initiative

MM1810104494 Gdansk GLOS WYBRZEZA in Polish
11 Oct 94 pp 1-2

[Article by "I.W.": "Party's Left-Wing Forum: Kuratowska Concerned, Kuron Contented"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Sunday, a left-wing group active in the Union of Freedom [UW] announced the creation of the Democratic Forum. This is the group's answer to the tendency, shown by the party's present leadership, to lean toward a Christian democratic orientation. Leading UW activists expressed their reactions to this development.

Olga Krzyzanowska, Deputy Sejm speaker and UW parliamentary deputy:

"I am watching the situation with concern. Too much is happening at present on the Polish political stage for the Union of Freedom to be able to afford internal discord. Despite the fact that my views are very close to those held by Zofia Kuratowska (one of the signatories of the Democratic Forum Declaration—I.W.), I am against this kind of action. It is simply dangerous for the Union. But I do not believe that a rebel group will form as a consequence of the present situation. The Democratic Forum was set up by people who are much too sensible to allow themselves to choose such solutions. It is not personal ambitions that prompted Kuratowska, Frasyniuk, and others to form a faction, but their concern for the party's future. Unfortunately, the moment they chose is most inopportune. There are quite enough opponents outside the UW as it is."

Jacek Kuron, UW parliamentary deputy:

"All new initiatives of the Democratic Forum kind, whether within or outside the framework of political parties, are very useful because they provide an arena for

discussion of party programs. The UW needs such program discussions just as it needs fresh air to breathe because it suffers from far too many party disputes and arguments concerning cadre matters."

Frasyniuk Explains Democratic Forum's Objectives

MM1810080194 Wroclaw SLOWO POLSKIE in Polish
11 Oct 94 pp 1, 13

[Interview with Sejm Deputy Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, Union of Freedom activist and cofounder of Union of Freedom Democratic Forum, by correspondent Elzbieta Graczyk; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Graczyk] You recently claimed, in loud tones and making no secret of your irritation, that the presidential campaign should be launched before the end of the year, especially because you have the best presidential candidate—that is, Jacek Kuron—in your ranks. Why so soon, and why Kuron?

[Frasyniuk] The most important thing is the mode of appointing the presidential candidate. We would like to see a system of conventions operating throughout the lower party ranks, during which we would not only select a Union of Freedom [UW] candidate but also talk about the constitution, about our place on the political stage, and about alliances. All that takes time. Why Kuron? He is one of the few UW politicians who has a chance of grouping around himself voters from outside our party—voters from the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], the Union of Labor [UP], and the Center Alliance [PC]. I am thinking here of people active in the former Solidarity and the opposition who still see Jacek Kuron as one of them. He is a politician who also has a chance to attract votes from people who do not identify themselves with any political group but whose respect he commands because of his exceptional ability to defuse conflicts within the state. By April, all of the voters will know which candidates represent which groups. The only name they will not know is that of the UW candidate because the UW will be debating the presidential candidacy just then, during the congress. I note a peculiar unwillingness to discuss Kuron as a presidential candidate.

[Graczyk] You hold a very critical opinion of your own party, accusing it of being lethargic, petty, and reluctant to make decisions. The UW statute forbids the creation of factions, so yesterday in Warsaw you called into being the UW Democratic Forum. Was that dictated by your intention to force changes in the party, or was it a step in the direction of leaving the party altogether?

[Frasyniuk] I would be able to talk critically about my colleagues only if they were making decisions with which I disagreed. But they are not making any decisions. I point this out with sadness. The only "manly" decisions there concerned Barbara Labuda and the question of the state secrets act. In setting up the Forum, we intend to change that state of affairs.

[Graczyk] You wrote in the Democratic Forum declaration that "the UW is in a state of serious crisis...."

[Frasyniuk] ...but we ended it by saying that the Forum will present its recommendations and proposals to the UW authorities. We treat the Democratic Forum as an attempt to work out a reform program for our party that will again integrate our members and allow us to regain the position we have lost. Our popularity has dropped to 8 percent! It would be a pity to waste the achievements of several years' work done by our people. The UW cannot be just a petitioner at various meetings, whose participants keep debating which potential presidential candidate to import to Poland from overseas.

[Graczyk] The Democratic Forum's initiative group includes yourself, Zofia Kuratowska, Marek Balicki, Marek Edelman, and 44 other UW activists. Apart from yourself, which other activists from that group represent Lower Silesia?

[Frasyniuk] Andrzej Morawiecki and Ludwik Turko. And we invite everyone to join us on the Forum. We are open.

[Graczyk] The Democratic Forum declaration does not differ in any detail from the UW rules or from the earlier rules of the Democratic Union or the Citizens' Movement-Democratic Action [ROAD] group. Are you not devouring your own tail?

[Frasyniuk] I hope that precisely thanks to our declaration the Union of Freedom leadership will be reminded again of its original declarations. Many such similarities can also be found in the Liberal Democratic Congress program. Before our fusion, each party committed itself to the liberal positions. As a result of the fusion, these two liberal political entities combined to form a new entity of a Christian democratic nature. Maybe this is the kind of chemical processes that usually take place when two parties merge. Not everyone wants the UW to be Christian democratic in its nature or to make extemporaneous and expedient decisions. Adherence to the principles in force must still be the rule, and politicians should be called to account according to these principles.

[Graczyk] Thank you.

Poll Respondents for Parliamentary-Cabinet System

WS1810103294 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 15-16 Oct 94 p 3

[Article by P.P.: "CBOS: Two-Thirds of Respondents In Favor of Parliamentary-Cabinet System; Concern or Ambition?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Sixty-seven percent of Poles believe that the government should be headed by a prime minister controlled by the parliament; 14 percent say that the prime minister should be supervised by the president. These are the results of an opinion poll that the Public*

Opinion Research Center carried out in October on a 300-person sample of adult inhabitants of Warsaw. The idea of the presidential system, similar to the U.S. model, was supported by 12 percent of the respondents.

The superiority of the parliamentary-cabinet system is pointed to primarily by people who are interested in politics, who declare leftist views, and who have a secondary-school or higher education.

Almost three-fourths of the respondents say that recent activities by Lech Walesa have been caused by his desire to be reelected president; only 17 percent consider them to be a manifestation of his concern about the country's affairs. Sixty-three percent of the respondents view the president as badly fulfilling his duties, and 27 percent are of the opposite opinion.

Opinions on the existence of the so-called presidential ministries are divided. The largest percentage of people (39 percent) believe that the appointments to all ministerial positions should be made by the prime minister. Thirty-five percent believe that the present solution is the best—the president decides who is to head three ministries: the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, National Defense, and Internal Affairs. Only 14 percent of the respondents would like the president to exert influence on the appointment to all ministerial posts.

Poll Shows Perceived Threat to Democracy

WS1810110094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 17 Oct 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Renata Wrobel: "Authorities Pose a Threat to Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Nearly one in three adult Poles is unable to understand the recent conflicts at the top levels of power. The group of people who know "what is going on" is not much larger. There is a prevailing belief that the current situation is dangerous to democratic order in the country.*

The president's decisions regarding the National Broadcasting Council [KRRiTV] and the Army are considered wrong. Respondents who claim that the Freedom Union [UW] and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] should establish close cooperation outnumber those who believe these parties should remain apart. The poll was conducted by the Social Research Laboratory [PBS] for RZECZPOSPOLITA last Friday and Saturday.

What Is This All About?

The average citizen in our country who reads domestic news in the press or turns on the television news is bombarded with reports on disputes and conflicts between the top organs of power. He hears about moves the president of the Republic of Poland makes on the fringes of the law. He hears contradictory interpretations of contacts between the head of state and the Army. He hears that Lech Walesa is withdrawing support for "his"

people in the government and the KRRiTV. He hears about party conflicts. He hears about the prime minister, who is unable to reach an agreement on privatization with the minister responsible, and about the minister of finance, who is unable to reach an understanding with the president of the National Bank of Poland. He hears of the Sejm and the president, who accuse each other of violating the law. Nearly every third respondent (32 percent) claims that he simply does not understand these conflicts. Not many more claim to understand the conflicts between top authorities (a mere 37 percent). The rest either prefer to refrain from giving an opinion (11 percent) or are simply not interested (20 percent).

The Situation Is Threatening

Nearly 60 percent of respondents believe that the current situation poses a threat to democratic order in our country. Only one in five respondents does not see such a threat. Respondents who claim they are up to date on the current developments are even more disturbed. Seven out of 10 respondents within this group see "black clouds" gathering over Polish democracy.

This group is made up primarily of people who have higher education, inhabit small and medium-sized towns, and are middle-aged (40-59 years old). Those who do not approve of Lech Walesa's recent moves tend more than others to see democracy as being threatened.

The President's Reasoning

"Polish democracy is endangered. The President's moves violate the principle of an apolitical military and independent KRRiTV, which destabilizes the constitutional order. The Sejm of the Republic of Poland, refusing to accept illegal decisions, expects the president of the Republic of Poland, who is expected to protect the Constitution, to abandon moves that may lead to a national crisis." Such an appeal was issued during the last session of the Sejm, at the initiative of deputies from UW.

Earlier, during a heated meeting between Lech Walesa and the UW Parliamentary Club, the party accused the president of violating the law, while Walesa accused the party of not understanding him and not letting him speak.

The poll shows that there are not many people who claim the president is in the right in this dispute. Only one in seven respondents (14 percent) believes that the president was right in his decisions regarding KRRiTV. More respondents—59 percent—disagree with those decisions. Among those who declare they understand the latest conflicts between the authorities, the disapproval of Walesa's recent decisions is even greater (68 percent).

The disapproval of Lech Walesa's moves concerning the Army are not much different. The president's moves regarding the Army are considered wrong by 52 percent of all respondents and 62 percent of those who claim they understand what is going on.

The Fate of Former Confidants

Three members of the KRRiTV, including the chairman, were appointed by the president. He also had a decisive voice on the appointment of heads of three ministries: Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and National Defense. The president recently withdrew his support for several proteges. The number of respondents who claim these people should keep their posts is nearly the same as of those who state they should resign from positions they had been recommended to by the president, once they have lost his trust.

Too Early for an Alliance

Many observers claim that UW and the SLD are becoming increasingly similar in their programs, particularly on issues such as the economy or reforming public administration. Polls on voting preferences show that both parties appeal to similar types of voters. An alliance of UW and the SLD is mentioned as a plausible alternative to the coalition government of the SLD and the Polish Peasant Party. Despite everything, differences of "descent" still remain most important, and instances of close-knit cooperation between the two groups are rare. The poll claims that a permanent coalition would not yet be widely acclaimed, although more people (39 percent of all respondents and 44 percent of those "well informed") would support close cooperation between UW and the SLD as beneficial for the country than object to such a collaboration (24 and 31 percent, respectively). The remaining respondents refrained from giving an answer.

Does the present situation at the top levels of power threaten democratic order in the country?

Yes	58 percent
No	19 percent
Difficult to say	23 percent

Should politicians recommended by the president resign from their functions once they have lost his trust?

Yes	38 percent
No	39 percent
Difficult to say	23 percent

Would close collaboration between the SLD and UW benefit Poland?

Yes	39 percent
No	24 percent
Difficult to say	37 percent

PBS poll for RZECZPOSPOLITA, conducted on 14-15 October on a representative sample of 1,040 Adult Poles.

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Poll: Poles Favor Greater Powers for Sejm

WS1810141794 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in
Polish 18 Oct 94 p 2

[Report by NIKA: "OBOP: Sejm Should Have Greatest Powers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Senate is needed in Poland. This is the opinion expressed by every second Pole. On the basis of experiences gained in the last several years, 38 percent of the respondents believe that a second parliament chamber is indispensable in Poland.

Despite low evaluations of the activities of Lech Walesa, the office of the president, which was restored at the same time as the Senate, is enjoying great social acceptance—79 percent of the respondents believe that this office is needed in Poland. Fourteen percent is of the opposite opinion.

Even though the definite majority of Poles are convinced that our country needs the office of the president, only 27 percent of the respondents say that the president should have greater powers. Twenty-five percent said that the government should have the greatest powers. The respondents most often (43 percent) expressed the opinion that it is the Sejm that should have the broadest powers.

Supporters for granting the greatest powers to the lower house of parliament are from all social groups (though respondents declaring leftist views express this opinion most often). Supporters of the right wing would more often give greater powers to the president (40 percent) than to the Sejm (38 percent).

The poll was carried out by the Center for Research on Public Opinion between 1 and 4 October of this year on a representative 1,130-person sample of adult Poles.

Poll: Majority Support Slowing Privatization

WS1710150294 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in
Polish 15-16 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Prime Minister Pawlak Is Right, Our Privatization Is Bad"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Most Poles believe that Prime Minister Pawlak is right in curbing the Mass Privatization Program [PPP].

More than half of the respondents to an opinion poll conducted by the Center for Research on Public Opinion [OBOP] early in October believe that, in the dispute over the PPP, it is the prime minister, not his critics, who is correct. Most of the people share Pawlak's view that "privatization is so complex that one should not act hastily." Only one-fifth of those polled decided that "the prime minister harms the economy" because they share the opinion that "blocking the privatization program may halt reforms."

Who likes the prime minister's decisions the most? All those on the votes of whom the governing coalition is counting. It is interesting that the difference of opinions between the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is not reflected among the party's supporters—the SLD (70 percent supporting Pawlak) and the PSL (68 percent). Kwasniewski's "electorate" also supports the prime minister's stand as much as Pawlak's electorate does.

Only most supporters of the Freedom Union believe that the prime minister harms the economy.

The prime minister's hesitation is supported by almost two-thirds of peasants and blue-collar workers. As for professional groups, only among private entrepreneurs do those who believe that the prime minister harms the economy constitute a majority.

However, agreement to the prime minister's arguments does not mean objection to privatization in general. Only 12 percent of the OBOP respondents believe that the shares of state-owned enterprises should remain in the hands of the state. The poll also suggests that Poles favor the idea of selling shares rather than giving them away for free to all or selected groups of citizens.

[Box, p 1]

The prime minister is doing the right thing because privatization is so complex that one should not act hastily	54 percent
The prime minister harms the economy; blocking privatization may halt economic forms in general	21 percent
Hard to say	25 percent

Poll Shows Different Views on Mass Privatization

WS1710151794 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in
Polish 15-16 Oct 94 p 23

[Article by Pawel Wujec: "OBOP for GAZETA WYBORCZA; We Do Not Want It for Free"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Poles do not like the idea of giving national wealth away for free. Only 12 percent of the respondents said that the shares of state-owned enterprises should be "given for free to each citizen in equal amounts." Still fewer, 5 percent, say they should be given to senior citizens and the employees of the budget sphere.

It is interesting that even the senior citizens themselves are not convinced that they should receive any shares. Only every 11th of them believes that such a form of privatization would be best.

In all groups—from the intelligentsia to peasants, blue-collar workers, housewives, and the unemployed—most common is the opinion that the shares should simply be

sold out and the principles should be the same for all. This form of privatization was supported by 35 percent of the respondents, mostly younger, better educated people and the supporters of the Freedom Union.

Many people also express the opinion that employees of enterprises should get their enterprises' shares (22 percent).

These results lead to a surprising conclusion. One of the reasons the Mass Privatization Program is losing popularity right now may be the very same thing that was to become the source of its success: the idea of selling the shares of enterprises at a very low price and giving them to senior citizens and the budget sphere employees practically for free.

It has been known for some time that privatization is often treated as something that simply has to happen: One must go work "in a private company," but this is no reason to be happy. However, opinions are changing, and there are increasingly more private companies. This is why we asked the following question: What does privatization mean to you personally? We presented four answers that the respondents could choose from (it was possible to choose three). Poles' opinions are distributed pretty evenly.

One-third believes that the transformations mean "riches for few, poverty for many"; one-third thinks that privatization means "stealing of the national wealth" or "mass layoffs."

On the other hand, one-third believes that privatization results in "an improvement in the organization of a given company and a fast wage increase." Almost as many respondents believe that "it is the only possibility of rescuing enterprises," and one-fifth believes that it is financially beneficial to both the state and the privatized company.

What does privatization mean to you?

	Percent
Riches for few, poverty for many	34
Improvement in the organization of the company and a fast wage increase	30
The only possibility of rescuing enterprises	28
Stealing of the national wealth	23
A lot of money for the state budget and additional money for the privatized enterprise	23
Mass layoffs of employees	22
A sad necessity because it is safer to work in a state-owned company	21
Dictate of Western capitalists	9
Riches for many, poverty for few	6
Hard to tell	9

PSL Wants More Power Before Congress

WS1810104094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
17 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by E.Cz.: "PSL Wants More Control in National Investment Funds"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Chief Council of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] has not yet taken a stand on the conflict between the parliament and the president. The PSL congress is scheduled for 25-26 February of next year. Party members desperately want to pass a law on credits for the agricultural sector and are arguing about preferential credits for farms.*

Jozef Zych, head of the PSL Chief Council, said at a press conference that the council did not consider it necessary to take a stand on the issue of the president's appeal to parliament because the government coalition has already done so. Council members asked the prime minister about the conflict in the Ministry of National Defense, the appointment of the head of police, the president's conflict with the National Broadcasting Council, and the parliamentary appeal to the president. Pawlak stated that he could not say more than what was already known to the public because the council session was open to the press.

Ryszard Kochaniak said that the "level of PSL member saturation in the government is minimal." "There are structures in which the PSL is not present and in which we should have more control," said Kochaniak, who mentioned the National Investment Funds. "What have we done to introduce our members to supervisory boards, to the management of privatized enterprises?" Kochaniak, a lawyer representing the PSL in court proceedings over the party name, with the PSL being represented by H. Bak, suggested to the prime minister that, instead of a spokesperson, the government should appoint an orator, who would deliver speeches but who...would not answer questions.

Before the council session, about a dozen members presented Zych with a letter demanding clarification of the PSL's agricultural policy, the introduction of preferential credits for family-run farms, and the revival of state interventionism in agriculture. The reason is that they oppose the idea of creating huge farms, several hundred hectares in size, from what used to be state cooperative farms, entitled to the same credits as other farms.

"Latifundia are being formed, and I hear that our members are involved," charged Dominik Ludwiczak, deputy chairman of the council, who also pointed out that this was contradictory to the ideological principles of the party and the entire movement. "I am surprised we approved of Tanski as head of the Agency for Farm Property of the State Treasury [AWRSP]."

The direct reason for the attack launched by the authors of the letter on "a certain group of PSL deputies," the government, and AWRSP for establishing and strengthening large farms and demanding that the PSL take a stand on this issue was the preparation of a draft law on agricultural credits within the Ministry of Agriculture. Although Minister Smietanko's idea to grant credits exclusively to farms with an area of up to 50 or 100 hectares (larger farms would be eligible exclusively for commercial credits) met the demands of the letter's authors, it was criticized by numerous PSL members. Supporters demanded a clear definition of a family-run farm and its upper area limits. The majority of council members opposed the idea. The council agreed that the law on subsidies for interest on credits for agriculture and the food industry should be passed by the end of this year. The law should guarantee family farms access to inexpensive credits, "according to models applied in the EC, with respect for regional agricultural policy."

On 25-26 February of next year, a congress will be held to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the peasant movement. The council has decided to combine the regular report and program convention with celebrations of the centennial. Apart from delegates, Warsaw will be visited by presidents of local PSL boards, gmina administrators who are PSL members, and heads of gmina councils and delegates to voivodship self-government assemblies. Participants in the congress shall decide who will be the party's candidate for president.

The council has decided to form a national committee to secure the return of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk's ashes from Washington and erect a monument to him in Poznan.

Soaring Food Prices Boost Inflation in Sep

WS1710155894 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 15-16 Oct 94 pp 1, 7

[Article by K.B.: "Inflation in September Higher; Food Raises Prices"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The prices of consumer goods and services went up in September by 4.5 percent, which is 0.3 percent more than was initially forecast by the Finance Ministry, the Central Office of Statistics [GUS] announced yesterday. Such a high increase resulted first of all from the fact that food prices were increasing very quickly. They went up by 5.9 percent in September. The Finance Ministry estimated this increase at 5.3 percent. The indexes of the increase in the prices of nonfood goods were also corrected—from 3.3 to 3.6 percent. The prices of alcohol and services went up just as the Finance Ministry predicted (0.9 and 4.1 percent, respectively).

As GUS estimates, the prices of most food articles increased especially at the beginning of September. This concerns chiefly vegetables and fruit, edible fats, meat and processed meat, as well as eggs and coffee. [passage omitted]

The high increase in the prices of nonfood goods was also a consequence of the fact that more expensive winter clothes and shoes appeared on the market; also, the rates of the excise changed, which caused an increase in the prices of tobacco products. Other factors are an increase in the prices of gasoline, automobiles, fuel, some medications, publications, and school textbooks.

The main reason the prices for services went up were the government-planned increases in the prices of electricity and gas, as well as higher prices for tickets for the State Polish Railroads and State Motor Transport. Fees for kindergartens increased more than usual. The prices for services were 24.5 percent higher than in December (compared to 30.1 percent last year).

In comparison with September of last year, the prices of consumer goods and services were 34.6 percent higher in September of this year. The Finance Ministry plans, however, that this December's prices will be 27 percent higher than last December. The National Bank of Poland believes that this is unreal; however, the economic results in December will be decisive.

Visit to Maria Nuclear Reactor Detailed

WS1810105694 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 17 Oct 94 p 10

[Article by Ewa Wesolowska and Katarzyna Zuczkowska: "A Visit to Maria"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Before entering the Maria nuclear reactor, we put on white lab coats and protective shoes and stand in front of a special radiation detector. We pass the test (no alarm shrieks) and are allowed inside.

"We control our visitors to make sure they have not been exposed to radiation outside the center," says engineer Jerzy Koziel, director of emergency services at the plant. "If the sensors go off when you leave, we will know you have been contaminated here."

We pass through armored doors to the so-called pressure sluice, a small compartment lined with steel. Beyond a second pair of massive doors lies the multistory high area of the reactor. From an iron bridge, through crystal-clear water, one may see the top surface of the reactor core, an entanglement of steel cables carrying pressurized water and long rods containing fuel (uranium-235). If the reactor were operating, a bluish glow would be visible above the water. Using a pocket counter, we establish that radiation just above the reactor pool is merely 10 times higher than that on Marszalkowska Street during rush hour.

"If the water suddenly evaporated, we would receive a lethal dose of radiation," says engineer Koziel. "There would be no major catastrophe, however, because a reactor shuts off automatically once it ceases to be protected by water."

According to Director Koziel, a failure resembling the one in Chernobyl is impossible in Swierk. "The reactor in Chernobyl was graphite moderated—outdated and improperly serviced. Its core melted, an explosion followed, and fire broke out," the physicist explains. "The construction and operating principles of the water-cooled Maria reactor excludes such a scenario. Besides, the power of both reactors is incomparable: In Swierk we have only several kilos of uranium, whereas in Chernobyl there were several tons."

The center's main worry is storage and utilization of spent fuel, which used to be purchased by the former Soviet Union. At present, heavily contaminated tanks with spent uranium sit underwater near the reactor. They may remain there safely for another five or 10 years. No one knows what to do with them after that.

"The center has no money to construct a radioactive waste management facility," says engineer Koziel. "The majority of scientists who work here are enthusiasts, who are content with very low pay. In the United States, employees of nuclear centers earn approximately \$15,000 dollars per month."

The director vehemently denied rumors that long-standing employees of the center had health problems. "I have worked here for 36 years, my wife for over 20, and we both feel great," says engineer Koziel. "I have not encountered a single documented case of illness related to work at the reactor."

Maria is only 20 years old (modernization has been carried out over the past seven years), and it has a bright future. Apart from research, the reactor is used for the production of isotopes used in medicine. Elements (such as manganese) are introduced into the reactor, where they are irradiated. From then on, no one touches them with their bare hands. After they are hydraulically "sucked" from the reactor, the isotopes go to a special chamber. Pretreatment is controlled by scientists from behind a thick shield of lead glass, with the help of "robot hands." The irradiated elements are indispensable for the production of medicine (radiopharmaceuticals), which are used, for instance, in oncology. The center in Swierk is the sole producer of isotopes in Poland. These isotopes are produced inside Maria. The second reactor, Ewa, was recently shut down for good, after 36 years of operation.

UN, NATO Fail To Agree on Air Strikes

LD1710220094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2130
GMT 17 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Oct. 17 (TANJUG)—Representatives of NATO and the United Nations failed to overcome the differences in their approaches to the use of air force in Bosnia at a meeting in New York Monday.

Diplomatic sources at the United Nations New York headquarters said the talks lasted almost three hours and that no communiqué was released afterwards.

The diplomats said the idea was to avoid publicity because of the specificity of the subject and the impossibility to bring closer the two stands.

NATO wants more freedom in the use of air force in civil war torn Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also wants to be allowed the possibility to choose one of four targets for air strikes without previous warning.

The United Nations, meanwhile, insists on air force being used only to defend the peace keepers and the exclusion zones. It maintains that only targets which directly jeopardize the peace force should be attacked and with previous warning.

One diplomat said both sides had stuck to their initial positions. There was only a "very marginal" rapprochement, he said.

NATO insists on a stronger use of force in order to force Bosnian Serbs to accept the "Contact Group" plan on the territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the diplomat said.

U.N. representatives again insisted that the greater engagement of the NATO air force would endanger the peace force and could trigger their withdrawal from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Karadzic: RS, RSK Moving Toward Unification

AU1710163494 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in
Serbo-Croatian 17 Oct 94

[SRNA report: "Differences Between Belgrade and Pale Should Not Be Exaggerated"]

[FRY Translated Text] Banja Luka, SRNA—President of the Srpska republic [RS] Radovan Karadzic has stated in Banja Luka that differences in policies between Belgrade and Pale "should not be exaggerated.

"The people are not divided and will decide by themselves as to who will lead them. All is good in Serb-Serbian relations, and Serbia matters to us as a stable country," Karadzic emphasized at the Banja Luka public debate entitled: Jovan Raskovic—the Serbian question.

Karadzic assessed that the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] and the Srpska republic "are moving in the direction of unification, and there is no reason for impatience."

"A shop should be stocked with goods [as heard], we will not give it a name for the time being, and Serbianism and democracy remain our ideology," the Srpska republic president said.

When asked whether some territories of the Srpska republic will be exchanged, Karadzic replied that "we should not give away anything that a Serbian soldier has liberated and protected."

The president of the Srpska republic stressed that "if a political solution is found, the final verdict will be given by the people."

Speaking at debate in Banja Luka, RSK President Milan Martić said that the Serbs in the Srpska republic and the RSK "will not allow anyone to disunite them," and emphasized that "the RSK is standing by the people and the leadership of the Srpska republic."

Coexistence in Federation Seen as Precarious

95BA0003B Belgrade SRPSKA REC in Serbo-Croatian
26 Sep 94 pp 18-19

[Unattributed article: "The Devil Is at Work"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The federation exists on paper. A certain number of laws have been adopted, but the federation is not yet reality," Irfan Ljubijankić, minister in the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, declared the other day. Nor have other top-level Croatian and Muslim officials been concealing the fact that the federation between Bosnian Muslims and Croats proclaimed by the Washington Agreement is only words on paper and in practice has not begun to function in any aspect. Its only constructive element is that it has broken off the Muslim-Croatian conflicts, although there are still isolated gunfights in certain places, which neither side is informing the public of "so as not to create a panic and spread the conflict to other places."

In other words, proclamation of the federation has localized the Muslim-Croatian war, but that does not mean that it is over and done for all time. According to many assessments, and they have credence in these times of propaganda and lies, should there be an official disintegration of the federation, the Muslim-Croatian conflict would be fiercer than even before, except that the Croats would have the direct support of the Serbian side, and the Muslims, legally or illegally, would get larger amounts of arms, and not just from certain Islamic countries.

Judging by the facial expressions of Alija Izetbegović and Franjo Tuđman during the talks in Zagreb and those of their closest associates, they are only beginning to arrive at agreement on models and procedures for shaping

some kind of joint state. Looking at it objectively, no one trusts anyone, and hostile sentiments are still dominant.

Conflicts with the Serbian armed units forced the Muslims to conclude a pact with the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina and with the Republic of Croatia. After all, they could not fight on two fronts. Croatia was at the same time attempting to represent itself, above all to the Islamic world, as their protector and "friend," most of all because the only real aid in money is coming to the Muslims from that world and via Croatia. That republic has great benefit from that. First of all, it is in a position to distribute that aid according to its own lights and to take the lion's share for the refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Reliable sources say that this amounts to more than half of all the aid. Only a symbolic portion reaches the refugees.

Wishes Are One Thing

The Croatian and Muslim sides have been exchanging charges since official formation of the federation began. Izetbegovic most frequently points his finger at the self-proclaimed "Herceg-Bosna," which continues to function and behave as a true state, as indicated by the fact that it is collecting and keeping all customs revenues as though there were no federal authorities in Sarajevo at all. Likewise, the Croatian side is being accused of preventing the free movement of the population. Reporters of the Sarajevo studio of Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina recently visited the touchiest cities, Mostar and Gornji Vakuf, and they saw this for themselves on the spot and on the basis of conversations with both Muslims and Croats. According to those reports, Croats move more or less freely over the territory controlled by the Muslim forces, while only individuals from the opposite side are allowed to move onto their territory. The reporters also recorded exceptions—people going to one side or the other and saying themselves that they are much less afraid of these "trips" than a few months ago. Everything depends on the general situation in the particular place and on whether a person has had someone in his family killed or badly wounded.

Asked whether anything will be left of the federation, ordinary people mainly reply that they would like it to take root, but that there is still too much hatred, distrust, and hostility for them to be able to believe in it. Most often they say: "We want to get along with them, but they do not want to get along with us."

Statements to the effect that "the people were never at odds, but were set at odds by the politicians" are slowly fading. After all, the people did choose those very same politicians and considered them the best. The fact that they drew them into a war is another story.

As for Gornji Vakuf, the city that has suffered the most damage after Mostar, it is significant that the president of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] there, Milan Saric, takes offense if this town is referred to by its true name. For him it is Uskoplje, the name given it by the

Croats at the beginning of the conflict with the Muslims. So, Karadzic is not the only one changing the names of cities.

Saric believes that there are insurmountable problems in bringing the federation to life: "It would be best for the one who thrust us into war to leave us alone to get out of it. How we do it is our problem, but I think we will do it sooner than with those people who began the war and wanted it with a single motive, and that is theft. The biggest problem is that the displaced persons do not dare to return to their homes. Distrust is at the same level as it was during the fiercest fighting."

Ismet Gegic, president of the SDA [Democratic Action Party] in Gornji Vakuf, believes that the numerous commissions and groups of experts are the biggest interference in practical formation of the federation, since this way no one knows exactly what to do:

"Even those at the top do not know exactly what they want. We in the field would carry out their orders. I am referring to us Muslims. If we go one in this sloppy way, nothing will come of the federation."

That is also the thinking of ordinary people, and few believe that the Croat-Muslim federation will be able to survive, not only because so much blood has been shed in the war, but also because there was not really much mutual trust even before the war. In places where the Croats were in the majority the Muslims were either "Croatized" or neglected when public offices and administrative jobs were being handed out.

(Un)Recognized "Herceg-Bosna"

There are very serious problems everywhere over the distribution of portfolios. Another problem at this point is that the ratio between Croats and Muslims in central Bosnia is close to 50:50. According to certain unwritten rules, that is how offices in the local government should be distributed. Whenever this is the ratio, both sides want to grab those administrative posts that offer the best vantage point for effectively influencing overall political life.

Nor is the situation any better in Sarajevo. Kresimir Zubak, who in formal terms is president of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, says that only 22 of the 550 employees of the ministry of internal affairs are Croats, and only one holds a top position. According to him, there is only one Croat in the social welfare ministry. According to his own calculation, among the nearly 1,000 persons employed in the government and ministries and other institutions of the state, only 10 percent are Croats.

The Muslim officials, on the other hand, admit that that percentage does not entirely correspond to the percentage of Croatian population according to the 1991 census, but in this connection they always point out that "Herceg-Bosna" continues to exist as a quasi-state as though the federation had not been formed and has its

own ministers, government, and all the rest as though it were a true state. If it were dissolved, they say, many of its present officials would find a place in the federation. First of all, the top people in "Herceg-Bosna" are not giving a thought to dissolving this creation, which Franjo Tudjman sponsored personally. Zubak himself justifies the existence of "Herceg-Bosna," which is not referred to that way in the federation's constitution, but as a separate "existing administration." He says that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina "is concluding the appropriate protocols with the government of Herceg-Bosna. That means that it has actually recognized it."

When one adds up just these several facts, one gets the impression that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed solely to at least diminish the ferocity of the Croat-Muslim conflicts and that this is a necessary transitional solution which will last until the Serb-Muslim conflicts are over in various parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A "Small Shell" for Kosnik

Aside from that, the Muslim leadership will have a hard time forgiving Croatia for its lengthy open support of Fikret Abdic, former president of the autonomous province of western Bosnia, who in Sarajevo, and not only in that city, has been proclaimed a first-class traitor. That is in essence what he is for all Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina except for those in Velika Kladusa. This is a fact regardless of how one looks on his attempts to save the population and peace treaties which he concluded with the Serbian and Croatian sides. In the end it turned out that both were using him for their own purposes and that there was no longer any chance of his returning to the political scene.

A typical opinion is that of Sems Alikadic of central Bosnia, who says: "How would the Serbs take it, for example, if Vucurevic were to separate from the government at Pale, establish his own autonomous province, and associate with the Croats or Muslims? Well, that is how we perceive Abdic, and it is a great wonder that such an intelligent man, so crafty, should have been taken in by Croatian and Serbian propaganda."

If one wants to face the truth, the Muslim-Croat federation fell apart before any provision of its constitution began to be implemented. Viewed from that angle, the Serbian side was right in not wanting to be involved in combinations of that kind, but at the same time it made several major mistakes on the other side. First of all, by completely rejecting the peace plan of the international Contact Group, which in practical terms recognized "conquest of territory on which the Muslim inhabitants were a majority before the war." After all, the plan somehow bypassed the problem of eastern Bosnia.

One of the biggest "painful points" of the Bosnian federation is Mostar, a city which has lost the principal feature which gave it its name. The fact that members of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] fired a shell that

hit the hotel room of Hans Kosnik, European Union administrator of this city, and did so during the visit of Pope John Paul II to Zagreb, says enough about the disposition of the Croatian officers concerning realization of Kosnik's intentions of making Mostar a unified city once again. Although he himself wanted to play down the importance of the attempted assassination, explaining that this was a "small shell," the fact remains that as an appointed mayor he is exposed to great danger. After all, he could have been killed just as dead by that "small shell" as by the biggest one.

Although it is a consolation that the police chief of the Croatian section of Mostar has been removed and that five people said to have taken part in the failed assassination have been arrested. The very fact that there are forces which look unfavorably on Kosnik is sufficient warning that these are not forces to play around with.

The aversion to Kosnik and what he is doing is also indicated by the fact that the day after the assassination attempt no one from the Croatian side attended the opening of the steel bridge connecting the Croatian and Muslim parts of the city, which was built in three weeks by British and French engineers belonging to the peace-keeping forces. The Croatian side simply ignored that ceremony, allegedly because it links areas "held by the Muslim forces." The wording of this tells it all. In other words: There are no areas held by the federal forces; both the cities and uninhabited places are divided exclusively into Croatian and Muslim. Where, then, are the joint areas?

Ordinary people in Mostar say that it is possible to build all the bridges over the Neretva, but no one can even dream of rebuilding the bridges between certain people. Of course they all say in this connection that old friendships have remained between "normal" Croats and Muslims, but the question is how many "normal" people there are. Most of them have either fled or have absolutely no impact on political events or the events of the war.

Incidentally, the Croats consider Mostar their city and intend to keep it that way. None of the leading Croatian politicians in Herzegovina want to hear anything about past population censuses.

Although all the officials on both sides say that they favor a unified city, not much stock is put in what they say. Precisely because they do not trust one another. The people of Mostar, on the other hand, say that they have survived by accident and that nothing is clear to anyone as yet except that the devil got into people and dictated to them "who to kill, who to butcher, and what to destroy."

Those with a more sober outlook say that everything can be blamed on the mistaken policy of "those up above" who supposedly could have prevented the evil had they been wiser and more well-intentioned toward their own people. Still others do not give up their view that the war

in Bosnia and Herzegovina was imported from outside and that no wisdom within Bosnia and Herzegovina could have prevented it, since the weapons of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and all that goes with them created all the laws.

Events to date, since formation of the Bosnian federation, indicate that for the foreseeable future the three nationalities will not be able to live together, except in certain communities. It will probably be necessary to form three little states, which will somehow be able to cohabit one beside the other with constant challenges that threaten local conflict.

The picture of Bosnia and Herzegovina is much sadder and gloomier than anyone from outside would be able to see. Especially when one is mindful that the Muslims are still being driven out of Bijeljina, Janja, and certain other places. Ethnic cleansing, in a "humane way," is thus continuing. Given that state of affairs, to talk of any kind of federation or union of the "Bosnian republics" sounds more like black humor than political reality.

Ganic Criticizes Rose as 'Constantly' Pro-Serb

AU1810094394 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Oct 94 p 8

[Interview with B-H Federation Vice President Ejup Ganic by Z. Soldic; place and date not given: "I Did Not Sign the Leaflet for the Refugees"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The cause of the recent incident with the refugees at Turanj, Croatia was supposedly one of the leaflets distributed by the UNHCR to the refugees from Velika Kladusa. The leaflet was signed by Ejup Ganic, so we asked the deputy president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation if the signature on the controversial leaflet was really his.

[Ganic] That is pure fabrication. I did not sign any leaflets. We in the Presidency and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina regularly communicate with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] and the UNHCR about the problem of the refugees from Velika Kladusa. We have offered amnesty to all of them, as well as the guarantee that we will not mobilize them into the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. We have also offered them the UNPROFOR monitoring, that is, UNPROFOR's civilian police, when they return home. I do not know what more these people can want.

However, it is important to realize that the problem does not lie in our offer, but rather in Fikret Abdic's threats. Some of the refugees are completely loyal to Abdic and will not allow the rest of the people to return. Abdic represents nothing without these people; without them he is just another chetnik. These unfortunate people in Turanj are hostages to his sick egoistic policies.

[Soldic] The refugees have demanded to talk to Kresimir Zubak and Haris Silajdzic, and your alleged signature on the leaflet has upset them. How would you account for this?

[Ganic] I will be glad if the refugees talk to whomsoever they want. The important thing is to resolve the problem. It is irrelevant who does the talking.

[Soldic] Can Fikret Abdic, through the refugees, get more than has been offered?

[Ganic] We have offered them much more than citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army have. Abdic must realize that he can get nothing more. It would be much better for him to let the people return to their homes.

[Soldic] You talked to Yasushi Akashi on Wednesday. What can you tell us about that?

[Ganic] We analyzed the situation throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. UNPROFOR gets money to control the entire territory, but it is only present on the territory under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, which means that there is no UNPROFOR on 70 percent of the territory. I asked Akashi to see to it that UNPROFOR controls the territories that are now under Serbian control, as the Serbs have been ethnically cleansing these territories of the non-Serb population. He promised that he would visit Banja Luka and work on that problem. Moreover, an offensive is being launched against Bihac, and Bihac is a UN-protected area. Therefore, we asked the United Nations to take on its obligation. Akashi promised to implement the opening of the roads and the air bridge communication. When we asked him what means he would employ to implement this, he had no answer. However, the UNPROFOR problem is much more complex. UNPROFOR is being "balkanized."

[Soldic] Could you clarify the term "balkanization" of UNPROFOR?

[Ganic] UNPROFOR, headed by General Rose, is belittling and destroying NATO's reputation. When the Serbs destroy an UNPROFOR tank, then UNPROFOR destroys a Serb one through NATO. This is absurd, intolerable. One for one. This is the Rose doctrine, that is, the policy of Britain, which is constantly on the Serbs' side. Gen. Rose is marginalizing the role of NATO.

[Soldic] NATO can only act upon the request of UNPROFOR and against targets determined by UNPROFOR. Since you are not satisfied with the work of Gen. Rose, will you ask for the UNPROFOR head in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be replaced?

[Ganic] We will not ask for the extension of his mandate, which expires in February 1995.

[Soldic] You have also accused the French of working for the Serbs.

[Ganic] The French have changed significantly. At the NATO conference in Seville, everyone supported a more effective NATO, except for the English. The French also demanded that NATO be more effective.

New Russian Envoy To Hold Fewer Powers

AU1710194694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 17 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] (Aleksandr Zotov), Russian medium-ranking diplomat, is the new Russian envoy to the former Yugoslavia. However, his authorities are considerably fewer than those held by his predecessor, Vitaliy Churkin.

(Zotov) will not be Yeltsin's plenipotentiary, but will answer to Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, the Moscow correspondent of the ONASA news agency reports.

UN War Crimes Tribunal To Charge Bosnian Serb

AU1410105394 Paris AFP in English 1025 GMT 14 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] The Hague, Oct 14 (AFP)—The first war crimes case to be submitted to the international criminal tribunal on the former Yugoslavia will be that of former Bosnian Serb prison guard Dusan Tadic, arrested in Germany in February and later charged with genocide, the court said Friday [14 October].

A court communique said Tadic, 38, would officially be charged by the court here on November 8 following a request Tuesday by the international tribunal's chief prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, for Germany to drop its investigation of Tadic and transfer him to The Hague. [passage omitted]

Goldstone said that he had received unconditional assurances for cooperation from the Croat and Bosnian governments and that representatives from the tribunal will soon be sent to Zagreb and Sarajevo.

Goldstone said that the "discussions with all three governments were full, frank and friendly," but the atmosphere was more strained in Belgrade where the Yugoslav federal government "reiterated its view that a permanent international criminal court should be established... and that it regarded an ad hoc international tribunal only for the former Yugoslavia as an act of discrimination."

Serb Shelling Kills Six Civilians in Bihac

AU1710132794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 17 Oct 94

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] The shells fired from the well-known criminal strongholds in Grabez, (Tihotina), (Gorjevac), and (Lohotska Brda) have been directed at the most populated parts of the town. This morning six civilians were killed in the bestial chetnik shelling, while more were wounded [words indistinct] the reputation of the international organizations and the UN Protection Force, since the United Nations adopted a resolution

proclaiming Bihac a protected zone. The passive attitude by the international organizations toward the chetnik attacks and shelling of residential areas speaks clearly about the impotence of the United Nations in implementing its resolutions.

The fierce fighting today on the Grabez Heights has spilt over to the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau, where the aggressor is using all possible weapons—mortars, howitzers, tanks, and anti-aircraft guns—and also attempting infantry breakthroughs. The brave fighters of the 5th Corps are repulsing with superhuman effort all the aggressor's attempts at breaking through the defense lines, inflicting losses in men and equipment on the chetniks. All the defense lines are firm and stable.

There has been no peace, either, on the Buzim, Bosanska Otoka, or Bosanska Krupa fronts. The aggressor used artillery and anti-aircraft machine guns, and small arms.

UN Confirms Deaths

AU1810103994 Paris AFP in English 1011 GMT 18 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Oct 18 (AFP)—Six civilians were killed and 10 wounded when Bosnian Serb forces shelled the northwestern Bosnian town of Bihac, a UN-declared "safe haven," the spokesman for French units based in the region said.

The Bosnian Serbs fired two shells Monday evening [17 October] into the center of Bihac, one of the six UN security zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina, said the spokesman, Major Jean-Francois Philippe, contacted by telephone from Zagreb.

On Monday, UN military police counted 162 artillery exchanges around Bihac and on the strategically important Grabez plateau south of Bihac, according to the UN Protection Force press office here.

The area forms the front between the warring Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Government troops.

1st Corps Successful in 'Bloodiest' Battle

AU1710161294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 17 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The fighters of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army have recently been scoring great military successes on one of the worst fronts of (the Trnovisna) Heights and Mt. Cemer, according to a report by the 1st Corps Information Service.

The [Serbian] offensive on the free parts of Mt. Cemer lasted (45) days. The aim of this offensive was the capture of Mt. Cemer, which would allow the aggressor to control a large part of central Bosnia. The significance that the enemy was attributing to [word indistinct] is shown by the fact that they deployed a large number of artillery pieces, armored-mechanized equipment, and infantry: 18 howitzers, six mortar batteries, three tanks,

two aircraft missiles launchers [lanser avio-bombi], several Praga and Bofors mobile antiaircraft guns, and a large number of antiaircraft weapons. The aggressor also concentrated his most elite infantry units on this front.

The report goes on to say that despite the great number of artillery pieces and infantry forces, the aggressor has failed to fulfill his dream of capturing Mt. Cemer. Following some initial enemy successes, the units from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps counterattacked, forcing the enemy to flee the captured positions. Some 40 chetniks killed, the equipment seized, and wounded and captured chetniks are the best illustration of the seriousness of the aggressor's defeat. Our fighters retrieved the bodies of several of those killed, and there were Russians among them. The intensity of the enemy's attacks has lessened after the losses that they have suffered over the last two days.

Over the last 10 days on the (Trnovisna) Heights, desperate and ruthless fighting has also been under way for Mosevicko Brdo and the area on and around Mt. Cemer. The ferocity and heroism of our fighters will make the battle for this strategically important area go down in military history as the bloodiest and most merciless battles in the Liberation War, in which our artillery—although inferior to the chetniks—played a major role. Since 8 October, the gunners of the 1st Corps have destroyed a D-1 gun and a Vis with their entire crews, a truckload of chetniks on their way from Polom to Jasen, and an enemy trench [word indistinct] with a direct hit. Our long range artillery has also successfully parried the enemy's, reads the report from the 1st Corps.

UN Escorts Aid Trucks Hijacked by Serbs

AU1810094294 Paris AFP in English 0914 GMT 18 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 18 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs have hijacked five lorries packed with

medical aid near Sarajevo airport in the first incident of its kind in UN-controlled territory, a UN spokesman said here Tuesday [18 October].

Kris Janowski of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said Tuesday that on Monday "five UNHCR trucks loaded with medicine, medical equipment, hygiene kits and dialysis kits were stopped at the checkpoint between the airport and Sarajevo."

The supplies sent by the World Health Organisation had just been unloaded and were being taken to warehouses in the government-controlled part of Sarajevo prior to being distributed to both Serbs and Moslems, Janowski said.

The Serbs "said that they had no clearance which is of course wrong and after five hours forced at gunpoint the drivers to drive to the Ilidza barracks" in Serb-held western Sarajevo, he said.

A light armoured vehicle belonging to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) parked near the checkpoint, escorted the aid convoy without intervening, Janowski said.

The five lorries were later taken from Ilidza to Balzuj in the western outskirts of the city where they were unloaded at a warehouse near the railway station. The Serbs then let the drivers go.

The UNHCR spokesman said the incident was a first in an area controlled by UNPROFOR though in September 1993 and March 1994, aid convoys were seized inside the so-called "Serb republic" set up by Bosnian Serbs.

The UNHCR has meanwhile contacted Serb leaders in their "capital" of Pale east of Sarajevo to try to recover the supplies.

Serb Krajina Official Warns Against 'Aggression'

LD1410174594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1704
GMT 14 Oct 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct. 14 (TANJUG)—Croatia's latest threats to the Serb Krajina were designed to show that Krajina was allegedly not prepared to negotiate and that Croatia was driven to use force.

Krajina president spokesman Pero Damjanic also told the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA Friday that Krajina representatives were ready for further talks with Croatia 'even tomorrow if necessary.'

Croatia today enjoys no support from the international community to continue war with Krajina, Damjanic said and warned that in case of repeated Croatian aggression, Krajina would respond with all means available.'

'There is no local war or limited aggression for Krajina and every attack would be treated as a beginning of total war,' he repeated the words of Krajina President Milan Martić.

Granic Views UN Resolution, Current Events

AU1810101194 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in
Serbo-Croatian 8 Oct 94 pp 10-11

[Interview with Dr. Mate Granic, foreign minister and deputy prime minister, by Dunja Ujević; place and date not given: "The Position of Croatia Consolidated"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatia has reacted in various ways to the events in New York. Those who were only interested in the UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force] mandate think that our diplomacy fared badly in the UN. Those who see Resolution 947 as a share in the overall political game Croatia is involved in believe that Croatia has made a score in the UN.

[Ujević] Mr. Granic, what is the real position of Croatia following Resolution 947, that is, in the overall political context in which the resolution is the "technical bridging of time"?

[Granic] The real position of Croatia has been consolidated since the resolution. This could best be seen in all the contacts during the negotiations in New York and during my stay in Washington. This means that Croatian politics is transparent to the United States, the European Union, and the neighboring countries, and that our interests are at the moment well-coordinated with the interests of the United States and the European Union. We do not agree upon everything, especially the speed of achieving the aims. This is precisely why there will occasionally be further discussions, and why we will make sharper moves, as we will not allow the issue of Croatia not to be resolved parallel to the Bosnia-Herzegovina issue. It is precisely that speed and sequence of moves that were discussed the most in the United States.

On the other hand, it should be emphasized that at this moment the United States and the European Union, and particularly the United States and Russia, are conducting talks about strategic aims. That means that when we talk to the United States, we have to bear in mind that Croatia is only one of the issues, one of the items of discussion between the United States and Russia.

This is the framework for which the initial proposal of the Secretariat was, as far as Resolution 947 is concerned, that the resolution be technically extended so that the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not stopped. This process now has a new characteristic, which is Milosevic's support for the Contact Group plan.

This was the initial position, in which all our friends suggested the extension of the mandate as one of the interim steps for the resolution of the overall crisis, the priority in which is to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and force the Bosnian Serbs on the basis of the Contact Group proposal. They insisted the most because of Bosnia, as they do not consider the problem of Croatia as difficult. We, on the other hand, insisted on a parallel solution.

[Ujević] There was obviously no consent concerning the change of the UNPROFOR mandate in New York. What arguments did the Croatian side use in procuring the change in the initial version of the resolution, and how does its final version consolidate the political position of the country?

[Granic] We said we realized that a consensus concerning the use of force in implementing the resolution could not be reached, but in return we wanted as good a political declaration as possible. That involves appealing to the mutual recognition of all the countries, assigning the mandate to the Contact Group to present a proposal, emphasizing the issue of the pink zones, and referring to all the relevant resolutions, including Resolution 871.

[Ujević] Speaking of the pink zones, allow me to make a digression concerning the blue zones. How was it possible that Croatia gave the Serbs part of the free territory through the Zagreb agreement?

[Granic] As far as I can see it from the outside, I believe that the Zagreb agreement should be viewed within a certain time and circumstances. The Zagreb agreement was signed at the same time as the Washington agreement, which stopped the war between the Croats and Muslims and established the framework for a permanent solution to the Croat-Muslim relations and which, practically, guarantees survival for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, bearing in mind, of course, that nearly 380,000 Croats have been expelled or have moved out of Bosnia. This is the spirit in which the international community demanded that the war be stopped, that a cease-fire agreement be made, and that first the economic issues be discussed, and then the political solution for the Croatian occupied territories, in the spirit of the European Union. This was the idea behind the Zagreb

agreement. The negative aspect of this is that there was no cooperation of the local Serbs, which is what leads us to the conclusion that talks can be conducted only if pressure is made on Belgrade by tying the further suspension of the sanctions to the situation in the UNPA's [UN Protected Areas] and accepting the Contact Group proposal, which was agreed upon in Resolution 947, for the final solution to the situation in the occupied areas. This was the model of the agreement that, apart from having introduced less intensive provocations, also brought a good tourist season and the continuation of all the financial negotiations, and the international community proposing the final model for the solution that is acceptable to Croatia.

[Ujevic] You mentioned Milosevic's support for the Contact Group plan. How could the same model then be acceptable to Croatia? The mini-Contact Group allegedly presented certain proposals concerning federalization of Croatia. Is that true?

[Granic] In the Contact Group there are certain differences between the United States and Russia, and between the United States, the European Union, and Russia, and I must say that some of the present positions of the Russian Federation are unacceptable to us.

[Ujevic] Is it true that the Contact Group was supposed to propose the solution for Croatia that would grant the Serbs the rights that would go beyond the Constitutional Law, but on a somewhat smaller territory?

[Granic] We received no paper, nor was any paper agreed upon. Therefore, we can now not discuss what will be proposed. However, I said that the ideas were in any event that the local autonomy areas include only the districts of Knin and Glina. The occupied territories in western Slavonia are not included in any kind of autonomy.

[Ujevic] What about eastern Slavonia?

[Granic] That is not included either, though there have been some considerations that the Croatian state would gradually take over the authority within a specifically determined time.

As far as the ideas concerning federalization of Croatia, which we definitely refused, are concerned, we can say with complete certainty that the U.S. side would never accept them. I am also certain that they would not accept any plan that would not be favorable for Croatia.

[Ujevic] The Contact Group is supposed to come out with the plan by the end of the year, is that right?

[Granic] Within the next two months, by Christmas at the latest.

[Ujevic] It leaked in New York that this was the last extension of this kind of UNPROFOR mandate.

[Granic] That is correct. There is something else. I believe that the resolution should not only remain the way it is, but that it is now even more valuable. The parliament has presented its opinion. In three months it

will assess the situation and see what it will do. Do not forget, if the Contact Group does not present a plan that would be acceptable, that is, if the plan goes in the wrong direction, then the parliament resolution will be even more important. However, the chances of a positive change are very realistic, especially if there is a change in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which means if the Bosnian Serbs accept the Contact Group plan. That would mean that NATO forces would arrive, as well as some additional UN Protection Forces, and that means a realistic blockade of any military aid from Belgrade. This is the essence of this resolution, with which President Tudjman started and ended his conversation with President Clinton. In other words, the parliament resolution guarantees a clear political framework, and this is the extent to which it helped us withstand all the troubles and pressures that the Russian Federation was creating in New York; pressured, naturally, by Serbia. The diplomatic struggle continues, it goes on every day. However, our position is clear. It is the Constitutional Law. Item 7 of the resolution opens the door to negotiations, but we will not discuss the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and unity of Croatia.

[Ujevic] When you mentioned the Russian-Serb machinations in the UN, some people in the homeland reproached you for not having reacted more strongly to the fact that the Yugoslav foreign minister V. Jovanovic was allowed to speak before the Security Council.

[Granic] What I did—which was sit back (Ambassador Nobilo spoke on my behalf)—is the upper limit in such circumstances.

[Ujevic] What happens after the current UNPROFOR mandate expires? Another resolution?

[Granic] No. Butrus-Ghali's report will follow, which the Security Council will either accept or not accept. Before that, the government has to be consulted. Therefore, the fact that the parliament will discuss this on 10 January or around that date, and present its opinion, is ideal timing for us. This is when both the Croatian president and the government will present their opinion on whether any progress was made.

[Ujevic] What if they decide that there was no progress?

[Granic] If this is the opinion, and the conclusion is that Croatia will no longer extend the UNPROFOR mandate, then the only thing that can be discussed is the technical time for its withdrawal. Naturally, in that case there will be strong pressures. However, we have given a lot of thought to this, and concluded that in the present situation we constructively consolidated our position in the European Union, in relation to the United States.

[Ujevic] According to Resolution 947, what could, after the 100 days, be marked as concrete progress in the UNPROFOR activities?

[Granic] We must view the resolution in two directions. One of them involves the present UNPROFOR activities, and the other is the framework the Contact Group

provided for the political solution. However, what we want is a proposal for the political solution that would be acceptable to us. This is the main thing. If we get that, we will be able to say that the resolution was successful.

On the other hand, UNPROFOR must, within the framework of its present mandate, do certain things, from the pilot-program of the return of the refugees to the blue zones and the supply, to the initial opening of communications. This is, at the present stage, the realistic range.

[Ujevic] When will border control be dealt with?

[Granic] We will presently demand that UNPROFOR control the border with Serbia, at two border crossings. The resolution provides for that possibility.

[Ujevic] Would it be correct to put things this way: Croatia has, with its open issues, entered the joint political concept of the solution with Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, with the establishment of the federation and confederation. In view of that, the issue of either three or six months of UNPROFOR is fairly irrelevant. If this is so, when can the establishment of these relations with the neighboring country be realistically expected?

[Granic] That is correct. The establishment of the federations is of vital importance both for the Croats and the Muslims. It guarantees the Croats equal existence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the European state context to the Muslims—which is the only thing the international community is willing to accept. Similarly, the lifting of the embargo can only relate to the federation, and it must relate to Croatia, since, clearly, weapons can only pass through Croatia, although naturally we support the peace action plan. Moreover, the federation has to be ready to accept that. This is very important. A joint government and a joint headquarters must be established. As you can see, there have been many processes that need to be worked on.

[Ujevic] In view of that, what would be your comment on the fact that President Izetbegovic did not even mention the issue of the federation and confederation at the General Assembly, and on the change in his position regarding the embargo?

[Granic] President Izetbegovic said, in his explanation to President Tudjman, that he had been concentrating on the embargo issue until the last moment, and that this was the reason he did not speak about the federation and confederation.

[Ujevic] Was this meeting held at his initiative?

[Granic] Yes, at the initiative of President Izetbegovic. However, it should be noted that, though we acknowledge this explanation, we believe it was a great mistake.

[Ujevic] What lies behind the giving up on the lifting of the arms embargo?

[Granic] The fact that the Americans did not have the consensus of the European Union, which threatened that,

in case the embargo is lifted, it would withdraw all its troops, which position the Canadians joined. On the other hand, there is also the situation in which the lifting of the embargo requires specific preparations. That means that the federation indeed has established a joint command, and that the command has been established on the ground. Finally, it is important that there have been no guarantees in that case for an efficient defense of the enclaves.

[Ujevic] Would it be all right, in diplomatic terms, to say if Mr. Izetbegovic gave up on his demand for free?

[Granic] It would be diplomatic to say only that he did not.

[Ujevic] The following question is undiplomatic, but I will ask you nevertheless: Will the time necessary for the peace or non-peace process be sufficient for the people to return to their homes?

[Granic] These moves are certainly bringing us closer to that. However, if anyone were to discuss any dates, they would be either uninformed, or else they would not be telling the truth. What is certain is that Resolution 871 legally granted us the right to the return. However, no date for the return can be determined without the complete political willingness for a solution. In other words, we are systematically approaching the time when the political preconditions will be met, which will then have to include the exact date of the return. What we can do now is absolutely insist on the return to the blue zones.

Naturally, there will be some people, some elderly people, who may not return, and some children who may not want to return. However, it is certain that a great majority of people will want to, and this positive charge must be maintained—not by false promises, but by truth, and by working on providing these people with a good life and a good social standard.

[Ujevic] Will Serbia really be consistently pressured with economic sanctions until it recognizes Croatia?

[Granic] Absolutely. Among other people, President Clinton and Mr. Kinkel explicitly confirmed that.

[Box, p 11]

More Damage for Slovenia

[Ujevic] What is your comment on the attempt of the Slovenian Parliament to annex part of Croatian territory?

[Granic] In this case it is certain that the resolving of the overall relations between Croatia and Slovenia is less important for Croatia than for Slovenia, since Croatia has the more important issue of reintegrating its overall territory. For Slovenia, on the other hand, this is the primary problem. Secondly, Slovenia has created certain expectations about Croatia in the public and in the press, which are greater than what it can realistically meet. Thirdly, Slovenia often resolves its internal problems on the issue of its relations with Croatia. Therefore, who has

profited more from these moves, and who has suffered more damage? In the overall relations Slovenia has certainly suffered more, as Croatia will from now on be less flexible. I am not talking about giving or not giving territory, but about the setting of the border, and about the resolution of the two great economic issues—the Ljubljanska Banka one and the Krsko one—and the agreement on economic relations. This decision, which prejudices the solution, is of no consequence to us or the international arbitration, and it will change nothing on the ground. We would like to resolve the overall problems through negotiations, but if that does not work, we are prepared for international arbitration or international court. Minister Peterle's sober positions provide some hope for an agreement.

Serbian Paramilitary Group Accused of War Crimes

95BA0004B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
28 Sep 94 p 9

[Unattributed article: "Indictment of 58 Members of Paramilitary 'Bilogorska Detachment': Accused of War Crimes and Acts Against Humanity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Members of a paramilitary unit are suspected of killing several dozen persons of non-Serb nationality in the Grubisno Polje region, as well as seriously injuring, abusing, arresting, and otherwise mistreating a larger number of persons while in captivity. They also stole property from the populace and fired on civilian structures, vehicles, and persons without any military justification.*

Bjelovar—The Bjelovar Okrug Public Prosecutor's Office announced on Tuesday that it has entered indictments before the Zupanja Court in Bjelovar against 58 persons from the territory of the former Grubisno Polje Opština. They were indicted for criminal acts against humanity and international law—war crimes against the civilian population as designated in Article 120, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia.

Indicted were: Milan Bastasic, Zivko Zagorac, Branko Popovic, Rade Cakmak, Ranko Radelic, Branko Cortan, Lazo Savatovic, Milenko Stojic, Tihomir Antesevic, Jovan Berak, Milivoj Berak, Zivko Berak, Nenad Bizic, Spasoje Bizic, Ranko Bobic, Nebojsa Bojic, Bozo Borota, Milenko Bosanac, Sinisa Bosanac, Radovan Brkic, Ivica Capac, Milivoj Cakmak, Dragan Colic, Bogdan Cujo, Milorad Davidovic, Boro Davidovic, Timo Djevic, Slobodan Djordjevic, Damir Glusac, Vladimir Ilic, Ljubiska Jecmenica, Milenko Jezdic, Milorad Kovacevic, Gojko Kocic, Radovan Kosanovic, Ljuban Kovacevic, Djordje Kovacevic, Branko Kosanovic, Zdravko Kozulic, Slobodan Kucuk, Milan Laktas, Nenad Lolic, Uros Ljubisic, Stevan Macura, Borivoj Milasinovic, Dusan Mrksic, Milan Orozovic, Milenko Orozovic, Nenad Peulic, Slobodan Peulic, Miroslav Pribjegovic, Boro Sladojevic, Nikola Saric, Milivoj Tvr-dorijeka, Drazen Vuckovic, Zarko Vukovic, Nenad Vurdelja, and Savo Zvonaric.

The first eight men are charged with setting up a paramilitary unit in the territory of Grubisno Polje Opština during August, September, and October 1991, the so-called "Bilogorska Detachment," armed with weapons from the former JA [Yugoslav Army], with its base of operations in Velika Peratovica, and of having commanded this unit.

With this detachment, they carried out Greater Serbian policy in an attempt to forcibly overthrow the constitutionally established political and social structures of the Republic of Croatia, separate that region, and annex it to the Republic of Serbia.

The others are accused of forcibly imprisoning innocent civilians in Velika Peratovica as members of that unit during armed fighting in this region, contrary to international conventions and under orders from the first eight men. In the prison, civilians were beaten and mistreated in other ways; some of them were used as pawns during negotiations to ensure that demand would be met, while others were killed. They stole property from the populace and fired on civilian structures, vehicles, and persons without any military justification.

In these "campaigns," several dozen people of non-Serb nationality were killed, and a larger number of people were seriously injured, abused, arrested, and otherwise mistreated while in captivity.

In the court proceedings it will be necessary to hear the testimony of more than 100 witnesses, most of them injured parties. Since all the accused are at large, pretrial confinement has been stipulated and arrest warrants have been issued. The Okrug Public Prosecutor's Office believes that there are especially compelling reasons to try them in absentia and is thus recommending to the Zupanja Court that the accused be tried in absentia.

It is pointed out that this indictment covers the majority of the most significant enemy activities in the territory of former Grubisno Polje Opština, while at the same time several others proceedings are under way before the Zupanja Court and the Military Court in Bjelovar against a larger number of persons regarding other events in connection with the rebellion by part of the population of Serb nationality in this region.

HND Reportedly Making Inroads in Istria

95BA0004A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
20 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by Mirko Urosevic: "Cres and Losinj Instead of Dispossessed Brioni"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pula—"The Independent Democrats on the level of Istria Zupanja are moving forward ambitiously; after Porec, they have now organized in Pula as well and before long will do so in all Istrian cities, the goal being to enter into intense but democratic competition with the IDS [Istrian Democratic Assembly]. Just as we are constructive opposition to the HDZ [Croatian

Democratic Community] on the level of the Republic of Croatia, we want to be that in Istria and the Istrian islands to the IDS as well, which until our emergence lacked almost any opposition. In this context, we are also moving ambitiously into Opatija, where we already have 350 members even though we have not formed an organization, and the same is true of the Istrian islands of Cres and Losinj, where the IDS has completely capitulated. We need Cres and Losinj for island tourism, because pharaoh Tudjman had taken Brioni away from us for his residence." This was part of the statement made by the leader of the HND [Croatian Independent Democrats] for Istria, Elio Martincic, who is also the party's vice chairman and an Assembly deputy, during a Monday news conference in Pula concerning current events on the level of the Republic of Croatia and Istria Zupanija. Also present were the HND leaders for the city of Pula—the chairman of the City Organization, Marko Martincic, and vice chairmen Edi Pauletic and Mario Quaranta.

Support for Teachers

At the beginning of the news conference, Elio Martincic said that the HND wholeheartedly supports the teachers strike and condemns all efforts to undermine it, and that it regards with particular repugnance the method of threatening to fire them, for which there is no basis in law; rather, that move is derived from options provided for in the Law on Defense! In that context, Martincic expressed a negative assessment of the actions of the government and its prime minister, and especially of the Istrian zupan, who told representatives of the striking teachers that he is a state official and that he will execute the government's order on firing if necessary. Instead, Martincic said categorically, as the leading figure of the IDS Delbianco should have rejected the very notion of that sort of order instead of dutifully shrugging.

As far as the Statutes of Istria Zupanija are concerned, Martincic asserted that besides their other illegal features, of particular topical interest right now is the irregular linkage between Istria Zupanija and other regions, especially the regions of the Council of the European Community, for which there is no legal or constitutional basis. Only cities, opstinas, and kotars can establish links beyond state borders, not zupanijas, by way of national alliances. This linkage and fraternization with foreign regions constitutes manipulation of both the zupanija and its populace, through which the IDS is politicizing intrigue and sensationalism, creating new tensions and confrontations with the state leadership. Martincic also mentioned dual citizenship, saying that he does not see any problem there, in contrast to naturalization, which not only relates to Italy, but is much more serious with regard to Germany, because numerous citizens are renouncing Croatian and accepting German citizenship, all for existential reasons, due to the general impoverishment for which the HDZ is to blame on the Croatian level and the IDS is to blame on the Istrian level. Martincic added that the state is obligated to pay for property of those who choose another citizenship because that problem has not yet been resolved.

IDS Behavior Worse Than HDZ's

Particular attention was devoted to the work and behavior of the leading Istrian party, the IDS, whose behavior was said to be worse than that of the HDZ. Local self-rule and regionalism are not developing in the least and the zupanija departments are not functioning; moreover, in some cases, such as the Pula Municipal Administration, there is an abundance of examples of privatization where preliminary criminal charges have been brought precisely at the insistence of individuals from the ranks of the HND!

Asked by journalists whether there is any basis to the assertion by Milan Djukic that Serbs in Istria are subjected to numerous discomforts, Martincic said that the Serbs in this region have not committed any excesses whatsoever and for that reason they have been supported by the IDS and now by the HND. Regarding the World Congress of Istrians which Vice Zupan Dr. Loredana Bogliun-Debeljuh announced this weekend will be held next spring, Martincic said that the IDS cannot arrogate the Istrian diaspora in the same way that the HDZ has arrogated the Croatian diaspora! "The HND respects authentic Istrianism and supports positive regionalism, and in this context we will express our right to have contacts with Istrian emigres." However, as far as the initiative put forward at the HSP [Croatian Rights Party] convention in Rijeka on settling Istria is concerned, Martincic said that this is a frivolous proposal by a party that through such action shows that it is a lackey or sister party to the HDZ. "We have nothing against Istria being settled by Croats, because Istria is Croatian land, but we do not want to be threatened with that."

Millions of Marks Uncontrolled

Other participants in the news conference such as Marko Martincic, critically addressing the work of bodies of local self-rule and leaders of the IDS, pointed to the untenable practice of failing to collect municipal compensation from major enterprises such as Uljanik. In this way, millions of German marks remain uncontrolled, money that could be focused in various directions. Dr. Andjelo Slivar, a member of the Administrative Board of Pula Medical Center, sharply criticized the attitude of the IDS and of the Istrian zupan toward that health-care institution, especially the removal of leading Istrian surgeon Dr. Marija Glavas from the post of chief of surgery. In two months, he has been reassigned to a different post five times, even though the inspectorate ordered that the decision to replace him be deferred. What is being done at the Medical Center and against Dr. Glavas is a uniform administrative cowboy approach, Elio Martincic remarked. The Pula HND vice chairman Mario Quaranta, who is also responsible for minority affairs, asserted that there is actually no reason for the campaign for dual Croatian-Italian citizenship because the issue is one of economic exodus, not some sort of auctioning off of national awareness and pride.

Gligorov Leading in Presidential Election*AU1710195694 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 17 Oct 94**[Report by Zoran Lukovic from Skopje]*

[FBIS Translated Text] The unofficial information on the turnout and the results of the presidential and parliamentary elections in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] is arriving slowly, but, it appears, it is confirming the predictions. Of 120 electoral units, the candidates of the Alliance for Macedonia have won in 67 cases and are entering the second round of voting in the parliamentary elections. The same coalition, that is, the current authorities, has already secured 12 seats in the first round of voting. In another 40 or so electoral units, the candidates of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] and the NDP [People's Democratic Party], the parties whose members are of Albanian nationality, and the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] are in the lead. The Democratic Party of Petar Gosev has obviously suffered an election fiasco.

In the presidential elections, Kiro Gligorov is leading convincingly. It is assumed here that, when all the results are added, he will manage to secure about 690,000 votes, which is 50 percent plus 1 of the total electorate. Gligorov has received 560,000 votes so far. There are still some 40 percent of the electoral units to be processed.

The other candidate, Ljubisa Georgievski, received only a quarter of the number of Gligorov's votes.

First-Round Victory Impossible for Gligorov*AU1810091194 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 18 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] In Skopje, the State Electoral Commission is expected to issue the results of the presidential and parliamentary elections held on Sunday [16 Oct]. The commission's news conference scheduled for last night was canceled without any explanation. So far, the only official information is that 56 percent of the electorate has participated in the elections. It is assessed that this is insufficient for the victory of the ruling election coalition's presidential candidate Kiro Gligorov in the first round. The leading opposition party, VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], has announced that it will be calling for the annulment of the elections, on the grounds that it believes that they were rigged.

Alliance for Macedonia Issues Preliminary Results*AU1710211694 Skopje MIC in English 17 Oct 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] According to the latest announcement from the Alliance for Macedonia, their

election headquarters has carried out an analysis of 92 percent of the electoral units.

It was concluded that the electoral body has increased 1 percent. Of the voters, 908,534 went to the polls, which presents 65.78 percent of the total number of votes in all electoral units.

In the first round, according to this announcement, 13 deputies of the Alliance for Macedonia and a couple from the other parties have gained passage to parliament.

The Alliance is leading in 80 electoral units, VMRO-DPMNU [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] is leading in five, the Party for Democratic Prosperity in six, and four deputies from the other parties.

Of these 908,534 voters, 71 percent voted for President Gligorov, 18.9 percent for his opponent Ljubisa Georgievski, and 11 percent of the papers were invalid.

According to this information, 277,855 voters voted for the Alliance for Macedonia, and 643,627 for the candidate Kiro Gligorov.

CSCE Registers 'Irregularities' in Elections*LD1710135994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1313 GMT 17 Oct 94*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 17 Oct (TANJUG)—A delegation of the CSCE parliamentary assembly gave a news conference in Skopje today warning the electoral authorities that in the second round of elections for the Macedonian parliament they had to remove "some serious and obvious irregularities" for the elections to be considered fair and free.

At the news conference the delegation said that it had visited more than 100 polling stations and established that the lists of voters were "unreliable" and that the "voters had been deprived of the necessary information, because they either had not received invitations or had received them late."

The real picture of yesterday's presidential and parliamentary elections in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 120 electoral units is obscure and contradictory at the moment. This is caused in particular by the slow data processing by the State Electoral Commission, and unofficial and incomplete reports broadcast on some of the local media.

The commission has announced details on the turnout in only 98 electoral units where, according to reports received by this morning, approximately 576,000 people turned out to vote, which represents 51 percent of the registered voters.

Many observers, irrespective of the slow data processing, consider this "a rather weak turnout."

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The progovernment daily NOVA MAKEDONIJA carries on its front page the headline saying that the citizens turned out to vote "en masse." [passage omitted]

The second round of parliamentary and presidential elections in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be held 14 days after the first round.

Observers Issue Statement

AU1710170694 Paris AFP in English 1635 GMT 17 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Oct 17 (AFP)—European election observers urged Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Monday to rectify "blatant irregularities" which they said had marred the first round of presidential and legislative polls.

Sunday's polls—the first since Macedonian independence from Yugoslavia—were monitored by some 150 observers from the parliamentary assembly of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Council of Europe.

In a statement the observers said they had "found a number of irregularities, some potentially serious."

Electoral lists "were considered unreliable because they did not include a high number of people who had the right to vote," the statement added.

It called on the government to "urgently correct this situation" prior to the scheduled second round of voting on October 30.

"The delegation... urges that the more blatant irregularities described be corrected by that time so that the elections could be considered adequately free and fair."

The CSCE delegation, led by Spaniard Javier Ruperez, comprised representatives from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Russia, and Turkey. The monitoring team also included U.S., Turkish, and Ukrainian advisers.

Late changes in constituency boundaries since the country's first elections in 1990 meant some voters were directed to the wrong polling stations.

Two opposition movements, the Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) and the Democratic Party, earlier denounced the election as irregular.

The favourite to win the presidential race was outgoing President Kiro Gligorov, 77. His rival was 57-year-old Ljubisa Georgijevski, a right-wing nationalist from the VMRO-DPMNE.

Surveys indicated Gligorov could win an outright majority on Sunday.

Meanwhile, 1,766 candidates from 36 parties were running for 120 seats in parliament, where the VMRO-DPMNE garnered the largest share of the vote in 1990, winning 44 seats.

Unofficial early results published Monday showed Gligorov and his ruling leftist coalition were ahead in the first round of voting.

The results, cited by local media, said Gligorov won 316,000 out of 430,000 votes Sunday compared to his rival Ljubisa Georgijevski who won 97,000 votes. There were 17,000 spoiled votes, according to the early results.

VMRO-DPMNE Demands Rerun of Elections

AU1810083894 Paris AFP in English 0053 GMT 18 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Skopje, Oct 17 (AFP)—Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] main opposition party called on Monday [17 Oct] for the cancellation of the first round of presidential and legislative polls, held on Sunday, because there had been "too many irregularities."

The claim was made by Ljubisa Georgijevski, leader of the extreme right wing nationalist Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), speaking at a news conference in Skopje. [passage omitted]

Georgijevski stood as the VMRO-DPMNE candidate for the presidency of Macedonia against the outgoing president Kiro Gligorov who was backed by the Alliance for Macedonia, a coalition of three left-wing parties.

"Unless the government cancels (the first round), we shall withdraw from the elections and we shall not take part in the second round," Georgijevski said. The second round is due to take place on October 30.

Georgijevski presented a number of examples of irregularities which, he said, had taken place during the first round, involving in particular the altering of electoral lists without voters being notified in time.

As soon as polling ended on Sunday evening the main opposition parties alleged that the process had been marred by irregularities. Georgijevski said that a big protest demonstration was being organized for Wednesday. [passage omitted]

DP Blames State for Electoral 'Irregularities'

AU1710131894 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 17 Oct 94 p 4

[Unattributed report on DP news conference: "The Elections Are Irregular"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today we only wished to monitor peacefully the course of the elections, but the authorities have forced us to react to the numerous irregularities in this way, Petar Gosev said at the first

meeting that he had with the journalists yesterday at DP [Democratic Party] headquarters. Of the numerous reactions and also our personal observations we see that the Law on Constituencies has been violated. The example of "103" [not further specified] has now been repeated on a grand scale. The constituencies are being altered, with whole streets redirected from one constituency to another without anyone previously informing the citizens. We have such a case with Kisela Voda, Gorce Petrov, Gazi Baba, Centar [communes in Skopje], and Stajkovci Village. The authorities made the arrangements unilaterally to dissipate the voting body that is inclined to our or another party.

Another major problem is that the voting lists have not been updated, a large number of citizens are missing from them, although they were there in the previous elections, as well as the four generations that are old enough to have the right to vote, and, therefore, it is absurd to claim that the number of the voters is so much smaller. However, it is a fact that one election list that had 600 voters on it at the previous elections now has only 60. Citizens are wandering from one polling station to another and thus the desire to vote in the morning has been already lost; this was probably the ultimate goal, Gosev said. He said that it was the greatest manipulation to prevent students in Skopje from voting. In addition, voting papers have been delivered in a strictly selective way, while in some Skopje districts, such as Zdanec and Kozle, they were not sent at all, and the ballot papers have been made of a paper so sensitive that it leaves a mark on the one below. Gosev also objected to the violation of the election silence period by some daily newspapers and by the weekly PULS.

The DP held another news conference at the end of the day at which they said that all the violations mentioned had increased in both quantity and intensity. Gosev said

that similar activities were going on in all the communes, that the lists were absolutely out-of-date, that constituencies were being changed, monitors from the parties expelled, voting allowed without identification or with old identity cards, and those who were sent to find certificates from the local authorities could not do so because the offices were closed. This had been the case in Ohrid, Kumanovo, Bitola, Resen, and Gorce Petrov. In view of all this, the DP considers the elections irregular and will be taking all legal steps. It is really to do with well planned state obstruction with the aim of rigging voters' wishes, Gosev concluded.

'Dissatisfaction' of Civil-Liberals With Election

*AU1710132394 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 17 Oct 94 p 4*

[Unattributed report on statement by the Civil-Liberal Party: "Dissatisfaction Owing to Irregularities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Civil-Liberal Party of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] has issued a statement on the occasion of the presidential and parliamentary elections. It reads that there have been irregularities in the elections in the sense of the delivery of election papers as well as in the voting with many citizens prevented from voting because the election lists were not updated. The statement goes on to say that some absurd situations have been created in which the citizens of one commune were redirected to another without any previous notification.

Because of such cases the Civil-Liberal Party of Macedonia proclaims its dissatisfaction to the Macedonian public, and observations have been formulated in writing about these irregularities that will be presented to the State Election Commission.

Federal

Foreign Minister, SPS Official Interviewed

AU1710211994 Belgrade RTB Television Network in
Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 17 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Here is what Federal Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic and Borisav Jovic, vice president of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and president of the Council for International Cooperation of the Main Committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia, told our reporter about the current international position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the lifting of the sanctions.

[Jovanovic] We would like this process to move at an accelerated pace. We think that, regarding both local protagonists in the Yugoslav crisis and those further afield, we have contributed most to the strengthening of the peace process and that this should be fully acknowledged by and reflected in the international community's actions toward us as soon as possible.

A further easing of sanctions, a radical easing of sanctions, and the radical removal of the isolation that was imposed on our country are something that can naturally only strengthen and make easier this peace process, since this process can only be assisted more by a country that is an equal participant in it. This cannot be said for our country yet.

Therefore, both the sanctions and the isolation are essentially major obstacles to peace. They are generally not what they were supposed to be in the eyes of their creators. They have virtually turned into the biggest obstacle to peace. Awareness is growing in many countries that this is anachronistic and absurd. We expect not only this awareness, but also pressure from the greatest number of these countries, above all the European countries, to grow and speak in favor of lifting this burden from our back, to grow to the extent of it becoming unbearable and thus force the Security Council to face this issue very soon and adopt an appropriate and, naturally, positive decision.

[Kerkez] Tell us, what are the specific future steps to have the sanctions totally lifted?

[Jovanovic] We are in contact with members of the Contact Group, with members of the Security Council. We intend to contact the Security Council officially in the near future and demand the lifting of all sanctions, because Yugoslavia, judging by a very thorough analysis of the conditions in Resolution 757, has done everything it has been requested to do, and has even gone a few steps further. It is up to the Security Council, for the sake of its own authority and credibility, to carry out its share of the obligations stipulated in the resolution, namely to lift the sanctions on Yugoslavia, since the reason for the further maintenance of the sanctions has simply vanished.

[Jovic] The position of our country is clearly improving at this moment. Of course, this is so owing to the force of

international circumstances, but primarily owing to the sustained peace policy of our country, which, recently, has been respected and recognized increasingly more.

The aim and purpose of the discussion in the Council [for the International Cooperation of the Main Committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia] is to assess all the circumstances in which our country has found itself, to review our activities in that respect so far, to find out what we should do in the future to continue this course and secure as good an international position as possible. This means peace, the lifting of the sanctions, and the inclusion of our country in the international community.

According to our assessment, which is very clear, our position is improving, we are moving closer to the total lifting of the sanctions—we hope that this will not be dragged on for long—and our inclusion in the international community, which would give our country good chances to improve its position considerably.

Bank Governor Avramovic Says He Will Resign

AU1710182594 Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA in
Serbo-Croatian 15-16 Oct 94 p 9

[Report by M. Mikulic: "I Shall Leave in Three Months' Time"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A rather emotional address by Professor Dr. Dragoslav Avramovic, governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia and creator of the program for country's economic recovery, has upset and saddened the hundreds of trade union activists from throughout the republic gathered at the 27th meeting of the Alliance of the Independent Trade Unions of Yugoslavia in Matruska Banja. Namely, "super deka" [super grandpa] complained to the trade union leaders that "there are not a few people who are undermining his program" and that this represents "a serious threat to the survival of the nation, the state, and society."

"I would like to tell you," Avramovic emphasized, "that those who would like to destroy all this have closed their ranks. This is a very serious problem with possible catastrophic consequences. We have created the preconditions for survival and the future and steered everything back on the tracks of normality, however, there is a serious danger that it will all be derailed. Economists are threatening, banks are threatening, governments, businessmen, press are all threatening.... I appeal particularly to the businessmen who are unjustifiably raising the prices of their produce not to commit collective suicide. If this spreads and we sink into inflation unnecessarily, then I do not know how this society will survive...."

Upon the insistence that he "be more explicit" and name the culprits specifically, Governor Avramovic continued in the same style:

"Everything can disappear just like in a fire. We cannot sustain such expenditure by our governments. Our country cannot afford to have three states, three governments,

various subgovernments, economic chambers, and other idiocies. Our best cadres are leaving because they cannot survive on 200 dinars a month. Our best engineers have become the most accomplished speculators in gasoline. The teams that I have formed will tell us where we stand and what to do next by 1 January this year [sentence as published]. I have no political ambition nor do I harbor a desire to be the governor, I shall withdraw in three months' time...." Dragoslav Avramovic said.

A salvo of support for Avramovic's program and Avramovic personally was started by Tomislav Banovic, president of the republican trade unions' council, who emphasized that "there is no alternative to this program, and people should be clearly told who the saboteurs are, and they should be tried...."

"Professor Avramovic, on the occasion of our first meeting, we told you that we believed in you, but that we did not trust those around you. We supported your program and, if need be, we shall teach the first, second, third, fourth, or fifth government how it can be implemented. We will not take people onto the streets, however, we can take hoes in our hands and chase everybody out of the government. Your program must be implemented," Slobodanka Brankovic, member of the presidency of the republican council of the Alliance of the Independent Trade Unions, exclaimed.

Svetozar Gataric, president of the Vojvodina Trade Unions, came out with similar threats, emphasizing that "a 2-million-strong army of workers will find it easy to deal with saboteurs...."

"We all know who is holding us back and stopping us. We visited Pristina recently and saw everything. They have told you that production in Kosovo has allegedly increased by 21 percent while you have seen for yourself that it has actually dropped by 18 percent in comparison to the earlier period. Milenko Ilic, the head of the Mitrovica-based Trepeca, an enterprise that finally went under under his leadership, is in one of your study groups. We have already started clearing the ranks in Kosovo, and a number of directors have been banned from entering factories. That is how we will defend your program," Momir Popovic, head of Kosovo trade union organizations, said. Ilija Stetic from Vrsac spoke about the anger of the "deceived" Vojvodina farmers, while Bojana Kelic from Samobor spoke of the poor conditions in the health care system.

Facing adamant insistence to name the culprits, Governor Avramovic said he was touched by trade unions' support, however, "do not expect me to point the finger at those who should be driven out with a hoe...." Finally, he expressed the hope that everything will nevertheless be fine, emphasizing that "the key to survival lies in greater and more extensive investments in modern production."

[Box 1, p 9]

It Will Be Known by New Year

After the meeting, we asked Governor Avramovic to answer more precisely whether he would really withdraw, as he had announced, in three months' time.

"If I said so, then it must be understood in that way. Everything that we have done so far is a great success, by the New Year we shall know what to do next, and afterwards things can proceed without me," Governor Avramovic replied in his unique style.

Interview With Customs Director Mihalj Kertes

95BA0005A Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian
19 Aug-2 Sep 94 pp 18-21

[Interview with Mihalj Kertes, director of Federal Customs Administration, by Marko Lopusina; place and date not given: "Special Envoy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The greatest Serb among the Hungarians, the director of the Federal Customs Administration [SUC], a man with many nicknames, but better known as Braca, has resolved to bring order to the border crossings. Because of that, he has already clashed with Milo Djukanovic, people from the AMSJ [Automobile and Motorcycle Federation of Yugoslavia], and bankers, but also with some of his own customs agents. Kertes put the SSUP [Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs] in its place, Milan Panic put him in his place, and he put Dafina in her place. Wherever Bracika goes, as he himself always says, ethical cleansing takes place!*

There is not a Serb alive who has not heard of Mihalj Kertes. He is the envoy with the most confidential functions, but also the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] deputy with the most nicknames. Kertes was the leader of the antiautonomist revolution in Novi Sad. He became famous in 1988 for his statement that he, as a Hungarian, is not afraid of the Serbs. Authorship of those already historic words is ascribed to Jova Rados, at the time an official of the PK [Provincial Committee] of the SK [League of Communists] of Vojvodina, but also to Miroslav Slevic, leader of the Kosovo Serbs. Unlike the two of them, Kertes has made a political career out of those words. He was elected deputy to parliament in Grocka, amid an opposition challenge and with the support of the Supreme Court. He is remembered both as the minister for the people, because he was chairman of the Commission for Citizen Complaints and Grievances, and as minister without portfolio in the Sainovic government. He was not celebrated as the chairman of the Commission for Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija], but he was famous as deputy minister of internal affairs of Yugoslavia, when he "converted" the SSUP into the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Serbia.

Because of his efficiency in his political dealings, NIN wrote last fall that Kertes is a man for special purposes in the Serbian government, VREME called him a "Balkan

spy," while to BORBA he was the "prince of Serbian Disneyland." Friends and sycophants call him Bracika, while he prefers to be simply Braca. When he became the top man for Yugoslav customs, Kertes gained another nickname from dissatisfied workers—director. Upon his arrival in May at the stone building of the Federal Customs Administration in Novi Beograd, a regime of order and work was established, which was not exactly to the liking of some officials at this federal institution, nor to the customs duty collectors at the state border. Many authorized and unauthorized smugglers in the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] regarded Kertes's appointment as an attack on their right to rob the state, so that they proclaimed him the Serbian sheriff of Norwood Forest.

"To be quite honest, I was not satisfied with the situation I found at customs. The prevalent mood among many members of the customs service was a laid-back approach, carelessness, and spotty morale. Based on what are to me essential criteria—the attitude toward work, the state, and major mistakes that were made—a number of supervisors of customhouses and of customs institutions were replaced and a rather large number of customs employees were eliminated. We are replacing them with very high-quality people, the goal being to protect the citizens and the state treasury through honest work. Why should that which belongs to the FRY line the pockets of bosses and mafiosi or anyone else? I personally visit customs crossings every night to check on the attitude toward travelers and, in turn, toward the state. Believe it or not, I have encountered cases where a customs agent has refused to perform a check under my orders.... Through continuous checks, we uncover all sorts of things, such as individuals who want to take several tens of thousands of German marks [DM] out of the country. We have seized 7 kg of gold, which one person wanted to smuggle out of the country. We confiscated weapons in a humanitarian convoy. We know for whom they were intended and why," Mihalj Kertes said recently.

Newspapers have reported that the new customs director has promised emigres and those working abroad that he will open a new traffic lane for them so that they do not have to wait at the border with their loads of medicine and food, but that has not happened. It is true that the traffic jams have been reduced, but they have not been eliminated. Instead, Mihalj Kertes has abolished the payment of customs duty by check, despite a state decision to the contrary, because he does not have the patience to wait for payment on these securities. He has banned the import of bananas because foreign exchange is provided for them, even as there is no one to pick plums and apples, nor to buy them. When he tried to replace the head of customs in Podgorica, he clashed with Milo Djukanovic, which has been officially denied by the office of the Montenegrin prime minister. Unofficially, however, that clash is still smoldering, because afterward Braca Kertes also "attacked" the AMSJ, which is headed by Milo Djukanovic, but also his agents Vukasin Maras and Dragan Culafic, the former head of

the Administration for Foreigners and the Border of the SSUP and an expert in issues of state borders and customs.

Serbification of Customs

"As long as I am what I am right now, I would not even dream of allowing what belongs to the FRY to disappear without a trace into the pockets of various mafiosi. Last year, for example, the AMSJ delivered 1,192 vehicles for 4.8 billion dinars and made it possible for its intermediaries to earn more than 1.32 billion from that. Only 3.57 billion flowed into the state coffers. The AMSJ is earning money without even breaking a sweat. Everything in the AMSJ denial was vague. It is interesting that the AMSJ is jostling so much for a job for which it says it has no use. For everything that I have stated, I have documentation from the AMSJ, AST Bank, and its Yugoslav and foreign stockholders, as well as documentation from the SUC," Mihalj Kertes said.

For years now, the AMSJ has been collecting customs duty for road transportation, collecting a fee for foreign vehicles on the roads, and also collecting a fee for gathering, watching over, and selling customs vehicles and auto parts. The AMSJ has legal backing for this, which Vukasin Maras alleges the customs director is now taking away from it. This involves the FRY's desire to completely cover revenue from customs, because the federal administration is no longer financed from the budget. However, that also represents a blow against the AMSJ and the people who have done well in it, some of whom are alleged to have gotten so rich that they have their own foreign exchange accounts in Switzerland. People familiar with the situation in the financial world contend that Kertes's mission is in fact to Serbify customs and its revenue, i.e., to circumvent the FRY and send it to Serbia, while people from police circles contend that Mihalj Kertes is slowly assuming control over the FRY and Serbian borders from Radovan Stojicic-Badza. And with it, the customs, commercial, and smuggling trade as well.

"Mihalj Kertes was born on 29 August 1947 in Backa Palanka. He completed Advanced Administration School and in 1970 got a job as a social services administrator. He became a member of the SKJ [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] in 1975. He worked in the 'Danube' Military District as an administrator for national defense and social self-protection. During those years, he became involved in the political structure of Backa Palanka Opstina, and in 1986 he became secretary of the Opstina Committee of the SK. He has been a member of the Serbian Presidency, a government minister, a deputy federal minister of internal affairs, and chairman of the Serbian Grievances Commission and the Serbian Amnesty Commission. A people's deputy in three sessions of the People's Assembly of Serbia," says the official biography of the newly appointed customs director.

Braca's name has been linked to cases of arms being smuggled into Bosnia, which according to VREME he

carried out with Miodrag Davidovic, the head of the SUP [Secretariat for Internal Affairs]. Dafina Milanovic has personally testified that she complained to him as a brother that "those people of his were eavesdropping" on her. Kertes himself admitted in the Serbian parliament that he had wiretapped and translated the telephone conversations of Andras Agoston, the leader of the Vojvodina Hungarians. He also defended the Serbs in that parliament against Subotica Mayor Jozef Kasa. Later, under public pressure, but also pressure from the SPS, Braca admitted that he was joking when he talked about wiretapping.

He made that statement publicly, because he had already experienced first-hand what it means to be expelled from and boycotted within the ruling party. When Milan Panic suspended Kertes, there was no room for him in the new Serbian government, so that Braca spent days at Nemanjina 11 walking the corridors. He entered by the prime minister's entrance so that every day the ministers and their aides thought that Kertes was calling on Nikola Sainovic. His only privilege at the time was to get gasoline from the Serbian MUP.

Crowd in London

Mihalj Kertes, the former deputy minister of the federal police, went without work and without pay for a full eight months. As a volunteer deputy he did receive his parliamentary deputy's supplement, but that is not the same thing, since the vice minister's salary was much greater. The popular Braca was the only person to pay the price for the political caprices of the dismissed Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic. That is why Mihalj Kertes, with the help of two attorneys, brought charges against the American businessman in both the United States and Yugoslavia. We asked Kertes why he did that.

[Kertes] When Milan Panic suddenly expelled me from my job on 28 August in London, he accused me of not supporting the government's program to prevent ethnic cleansing, meaning that he essentially accused me of genocide before the international public and termed me a war criminal. This seriously tainted my name and my family's reputation. Twenty days later, however, this same Panic government came to the conclusion that there was no ethnic cleansing in the FRY and refuted its own prime minister, but at that point he did not retract his decision concerning my dismissal. Because of Milan Panic, I was fired from the SSUP and was left without a job and without a salary. That is why I am seeking compensation of \$10 million!

[Lopusina] How did Milan Panic react to the charge and to such large compensation?

[Kertes] He has never shown any further interest in my fate. He is silent now. He will probably be protected from responsibility by state immunity. However, I have brought charges against him both as a U.S. national and as a Yugoslav citizen. I do not need his money. When I get it, I will give \$5 million to the hospital on Tirsova

Street and \$5 million to the workers of "Galenika" so that they can buy it from Milan Panic as stockholders.

[Lopusina] Tell us what really happened in London and how it was that you were there?

[Kertes] I left for the London Conference as the eighth member of the Yugoslav delegation. There were 24 of us. Milan Panic arrived in England two days before the delegation. I was staying eight stories above the apartments of Slobodan Milosevic and Dobrica Cosic, although as the person from the federal police I should have been much closer to our presidents.

At the beginning of the conference, I had problems with the hosts, because they were avoiding issuing passes for the main hall to Radovan Karadzic and Goran Hadzic. They wanted to put them in the gallery as observers. Just as I had solved that problem, a stranger came up to me and said discreetly, "I hear that you have been dismissed!" Surprised, I responded, "Could be!" Several moments later I was summoned by colleagues from Belgrade and informed that Belgrade Television had broadcast two important reports from London. The first was that the London Conference had begun, and the second was that Prime Minister Panic had dismissed the deputy minister of the federal police.

Panic and Tudjman

[Lopusina] Do you have any indication of why that happened?

[Kertes] Not at all! I requested a fax with an explanation and got one from Belgrade. It said that I did not support the program to prevent ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia. I was left alone. Everyone avoided me. I felt like a cheated husband who is the last to learn that his wife is cheating on him. Even Dobrica Cosic learned from his wife in Belgrade what had happened to me. During those days, Panic and I did not even see each other. I got a copy of his speech and saw on the added page 4a his statement indicating that he had in fact dismissed me.

[Lopusina] It was said that this was done because the British secret service had shown him your file on ethnic cleansing. There are also people who contend that you were removed because you were wiretapping English and Yugoslav officials—Cosic, for example—at the London Conference. What is your interpretation?

[Kertes] The English service does not have any such secret file on me, nor was I engaged in wiretapping. Milan Panic simply sacrificed me because at that conference he needed an effective move through which he would win another political point with the international public, and especially with foreign politicians.

I obtained two of Panic's documents before the debate at the conference.

In the first one, he advocates FRY recognition of Croatia with Tito's borders, with the obligation that Yugoslavia

subsequently be recognized by the United Nations. The names Milan Panic and Dr. Franjo Tudjman were in the column for signatures.

The second document provided for FRY agreement to the formation of autonomous regions for Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandzak. For signatures, the names Milan Panic, Slobodan Milosevic, Dobrica Cosic, Momir Bulatovic, and—I do not know why—Dr. Franjo Tudjman were listed. This document was also obtained by Dr. Nikola Koljevic, and he showed it to members of our delegation. Everyone was surprised. Milosevic refused to continue the conference if those documents were taken into the hall. Cosic said the same thing. Panic pounded his fist on the table hysterically, threatening us with military intervention and bombing.

[Lopusina] Was your dismissal not vindicated by those documents? Did Milosevic intervene with Panic on your behalf?

[Kertes] He asked him what I had done. Panic responded to him, "I heard that he was ethnically cleansing the country and so I fired him!" Milosevic asked him if he had proof of that, and Panic turned on the charm and tried to embrace me, calling out, "Come on, it's nothing; come to work!" And I did come on Friday, but Minister Pavle Bulatovic explained to me that the government had adopted the decision on my dismissal unanimously. I wanted to effect the transfer of duties, but the people from the SSUP would not allow me to.

[Lopusina] You complained that they broke into your office and that your colleagues stole from you.

[Kertes] SSUP employees broke into my desk and safe. They were probably looking for compromising material against me, but all they found was a liquor bottle for entertaining guests and a "CZ 10" pistol that we bought as a gift for the former minister, General Petar Gracanin. I do not know why, but they also cut one painting into shreds. They probably thought that I was hiding something in it.

The federal administration simply boycotted me. They transferred my salary to "Jugobank." They took away my London journals. They hid my work card and refused to give me a dismissal notice because they wanted to list me as if I were available. I did not want that status, so after three months I simply took my work card and employment file and thus became officially unemployed!

M. Panic's Lies

[Lopusina] You have stated publicly that the SPS is responsible for the appointment of Milan Panic as prime minister. Why then does someone from the SPS not offer his resignation if bringing Panic in was a major political mistake?

[Kertes] Milan Panic was brought in to the post of FRY prime minister in order to soften or remove the international sanctions, while Dobrica Cosic was brought in to raise our country's international standing. Very quickly,

however, it turned out that Panic was working for someone else, not for the FRY and Serbia. He immediately turned against the SPS in order to seize power. The political marriage between the SPS and Panic was like a marriage of love, but afterward it turned out that the bride was everyone's and no one's. By retaining the post of minister of defense, Panic demonstrated that he was working contrary to our agreements and for others, but also for himself. While he was prime minister, he bought several drug factories in the East for little money. The SPS cannot be responsible for that, because it repudiated that prime minister in time!

[Lopusina] You have researched Milan Panic's personal biography and discovered that actually he was not a political fugitive?

[Kertes] Panic left Yugoslavia with a red passport. He, a singer, and a cyclist simply remained abroad. They stayed in a refugee camp in Karlsruhe. There, Panic became close to a certain Ms. Weber and very quickly became the camp overseer. He was a terror to the Serbs in the camp. He received pay for that, but he did not help his own people because he ignored his own family. Milan Panic was never politically persecuted in the SFRY, he simply made up that story about himself. I am saying this for the sake of the truth, not to defend the communist system of the time!

[Lopusina] Apparently Panic was afraid of you. Why?

[Kertes] I do not know, he had no reason to be afraid. He simply could have dismissed me as a bad official, without a fuss and uproar. Apparently he was playing someone else's game. It is not out of the question that my dismissal was arranged by the German intelligence service, which has been bothered by me since back in 1986 when I began to advocate the restoration and preservation of the Republic of Serbia's statehood. I ruined their plans to partition Serbia and make Vojvodina independent.

[Lopusina] It is known that you were one of the leaders of the Serb rallies and the hero of the so-called yogurt revolution in Novi Sad. After that you were elected to parliament. How did you end up in the SSUP?

[Kertes] Serbia appointed me to the post of assistant to the federal minister of police, but the government of Ante Markovic, or rather of Aleksandar Mitrovic, decided to name me deputy minister. That appointment was obstructed by many people from the SIV [Federal Executive Council], especially Zoran Miskovic.

When I arrived at the SSUP on 1 April 1992, I was given all the authorities of an assistant, but also of deputy minister. I moved into an office where Stane Dolanc, Zdravko Mustac, and later Ivan Erzan as well were working—traitors from the SSUP who stole and took with them all the original documents of the Yugoslav State Security Service [SDB]. Fortunately, some worker had preserved them on microfilm, so that we have copies of them.

Ethical Cleansing

[Lopusina] So that means that you also became the head of the SDB of the SSUP?

[Kertes] Yes. I became a sort of acting director there. I wanted to bring order to the SDB, but also to the entire SSUP. The place was full of alcoholics and was a hotbed of anti-Serbism in the middle of Belgrade. I began to impose order immediately. I requested an inventory list for 31 December 1991 and discovered immediately that SSUP employees had stolen 42 paintings owned by the SFRY. Right before I arrived they had distributed all the federal apartments, even to employees who had deserted to other republics. During a routine check at 27 March Street, in a 182 square meter apartment, I found nine subtenants instead of federal officials. Nine Greeks who were paying DM900 a month to a Macedonian official. We changed the locks and took that apartment back!

[Lopusina] It was being said around Belgrade that you ethnically cleansed the SSUP of personnel who were not of Serb origin?

[Kertes] I cleansed the SSUP according to an ethical principle, not an ethnic one. I tried to remove people outside Serbia and Montenegro from all so-called sensitive posts. These people were not under permanent employ, but rather were working in Belgrade temporarily. They had been appointed by their republics and I simply asked that they return home, to their states. It is interesting that there were no Serbs in key posts in the SSUP. For years, the SSUP was known as an anti-Serbian institution. Even worse, some Montenegrins and some Serbs were working against Serbia. For example, the head of the office and self-proclaimed head of building security, as well as the head of the General Affairs Division. These people were obliged to maintain continuity in their activities against Serbia. By dismissing and retiring such personnel, I wanted to break that continuity.

[Lopusina] Was the raid on that building by forces from the Serbian MUP also part of your campaign to break that anti-Serbian continuity?

[Kertes] That would not be my interpretation. The government of Aleksandar Mitrovic decided to transfer ownership of the SSUP building at Knez Milos Street 92 to the Serbian MUP. That transfer was upheld by the Second Opstina Court on 2 August of last year. No one complained about that government decision, not even the SSUP. The Serbian MUP notified it and asked that the transfer of the building be carried out. They did not do so in time and the MUP simply entered its own property. I happened to be there at the time, and I heard one federal police official call out to me, "This is an occupation!" I simply asked him, "What is it, have the Germans arrived?" He said nothing.

Sloba's File

[Lopusina] By taking possession of the building, the Serbian MUP also took over the technical department

and the archives of the SDB SSUP, as well as its employees. Was the SDB SSUP really that strong and dangerous that the MUP had to intervene against it?

[Kertes] The Yugoslav State Security Service had one of the strongest technical services in Europe. It was capable of following and checking on a large number of Serbs, while the archives contained thousands of files on Serb patriots, including people in high-ranking state positions. An entire room of files, which the SDB SSUP often used to blackmail and pester those Serbian politicians. The Yugoslav secret police was a master of life and death not only in the SFRY, but also in Europe. It was a state within a state, combatting everything that was Serbian. Under the command of Zdravko Mustac, the SDB SSUP followed, photographed, and wiretapped all Serb cadre beginning back in 1986. They did not even leave me alone!

[Lopusina] Did you find your file at the Yugoslav SDB?

[Kertes] Yes. I took it to see what was written about me. In it I found a statement by Stipe Suvar to the SFRY Presidency in 1989 to the effect that in 1971 I had allegedly belonged to the Maspok [Mass Movement—political movement in late 1960's and early 1970's centered in Croatia] and participated in the campaigns of Croat nationalists. I was in prison that year for having sung the song "Glory to the Serb" in a public place in Ilok. I also found in the file an evaluation by the inspector of the Osijek SDB indicating that I had a "Serbo-chetnik orientation," which obviously did not square with Suvar's allegation.

[Lopusina] Did you know that the SDB SSUP was following and photographing you?

[Kertes] Of course! They did so even when I was a member of the Serbian Presidency!

[Lopusina] Is there a file on Slobodan Milosevic in the archives of the Yugoslav SDB?

[Kertes] I do not know, I did not have time to look through everything. While I was deputy minister, I asked Gen. Gracanin to let me see some files, but he refused. The general was a very cautious man! He was surrounded by people who to this day admire Zdravko Mustac, so that as minister he had to be careful about what he did.

[Lopusina] The influence of that chief has long been felt in the third Yugoslavia. It is said that Mustac was behind the campaign to expel Croats from Hrtkovci, and even from all of Serbia. Do you have proof of such allegations?

[Kertes] While I was at the SSUP, I ordered the inspectors to uncover the mediator used by Zdravko Mustac and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] to exchange the property of displaced Croats and Serbs, which was carried out at a cost of DM1,000, but to the Serbs' detriment. We succeeded in discovering that Reverend Kraljevic was behind these and similar

exchanges, but also behind the HDZ and ZNG [Croatian National Guard Corps] sympathizers in Hrtkovci.

Minister Again

[Lopusina] It is said that you arrived in Hrtkovci wearing a red beret, as leader of the police forces?

[Kertes] That is not true. I am not a commander, nor a member of any special or paramilitary unit. I do have a red beret, and I am very proud of it!

[Lopusina] In the last elections, you again won a seat as deputy in the People's Assembly of Serbia. Now you are also a member of the Committee for Kosovo. It is being said, however, that you would like to be minister of the federal police to which you brought order.

[Kertes] I am 47 years old and have achieved plenty in life. I am not a man of function, nor of politics, because my behavior in that has been suicidal. However, I will not turn down any job entrusted to me either by the Serbian government or by the people, i.e., the voters. My obsession is for all Serbs to live in one state and for all of us in this territory to agree on our national interests once and for all. Personally, I want this Panic trial to be over as soon as possible so that I can take my fate back into my own hands.

Before he was appointed director of the Federal Customs Administration, Mihalj Kertes was evicted from his police apartment on Banovo Hill and moved to a parliamentary deputies' settlement in Vidikovac. He lives there with his wife Mira and his two daughters, who like to chat with journalists when they come looking for him at home. However, since Kertes has changed his phone number, it is increasingly difficult to find him, and having learned his lesson from experience, he too finds it increasingly difficult to talk to the press. Officially, he is too busy; unofficially, he does not want to risk again falling into disfavor within the SPS because of his tongue.

Issue of Division of SFRY Assets Examined

95BA0003A Belgrade SRPSKA REC in Serbo-Croatian
26 Sep 94 pp 16-17

[Article by Radmilo Cobovic: "You Can Keep the Debts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Peace, which, as least as matters stand at the moment, is finally on the horizon, marks the end of only one-half of the dirty job related to disintegration of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. The second part, which takes place at the negotiating table, has lasted almost as long as the war, but there is no end of it in sight. This is the **succession of the second Yugoslavia**. This legal process, which has lasted with intermissions of varying length since 1991 (when the Badinter Commission found that the SFRY no longer existed) has had its notable ups and downs, but it is also a fact that so far none of the former Yugoslav republics has managed to get absolutely what it wanted.

The last episode was rejection by the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] of the most recent agreement proposed in early September by the succession group of the International Conference on Yugoslavia in Geneva. This was just at the point when it seemed the stalemate would be broken.

The **legal basis**, that is, the **legality of territorial changes**, has paramount importance under the international public law of succession. It is also important whether the state has ceased to exist **altogether**, or the changes affect only **part** of its territory. Most of the dispute has been about these two things. The FRY contests the legal basis, the legality, of the separation of the former socialist republics, federal units within the framework of the former SFRY, asserting that this is secession contrary to international law. They, however, now already internationally recognized as states, deny this. As for complete disappearance, the FRY has said from the beginning that it is the legal successor of the SFRY as a state entity.

But since the actual state of disintegration is irrefutable, however and on what basis it occurred, there remains the **division of property**. But this is all the more difficult if the two previous issues have not been resolved. The confrontation of two views—the Yugoslav and Croatian—is the best illustration of this.

Percentages of Discord

According to Kosta Mihajlovic, member of the academy, who heads the Yugoslav group for succession, the essence is that everything that was the object of **joint investment** must also be the object of **joint division**. The property of the state which is subject to division, according to the official view of our delegation, consists of all investment projects financed from the budget from the end of the last world war to the disintegration of the SFRY. The Croatian approach, erroneous and unacceptable according to Mihajlovic, is that state property comprises everything that was under control of the Federation. He believes that this approach would be appropriate for states in which investments are private, but that is not the case with the former SFRY. Mihajlovic says that "the Croatian approach, according to which the 1974 Constitution made a clear division of republic and federal property, is unacceptable. This is something the Croats cannot prove."

In any case, the most important thing is first to establish the value of all the property of the former federal state. It was in this connection that the most important dispute took on amplitude early last year, when the former Yugoslav republics, now new states, were delivered the report of the team of experts from well-known European firms for appraisal of state property. The agreement was that the delegation of each state would make a declaration of the property it wanted, and also would contest what seemed to it to be dubious and debatable.

According to estimates, the property for division amounts to about **\$100 billion**, while the minus, that is,

the debts, are about \$36 billion. This is divided into six groups, while the value of the seventh group—the inventory of war damage—has not been estimated.

A division has also been proposed according to how much each state owed the International Monetary Fund. Under international law, when a state disintegrates or is divided into several independent states, the successor-states are jointly and severally liable for the debt. The criteria for division of the debt are, first of all, **economic capacity, area of territory, and finally, population.**

Public facilities, railroads, ships, financial resources, public buildings, and so on, which were on the territory of an earlier state and belonged to that state are by the nature of things transferred to the new state. The successor state has complete freedom of disposition of those assets. If those assets are burdened with debt, the state is required to discharge those obligations. The same applies to the public property located outside the territory of a state that no longer exists. If this becomes an issue, the state on whose territory the assets are located has the right of temporary administration, but not the right of appropriation or arbitrary division of assets. That is what the law says, but this is how the proposed sketch of division of property in percentages looks.

According to the original version, **Slovenia would get 16.39 percent, the FRY 36.50 percent, Croatia 28.49 percent, Bosnia and Herzegovina 13.20 percent, and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] 5.4 percent of Yugoslav property.** Following the Macedonian protest, a modified proposal was drawn up. In the new version Slovenia gets 16 percent of the value of the property, the FRY 35.3 percent, Croatia 27.2 percent, Bosnia and Herzegovina 13 percent, and Macedonia 8.5 percent. Macedonia protested once again, demanding that the size of the population be the criterion for division. An agreement has not been reached.

Even the Dowry in Common?

The FRY has also called for the assets for division to include all investment projects of the Federation in what then were the socialist republics. According to domestic estimates, there were about 6,000 of them, but a list of about 2,600 investment projects financed from the SFRY budget was delivered to the international commission. The others issued a unanimous objection: **state property is only what federal bodies and agencies were using at the time when the republics left the SFRY.**

If this latter view is accepted, then the assets for division would also include the capital which Serbia contributed as founder to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and through it to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and finally also to the SFRY, which now would supposedly be divided up as a joint acquisition! Which is not only illogical, it is intolerable. The intention, however, is altogether understandable. We will illustrate this with the so-called diplomatic real estate abroad of the former SFRY, today the FRY. The records on all that property, the original

documents, and the deeds, are deposited in the vault of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, but its value is relative, since it is growing with each passing day! Another issue is what the status will be of valuable properties that were personal gifts from one statesman to another, or the private gifts to the royal family and the property of the royal family outside the country, which until recently was used by diplomats of the SFRY, and now the FRY.

For example, the luxurious Yugoslav residence, formerly of the SFRY, today of the FRY, in Paris, alongside the Palais Chaillot, was a gift from the French government to King Alexander Karadjordjevic. It cost between seven and 10 million dollars to build, but if it were auctioned, say, at current real estate prices, it might be sold, together with its lot, for more than \$50 million! Or the embassy in Cairo, at No. 33 Monsur Mohamed Street. A magnificent edifice which King Peter II Karadjordjevic purchased. In Egypt there is also the immense building of the residence which Gamal Abdel Nasser gave to Josip Broz.

As for division of the so-called diplomatic property of the former Yugoslavia, which is not in dispute, there are two versions circulating. Depending on whether an agreement is reached. The first is for the property that is part of the assets for division to be distributed according to criteria that will be established in Geneva, and the other, simpler, version—if there is no agreement—is for sale and distribution of the money.

One of the possible ways of resolving the matters at issue is through an international commission that would have several months to offer solutions after establishing all the indisputable facts. If there is no result even after that, an international arbitration commission might be formed.

Alongside resolution of the dispute over the division of property, attention must also be paid to those previous issues we mentioned at the beginning; in one way or another they are present in every version of a proposed solution. For example, last week when Academician Mihajlovic addressed Alf Johnson, chairman of the working group for succession of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, to reject the most recent proposal, he said that it "flagrantly evades the history, the relations, the facts, and the real state of affairs." One of the objections is why the name Federal [Savezna] Republic of Yugoslavia, which preserves the continuity of the SFRY, has been re-christened the Federal [Federalna] Republic of Yugoslavia. This might seem like a technicality, since "federalna" (*foederalis* in Latin) means "pertaining to a federation, federal," it is nevertheless the internal affair of a (our) state. And if we give in on those matters, allow a compromise, the door will be opened to the imposition of compromises—which, when it comes to the property, could take the form of losses—concerning other issues as well.

We may have differing political convictions and views, differing visions of the way out of the economic crisis, we may favor the party in power or the opposition, we may dispute both the grounds and motives of the FRY being

the legal entity that succeeds and continues the existence of the SFRY as a legal entity, but there must be no difference over what belongs to Serbia and Montenegro. It is a part of the national interest to get the best possible material score in the division of assets, which certainly will be on the agenda for years to come. And the criteria for participation in that legal game—along with great patience—are not internal, based on politics and party, but they are exclusively bound up with knowledge and ability.

Belgrade Weekly on Pope's Call for Unity

94BA0421A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 16 Sep 94
p 9

[Commentary by Slobodan Reljic: "God's Will"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There has been too little time for analysts, in footnotes to the pope's speeches in Croatia, to determine the exact chapter and page of origin of these enthusiastic ideas: "We are all *brothers* and we must remain *brothers*.... No one can avoid the course of *unity and peace*." The emphasis is the editor's, but the general impression is that the writers of the pope's Zagreb "encyclics" (circulars, epistles) made ample use of the 50-volume (?) Collected Works of J.B. Tito. Yes, reporters recount, the pope "condemned the nationalistic intolerance that is starting wars in the former Yugoslavia." The Holy Father emphasized that "the future lies in cooperation and solidarity" and that "the progress and well-being of the nations in the Balkans have only one name—peace."

If he is sitting in some heavenly "Lux," drinking whiskey on the rocks, staring at his massive gold ring, Josip Broz must have been proud when Karol Wojtyla confronted the enraptured Croats with the amazing knowledge that they learned during his days in geography class from the book with that picture of Skrgin on the first page: "The Sava rises in Slovenia, flows through Croatia and past Bosnia-Herzegovina, and empties into the Danube in Serbia." And more: "In this metaphor, we can almost see the footsteps along the trail that God wants you to follow at this difficult moment in history." The only difference is that Tito did not wait for the Lord, but himself led proletarian brigades along the trail "at a difficult moment in history."

Naturally, the question remains of who hid this charitable knowledge from the Holy Father during the years of our Lord 1991, 1992, and 1993—or is it that "the greatest son of our nations and nationalities" wrote too much and that it has only now been sifted through in the "cells of the Vatican"? This question remains, but an answer to it in this situation would not change anything. When someone gropes to find his way in this darkness, he should not be pushed over a cliff because he previously spoke and acted differently, should he?

Franjo Tudjman, who must have felt at least 30 years younger next to Karol Wojtyla this 11 September, will nevertheless not have an easy time once the enthusiasm

settles down. Because what has remained of the "independent thousand-year culture" after the reminder that the "nations of these regions have for centuries achieved an exchange in the areas of culture, art, language, and writing" and that "during the past centuries more ties have been interwoven among the nations in this region than between any other nations in Europe"? And now it is necessary to "urgently bring together everything that unites—and there is no small amount of that—and in that way build new perspectives for brotherly solidarity." Even worse, Pope John Paul II abstained from principled messages and metaphors and with his charitable voice called on people "who are responsible for public authority over this noble nation" to "always follow, encouraged by the support of the international community, the course of peace in finding solutions to difficult, sensitive, and still-unresolved questions." But to avoid general confusion, the Holy Father identified the most important question in even more concrete terms: "the one relating to the establishment of sovereignty in the entire national territory, the return of refugees, and the reconstruction of that which has been destroyed by war."

It will be difficult for General Tudjman, and he will probably regret a hundred times over returning to the faith after a leisurely and godless life. Now his options are either to renounce, with scorn and through the newspapers, everything that he has held to be "most sacred" in the past—which is no problem whatsoever for contemporary Balkan rulers—or to attack the pope and clearly let the populace know that there is in fact only one "father of the nation."

What can the Croats, who have waited 817 years for the pope, say? (The last head of the Roman Catholic Church who came to Zadar was in 1117.) They had only just found someone who told them that they were European, and then the pope came and told them that they and the Serbs are brothers. And even more: "Have the courage to forgive and accept others.... Forgiveness means freeing your hearts of feelings of revenge that are incompatible with the civilization of love." So whose side is the pope on? Forgive what? For years now, both the people "responsible for public authority" and priests have taught them that the Serbs have exploited them, oppressed them, held them in the "prison of nations." Yes, some people immediately said that Wojtyla "had to say the things that he did because he is the pope." It is no problem to recognize here the inexhaustible Balkan ability to immediately disparage everything in every way. Some in turn said that Wojtyla is a "utopist." But it has been noted that "the pope's appeals for reconciliation in the Balkans, expressed during mass, were heard in an atmosphere of confusion, and that they were not received with applause."

In fact, even the pope was not very happy about the fact that his "Yugoslav tour" was reduced to holding a chaotic church ceremony at the Zagreb hippodrome and fleeing the embrace of the tireless Tudjman. Like any

politician of action today, John Paul II was most interested in Belgrade. Nevertheless, all that remained of the momentous, secret diplomatic mission was the comment that Milosevic was "for," while the Serbian Church was "against." Thus, the Serbian Church cannot seriously thwart Milosevic, but it can thwart the pope.

And then there is Sarajevo. But there too, things are changing. The Muslims are no longer the naive allies that they were when the war began. They have grown stronger. They fire at planes landing at Butmir and disrupt the water supply to Sarajevo, while the Washington federation, confederation, or whatever it is, hangs by a thread. Izetbegovic accuses the HVO [Croat Defense Council]; Zubak responds in an open letter: "The Muslims are working against the federation." There is shooting in Mostar, shooting in Vitez, the Muslims ban the activities of the Croat cultural society "Napredak" in Bugojno, Herceg-Bosna threatens a blockade on transportation.... And world press agencies reported from Islamabad on the "passionate appeal by Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic to the foreign ministers of Islamic countries." Thus, it is no longer important to simply go to that sort of Sarajevo.

So the "bird in the hand" was left. Zagreb waited with an open heart. The authorities believed that Karol Wojtyla would somewhat eclipse the "dark points"—from De Michelis and Mitterrand who finally acknowledged that this sort of breakup of Yugoslavia should not have been allowed, to Kinkel (and long live Genscher!) who has told them that the Germans too had to wait half a century to be united. But the pope turned his coat inside out. Only he did not do the folk dance and sing the song deeply implanted in South Slavic genes: "Comrade Tito, we swear to you" and he did not point out the famous road—the one to Kumrovec—to the formal young man driving the popemobile.

All that remains is Kohl. If he in fact remains. Simply put, a real Croat no longer has anyone to rely on. And that is what this papal visit has given Croatia. That instead of angry bullets, the Serbs should be given kisses. And whatever must be, will be. As has always been the case throughout history.

Serbia

DS President Djindjic Urges Partition of Bosnia

AU1710153794 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 17 Oct 94

[Report by Svetlana Zivkovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Democratic Party [DS] President Zoran Djindjic today held a news conference for domestic and foreign journalists in TANJUG's International Press Center. Svetlana Zivkovic reports:

[Zivkovic] In his conversation with journalists, Zoran Djindjic focused on the currently most topical move by the DS, a draft bill on the compulsory registration of politicians' personal assets.

According to Zoran Djindjic, the party has decided to make this move in order to avoid any possible financial scandals that could be used to compromise parties. So far only the party president has submitted a list of the assets that he owns. However, he did not answer a journalist's question on how he had acquired the assets on his list.

Regarding the party's policy, Djindjic said that the DS is a party of radical reforms and the opponent of all those forces who want the return of the system that existed before 1990, a system that meant a monopoly in the media, personnel policy, and the economy.

Commenting on the policy of Alija Izetbegovic, the DS leader stressed that the aim of the Muslim side is to create a unified Bosnia. Djindjic said that the war will not end until the international community clearly says that Bosnia-Herzegovina will be divided into two confederal parts.

Commenting on the statement by Klaus Kinkel that the further lifting of sanctions on Yugoslavia must be made conditional on the recognition of Croatia and Bosnia within their AVNOJ [Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders, Djindjic stressed that Yugoslavia, which is not recognized, has no obligation to recognize anyone. He also said that, if the Contact Group were to accept Kinkel's demands, this would mean that the process of adding conditions is infinite.

Draskovic Sees Bosnian Serbs 'Dragged' Into War

AU1710170594 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Oct 94 p 12

[Beta report: "Draskovic: People No Longer Want To Die"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Vuk Draskovic, stated today that "what the leadership of the Srpska republic is doing is not geared toward the realization of Serbian national interest."

Taking part in a Radio Kragujevac program "Pecat Vremena" [Sign of the Times], Draskovic assessed that everything is subordinated to "their personal problems" and emphasized that "nobody takes into account the sacrifices and suffering of the people in whose name everything is being done."

"The leaders of the Srpska republic are not interested in the greater Serbia, but only in themselves becoming unlimited bosses and they are trying to conceal how much this will cost the Serbian people," he said.

"What is the most important thing, namely human lives, has been completely neglected. What good will territories and percentages do if we lose people?" the SPO leader concluded.

"The people no longer want to die, and this constitutes them being dragged forcefully into a war," Vuk Draskovic emphasized in the interview for Radio Kragujevac.

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